University of Memphis

University of Memphis Digital Commons
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
6-19-2012

The Problem of Perception, Radical Reflection, and The Body:
Towards Understanding Merleau-Ponty's Post-Kantian
Transcendental Philosophy
Arsalan Memon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Memon, Arsalan, "The Problem of Perception, Radical Reflection, and The Body: Towards Understanding
Merleau-Ponty's Post-Kantian Transcendental Philosophy" (2012). Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
511.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd/511

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by University of Memphis Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of
Memphis Digital Commons. For more information, please contact khggerty@memphis.edu.

THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION, RADICAL REFLECTION, AND THE BODY:
TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING MERLEAU-PONTY’S POST-KANTIAN
TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY
by
Arsalan Memon

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Philosophy

The University of Memphis
August 2012

Copyright © 2012 Arsalan Memon
All rights reserved

ii

À ma mère

ii

Acknowledgements

The completion of the dissertation is made possible by the support of the
following people. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my
co-directors, Thomas J. Nenon and Mary Beth Mader, for being patient and providing
guidance throughout the entire dissertation project. I would also like to thank the
committee members, Sarah Clark Miller and Stephan Blatti, for their encouraging words
and constructive criticisms. Special thanks go to Hugh J. Silverman, Edward S. Casey,
and my other committee members—Leonard Lawlor and Bryan A. Smyth—to all whom I
owe much of my knowledge of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Len’s unsurpassed
knowledge of Merleau-Ponty has been invaluable in writing this dissertation. For the past
four years, I have also worked closely with Bryan to better understand Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophy. In personal conversations, seminars, and reading groups, Bryan has spent
countless hours discussing Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy with me. To all of the committee
members of my dissertation, I owe them a debt that I can never repay.
In addition to the members of my dissertation committee, I am also grateful to
Deborah Tollefsen (my teaching mentor), Timothy Roche, John Tienson, Bill Lawson,
Hoke Robinson, Kas Saghafi, Pleshette DeArmitt, Remy Debes, and Robert Bernasconi
for significantly contributing to the philosophical training that I have received in the
Department of Philosophy at University of Memphis.
In the past five years, I have also benefited from the thought-provoking,
philosophical conversations that I have had with the following fellow graduate students:
Matthew Lexow, Heidi Samuelson, Desirée Ramacus-Bushnell, Nicolás Garrera, Maia

iv

Nahele, Cigdem Yazici, Tina Botts, Michael Burroughs, Jon Dodds, Daniel Larkin,
Jasmine Wallace, Alice Everly, Cheri Carr, Janea Sholtz, and Ronke Oke. Amit Sen has
been a great friend and I thank him for being generous with his time and insights on
Hegel’s philosophy. Appreciation must be given to the staff members in the Department
of Philosophy at University of Memphis. Thanks to both Cathy Wilhelm and Connie
Diffee for making my graduate study a pleasant and smooth experience.
I would also like to thank my immediate and distant family. Thanks to my
paternal uncle, Aamir Nizamuddhin Memon, for instilling the passion for philosophy.
Thanks to my maternal grandmother, uncles, and aunts—Khalid, Adil, Abid, Zahid,
Shahid, Rashida, Parveen, Ejaz, Hamida—for contributing to my intellectual and
personal growth. Thanks to my first love and my best friend, Farrah, for never giving up
on me and for always loving me unconditionally. Thanks to my brothers and sisters—
Abdul, Salman, Anny, and Noorulain—for believing in me and for being there for me,
especially when I needed them the most. Thanks to my parents for financially and
morally supporting me throughout my life. Without their constant support and prayers, I
would not be where I am in my life today.
Last, but not least, thanks to Allah for blessing me with this life and for giving me
the capacity to critically think and to write this dissertation. Without his mercy and grace,
this dissertation would have never been written. If I forgot someone in this
acknowledgement, I apologize in advance.

v

Abstract
Memon, Arsalan. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2012. The Problem
of Perception, Radical Reflection, and the Body: Towards Understanding MerleauPonty’s Post-Kantian Transcendental Philosophy. Major Professors: Thomas J. Nenon
and Mary Beth Mader.

Merleau-Ponty is typically known for his account of embodiment or what it
means to be a body. In the dissertation, I argue that what Merleau-Ponty means by a body
has not been adequately understood because the framework in which it must be
understood has been either ignored or inadequately interpreted. My central interpretive
thesis is that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a body must be understood within a
transcendental framework. To substantiate the central interpretive thesis, in Chapter 1, I
examine Merleau-Ponty’s proposal for a post-Kantian transcendental philosophy with
which The Structure of Behavior ends. I maintain that at the basis of this proposal is what
Merleau-Ponty calls the Hegelian “problem of perception,” or the problem of
knowing how individual organisms can integrate their own historical emergence. In
Chapter 2, I then show that in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty offers
“radical reflection” as a new transcendental method to solve the problem of perception.
The method is transcendental because it seeks to understand the genesis of its own
operations. I claim that in radical reflection lies a response to the problem of perception
because it reveals temporality as the transcendental condition par excellence that explains
the historical emergence or genesis of individual organisms. With the transcendental
framework provided in Chapters 1 and 2, in Chapter 3, I turn to interpret Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of a body within such a framework. I argue that Merleau-Ponty offers a novel
theory of what it means to be a body where the body is reduced neither to a collection of
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biological or material organs nor to a first-person lived experience perspective, but is
fundamentally understood as a transcendental structure that generates time in the sense of
a synthesis in transition. This dissertation concludes by suggesting that Merleau-Ponty’s
post-Kantian transcendental philosophy is a philosophy that describes the phenomenon of
the real, which is historical genesis. Overall, a transcendental reading of Merleau-Ponty
is meant to serve both as a plausible interpretation of the Phenomenology of Perception
and as a defensible theory of what it means to be a body (i.e. embodied).
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Introduction:

What Does Merleau-Ponty Mean by a Body?

§ 1. Synopsis

What does Merleau-Ponty mean by a body? Prima facie, it may perhaps seem
strange that this question is still raised more than half a century after the publication of
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. What Merleau-Ponty in the “Preface” to
the Phenomenology of Perception said about the very question of phenomenology
itself—“What is Phenomenology?”—can very well be said about our initial question: that
such a question has not been adequately answered (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxx/7).1 It is my
contention that our initial question—what does Merleau-Ponty mean by a body?—has
not been adequately answered because the framework in which Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of a body is to be understood has been either ignored or inadequately interpreted. I argue
that this framework is a transcendental framework and that it is only within such a
framework that the body should be understood. Such a transcendental framework is
ignored or inadequately interpreted mainly, but not exclusively, because the relation
between The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of Perception is either
ignored or inadequately interpreted. I read both books together and my reading
presupposes a continuity between both texts. My position is not unique in calling for a
transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a body. Instead, as we will see
1

The first page number refers to the English edition of the Phenomenology of Perception
and the second to the French edition. Full references to both editions may be found in the
bibliography.
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throughout the dissertation—especially in the final conclusion—the uniqueness of my
position lies in the manner in which I offer a transcendental interpretation of MerleauPonty’s notion of a body.
Since the publication of the Phenomenology of Perception, there have been many
suggestions as to what Merleau-Ponty means by a body. I will discuss such suggestions
shortly. The point of this discussion is neither to be exhaustive nor to critically engage in
any detailed manner with such thinkers. Instead, it is to serve as a frame of reference
against which my transcendental interpretation should be judged. Also, as we will see, it
is not entirely clear if most of these thinkers are aware of Merleau-Ponty’s definition of
the body as is it explicitly stated in the Phenomenology of Perception, notably, the body
as that which generates time (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 249/287). As a side note, it must be
mentioned at the very outset that I will briefly discuss only the sources that I take to be
relevant to the issue at hand. A relevant source for me is one where a particular author
has something to say about Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a body and/or the possibility of
interpreting Merleau-Ponty in a transcendental manner (or the lack thereof). In other
words, my goal is not to give an exhaustive overview of the secondary literature on
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a body.
In what follows, in section 2, I first begin with the general interpretations of
Merleau-Ponty that are explicitly transcendental. I call these interpretations, “direct
transcendental interpretations of Merleau-Ponty.” In section 3, I then discuss the
interpretations that either do not exclude a transcendental interpretation per se or only
mention in passing that Merleau-Ponty’s position can be interpreted in a transcendental
manner. I call these interpretations, “quasi-transcendental interpretations of Merleau-
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Ponty.” Next, in section 4, I briefly present interpretations of Merleau-Ponty that are not
direct interpretations of Merleau-Ponty. Such interpretations take certain notions in
Merleau-Ponty’s corpus as attempts to rethink particular transcendental themes or
problems. As a side note, Merleau-Ponty’s corpus can be divided into three periods: the
early period or the “Pre-Sorbonne period (1938-1949)” writings, the middle period or the
“Sorbonne period (1949-1952)” writings, and the later period or the “Collège de France
period (1952-1961)” writings.2 I call these interpretations, “indirect transcendental
interpretations of Merleau-Ponty.” It is my hope that with such a discussion, it will
become clear how my transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty differs from other
positions.

§ 2. Direct Transcendental Interpretations of Merleau-Ponty

In his book Phenomenological Epistemology, Henry Pietersma interprets Husserl,
Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty as belonging to the transcendental tradition that was
inaugurated by Immanuel Kant, with their respective differences from one another and
from Kant (Pietersma 2000, 12). Pietersma justifies this interpretation by pointing to the
fact that all three phenomenologists have something in common: they all argue against
realism sensu stricto or the philosophical position where consciousness, if there is one,
mirrors a mind-independent world (Pietersma 2000, 12-3).3 Pietersma argues that

Such a useful distinction is made by Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor. See “Editor’s
Introduction,” The Merleau-Ponty Reader, translated and edited by Ted Toadvine and Leonard
Lawlor (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), xiii-xv.
2

In “Phenomenology as a dialectic between the transcendental and the descriptive,” the
second section of the “Conclusion” to the book Phenomenology and the Social World: The
3

3

Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception is primarily a work in epistemology or
theory of knowledge (Pietersma 2000, 141) and that “the criticism of Husserl is a
convenient point of departure for an epistemological study of Merleau-Ponty” (Pietersma
2000, 127).4
Pietersma interprets Husserl as providing an epistemology based on a
consciousness that remains pure or transcendental, which is the constitutive source of
everything. I take it Pietersma means that transcendental consciousness, for Husserl,
constitutes the world by bestowing meaning on it. If Pietersma’s interpretation of Husserl
is accurate, then it would follow that Merleau-Ponty’s “Phenomenology of Perception is
largely devoted to arguments for this rejection”—the rejection of Husserl’s notion of
transcendental consciousness as the constitutive source of the world through its meaningbestowing function (Pietersma 2000, 127). Although Pietersma asserts that the distinctive
mark of any transcendental philosopher, including both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (and
even Kant and Heidegger), is “[g]oing back to origins,” what distinguishes transcendental
philosophers from one another is “where they look for origins” (Pietersma 2000, 33). So
if Husserl looks for the origins of the world in transcendental consciousness, Pietersma
suggests that Merleau-Ponty looks for the origins of the world elsewhere—namely in

Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and its Relation to the Social Sciences, Laurie Spurling, in a very
similar manner to Pietersma, interprets phenomenology in general and Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology in particular as a “transcendental” philosophy (Spurling 1977, 168). Her reason
for such a transcendental interpretation is that “phenomena cannot be understood apart from the
notion of a subject or of consciousness as milieu of the universe” (Spurling 1977, 168). In other
words, both Pietersma and Spurling interpret the phenomenological movement as a rejection of
realism sensu stricto and such a rejection is seen as a fundamental aspect of a transcendental
interpretation of phenomenology in general and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in particular.
4

Throughout the book, Pietersma sees a fundamental discontinuity between Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty on almost every issue, especially on the issue of the body.
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primordial perception (Pietersma 2000, 33). Pietersma claims that by “perception,”
Merleau-Ponty means “an awareness of objects” (Pietersma 2000, 129).
In “Merleau-Ponty’s Idealism,” a section of chapter four, Pietersma argues that
despite Merleau-Ponty’s critical engagement with not only realism but also idealism visà-vis the notion of perception, Merleau-Ponty, at the end of the day remains an idealist
because Merleau-Ponty’s “anti-idealism is still replete with idealist notions” (Pietersma
2000, 163).5 Pietersma, however, qualifies this claim by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s
proximity to and distance from idealism in the broadest sense of the term.
According to Pietersma, Merleau-Ponty is an idealist for the following reasons.
This list includes mainly Merleau-Ponty’s proximity with the idealist tradition, but from
time to time, Pietersma does highlight Merleau-Ponty’s distance from that very same
tradition. It is only within the interpretation of Merleau-Ponty as an anti-idealist who
never gets rid of his “idealist notions” that Pietersma understands Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of a body. Pietersma claims that Merleau-Ponty is an idealist for at least for five
reasons.6

As a side note, in Merleau-Ponty’s doctoral defense of the Phenomenology of
Perception, Jean Beaufret had already raised a similar objection to Merleau-Ponty. I cite
Beaufret’s criticism: “The phenomenological descriptions which he [i.e. Merleau-Ponty] uses in
fact maintain the vocabulary of idealism. In this they are in accord with Husserlian descriptions.
But the whole problem is precisely to know whether phenomenology, fully developed, does not
require the abandonment of subjectivity and the vocabulary of subjective idealism as, beginning
with Husserl, Heidegger has done” (Merleau-Ponty 2007a, 117; my italics).
5

To the best of my knowledge, Thomas Langan’s Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Reason is
the only book in the English language that deals with Merleau-Ponty’s relation to all three of
Kant’s Critiques (i.e. Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of
Judgment). Langan interprets Merleau-Ponty’s entire philosophical project as a “critique of
reason” understood in the Kantian sense or an inquiry that circumscribes the region that
theoretical and practical reason can discuss (Langan 1966, viii). Langan argues that in the
Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty offers a “new transcendental aesthetic” in
contradistinction to the transcendental aesthetics found in the Critique of Pure Reason (Langan
1966, 15). According to Langan, in the Humanism and Terror and The Adventures of the
6
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First, according to Pietersma, given that Merleau-Ponty finds the idea of entities
existing independent of a consciousness highly problematic, it follows that MerleauPonty rejects “classical realism” or realism sensu stricto as a tenable philosophical
position. Yet, at the same time, Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion of a transcendental
subject as constituting the world (Pietersma 2000, 163). Secondly, Merleau-Ponty
believes that radical scepticism requires a response (Pietersma 2000, 163). Thirdly,
objects are exhibited in experience through an “objectification of appearances,”
something that involves concepts (Pietersma 2000, 164). Merleau-Ponty shares with the
transcendental idealist tradition the critique of objective knowledge insofar as it forgets
its own origins. But, for Merleau-Ponty, this origin is not the Kantian or Husserlian
transcendental subject (Pietersma 2000, 164). Even if it is granted that Merleau-Ponty
argues that the “objectification of appearances” requires concepts, it is not entirely clear
to me that that such a move entails that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental philosopher.
This may be true if the concepts in question are a priori concepts. However, neither in the

Dialectic, Merleau-Ponty offers a new practical philosophy, one that is political rather than
ethical, but is similar to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Langan 1966, 15). Lastly, Langan
claims that Merleau-Ponty’s later essays in Signs can be read as a “kind of counterpart of the
Critique of Judgment” (Langan 1966, 15). Like Pietersma, Langan claims that Merleau-Ponty
remains an idealist (Langan 1966, 187). However, Langan’s reasons are different from that of
Pitersma’s. Pietersma says that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental philosopher because he rejects
realism sensu stricto and that Merleau-Ponty is not radical enough in his critique of idealism
(Pietersma 2000, 163). In other words, it is Pietersma’s contention that Merleau-Ponty’s “antiidealism is still replete with idealist notions” (Pietersma 2000, 163). By contrast, Langan argues
that Merleau-Ponty remains an idealist because Merleau-Ponty lacks a robust notion of realism
(Langan 1966, 187). I take it that Langan is perhaps endorsing a realist view or the view that
Merleau-Ponty should have gone further in his critique of both idealism and realism to a truly and
genuinely realist position. In Langan’s words, “[c]ommon sense does presume that it knows
things in themselves; thus its knowledge is merely presumed to be always consistent. The
philosopher should indeed suspend belief in order to investigate the grounds of that presumption.
But must he make a counterpresumption involving the judgment that we can in no sense know the
things in themselves? Is not his task rather to discover whether, and if so to what extent, we do
know, and how (i.e. under what conditions) such knowledge occurs? Such would be, I submit, the
authentically critical attitude” (Langan 1966, 187; all italics are mine).

6

Phenomenology of Perception nor in The Structure of Behavior, does Merleau-Ponty
make such a claim. Pietersma does point out that Merleau-Ponty criticizes the idealist for
reducing everything to concepts. According to Pietersma, Merleau-Ponty fails to discuss
the nature of concepts and the critique of how the idealists understood concepts. Instead,
Pietersma believes that Merleau-Ponty follows the idealists by agreeing with them that
concepts are imposed on the perceptual given rather than exhibited in them (Pietersma
2000, 165-6). Fourthly, Merleau-Ponty places an emphasis on searching for truth, this he
shares with the transcendental or idealist tradition (Pietersma 2000, 165). If MerleauPonty is concerned with the question of truth, does it immediately follow that he is an
idealist? Are there no non-idealists philosophers (e.g. realists) who are interested in truth?
Pietersma fails to make explicit the kind of truth that Merleau-Ponty is interested in. If
such details were provided perhaps we would be in a better position to assess whether
Merleau-Ponty is indeed a transcendental philosopher because of his concern for truth.
Lastly, Merleau-Ponty has been preoccupied with “Kantian and idealist worries about
external relations” (Pietersma 2000, 165). That is to say, in thinking about the relation
between subject and object, Merleau-Ponty rejects the idealist solution because it relies
too much on conceptualization to bridge the gap. However, Merleau-Ponty does agree
with them that external relations are to be rejected in favor of an internal relation between
subject and object, which must be non-conceptual rather than conceptual (i.e. by means
of concepts) (Pietersma 2000, 165).
Although Pietersma discusses Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body throughout
Chapter 4, a thematic discussion of it occurs in a section entitled “Perception and the
Body.” Pietersma begins by bringing to the reader’s attention to the fact that Merleau-
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Ponty’s discussion of the body is in service of clarifying what he means by perception
(Pietersma 2000, 135). The discussion of the body, according to Pietersma, is not only
central for Merleau-Ponty’s epistemology, but for his entire philosophy. Pietersma makes
it very explicit that the body for Merleau-Ponty cannot merely be understood as an object
(Pietersma 2000, 135). In Pietersma’s words, for Merleau-Ponty, “[i]f an objectivist view
of the body were accepted without critique, the body would be the object that always
stands between us and all other sensible objects” (Pietersma 2000, 135). It must be
pointed out that although Pietersma is aware of Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the
phenomenal and objective body, he, however, does not follow it, at least not in any
rigorous fashion. I say this because in contradistinction to the objective body, Pietersma
does say that Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the “embodied percipience,” which I take
to be roughly equivalent with what Merleau-Ponty calls the phenomenal body (Pietersma
2000, 136).
According to Pietersma, the embodied percipience “functions in the subjectivity
of the perceiver, the body is that by virtue of which there are for us sensible objects”
(Pietersma 2000, 135). Pietersma contends that the body-subject is that through which
one has any kind of awareness of the world, especially sensible entities. Pietersma
highlights the interrelation of the phenomenal body (i.e. body-subject) and objective body
by remarking on the fact that one’s own body can be perceived by others and at the same
time, it can also become an object of one’s awareness through touching oneself and being
touched by oneself (Pietersma 2000, 136). Pietersma recognizes that for Merleau-Ponty
the body can indeed be examined in a scientific way as an object, but Pietersma quickly
points out that in so doing the “body-subject—i.e. its distinctive cognitivity—is lost from
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sight” (Pietersma 2000, 136). By “distinctive cognitivity,” I take Pietersma to mean the
body’s corporeal reflexivity or the capacity that the body possesses of feeling itself from
within and/or feeling other things from without (i.e. double sensation). As a matter of
fact, for Pietersma, what distinguishes a body-subject from an objective body (or how it
can be viewed by others and examined scientifically) and from inanimate objects is this
touching-touched relation or double sensation (Pietersma 2000, 136).
Pietersma sees that the connection or relation between the body-subject and the
objective body is established through the idea of “function” and specifically, through the
body-subject’s function in double sensation (Pietersma 2000, 136). That is to say, the
very same body can function as being given from a first-person perspective, that is, as a
phenomenal or “cognitive subject” (Pietersma 2000, 136). By the same token, the very
same body can be given from a third-person perspective, that is, as objective or
“cognitive object” (Pietersma 2000, 136). The body can reverse its roles without ever
completely becoming one or the other.7 This is why Pietersma claims that “[t]he body can
therefore never be reduced to an object without losing its function as a subject”
(Pietersma 2000, 136). Pietersma is suggesting that the body, because it can
simultaneously touch and be touched will always involve a hiatus [écart] between the
body as phenomenal or as subject and the body as objective or as object. And that this
hiatus [écart] can never be dissolved or bridged without reducing the phenomenal body
to the objective body or vice versa.

7

He further substantiates this claim by turning to The Visible and the Invisible and sheds
light on the fact that the functional reversibility between the touching hand (the subjective, active
side) and the touched hand (the objective, passive side) is always on the verge of coincidence, but
never reaches it (Pietersma 2000, 136; Cf. Merleau-Ponty 2000b 194).
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According to Pietersma, it is precisely because the body has this double functional
role that it has access to itself as an object and the sensible entities in the world
(Pietersma 2000, 137). If the self were a disembodied consciousness, it would not have
epistemic access to a sensible world. Even though Pietersma does not make this point
clear, it can still be said that he does see a continuity between the epistemology of the
Phenomenology of Perception and the ontology of The Visible and the Invisible, and this
continuity is established by the centrality of the function of double sensation in both
works (Pietersma 2000, 136). Overall, the phenomenal body or embodied percipience for
Pietersma is different from the objective body. And such a distinction is central to
understanding Merleau-Ponty’s epistemology. As Pietersma remarks on Merleau-Ponty:
“[h]is theory [of] knowledge begins from embodied percipience and introduces its
account of things in a phenomenological mode, namely, as the acknowledgment of certain
powers in fact possessed by the body-regarded-as-subject” (Pietersma 2000, 155).
Although Pietersma interprets Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental philosopher,
Pietersma explicitly states that for Merleau-Ponty the phenomenal body is not a “form of
transcendental subjectivity” (Pietersma 2000, 136). To bolster his claim, he says that the
phenomenal body is not a transcendental subject because in the transcendental tradition,
the “subjectivity that conditions knowledge is accessible to itself in reflection” (Pietersma
2000, 136). He cites Husserl’s transcendental consciousness and argues that cognitive
capacities of transcendental consciousness are “cognitively examined” in order to see if
they are adequate enough for the production of knowledge (Pietersma 2000, 136).
Pietersma thinks that this is not the case with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body-subject
because the capacities of the embodied percipience are not given in transparency. The
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only way to know the capacities of a body-subject or what it can do is by “actually using
it” (Pietersma 2000, 136). Pietersma juxtaposes the body-subject over against
transcendental subjectivity for at least two reasons. On the one hand, Pietersma sees
transcendental subjectivity as not part of the natural world that it constitutes or conditions
(Pietersma 2000, 136). On the other hand, Pietersma believes that we cannot observe the
body-subject in a detached manner because such an observation will make the bodysubject an object of reflection (Pietersma 2000, 136). But since the body-subject is
neither purely subject nor purely object, Pietersma argues that one cannot observe it like
one would observe or make transcendental subjectivity an object of thought (Pietersma
2000, 136).
This is why he suggests that one knows one’s body-subject only through one’s
comportment in the world through it (Pietersma 2000, 136). To put it differently,
theoretically reflecting on the body by analyzing it and practically engaging in the world
with it are two completely different things on Pietersma’s account. Thus, Pietersma
argues that the body-subject or the phenomenal body is and cannot be a transcendental
subject. I take it that Pietersma is not saying that the body can never be interpreted as a
transcendental subject or consciousness.8 Instead, since he takes Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of the phenomenal body contra Husserl’s notion of transcendental subjectivity (and
perhaps even that of Kant’s to an extent), I take this to mean that Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of the phenomenal body or body-subject can perhaps be interpreted in a transcendental
sense as long as it is not interpreted as a transcendental consciousness in either Husserl’s

8

He does not distinguish between a transcendental subject and a transcendental
consciousness.
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sense or that of Kant’s. Thus, it is my contention that Pietersma leaves a door open for a
transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the phenomenal body.
In the “Editor’s Introduction” to Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings,
Thomas Baldwin interprets Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental idealist (Baldwin 2003,
6).9 Baldwin qualifies this claim. According to Baldwin, Merleau-Ponty’s “transcendental
idealism” is not an idealism based on pure or absolute consciousness (Baldwin 2003, 6;
cf. 8) mainly because Baldwin interprets Merleau-Ponty to be rejecting a notion of pure
transcendental subject or a subject that constitutes the world and that would exist outside
of it (Baldwin 2003, 12).10 Instead, Baldwin maintains that Merleau-Ponty’s
transcendental idealism is one that is based on the “body” where the body serves as the
condition that makes possible a perceptual world (Baldwin 2003, 6). In Baldwin’s words,
Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental idealist because he seeks to show that the “phenomenal
body” plays “an active role in our experience of the world” and that the phenomenal body
“is apt to fill the role of transcendental subject” (Baldwin 2003, 15).
Baldwin believes that Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior is closer to Kant’s
transcendental idealism than Hegel’s absolute idealism (Baldwin 2003, 6). His reason is that
Merleau-Ponty is concerned with perception and “Hegel would have regarded Merleau-Ponty’s
emphasis on the role of perception in his account of the status and identification of” the forms of
matter, life, and mind as “excessively subjectivist” (Baldwin 2003, 4). Another reason why
Baldwin reads Merleau-Ponty as closer to Kant than to Hegel is because Baldwin thinks that
Merleau-Ponty’s figure/ground distinction is similar but not identical to Kant’s a priori forms of
intuition because the former is “less abstract” than the latter. By “less abstract” I take Baldwin to
mean that the figure/ground structure functions as a structure rather than an a priori form of the
“lived world of ordinary experience” (Baldwin 2003, 5). More so, Baldwin argues that although
there are indeed “a priori forms” in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy they, however, are not the ones
found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, instead Baldwin argues that such a priori forms would
function like Kant’s notion of “reflective judgment” from the Critique of Judgment (Baldwin
2003, 5).
9

10

According to Baldwin, the figures associated with a kind of transcendental idealism
that Merleau-Ponty rejects are Alain, Léon Brunschvicg, Pierre Lachièze-Rey, and Husserl
(Baldwin 2003, 12). Insofar as Husserl is concerned, Baldwin does mention that Merleau-Ponty
“sometimes” associates Husserl with the transcendental idealism that Merleau-Ponty rejects
(Baldwin 2003, 12).
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On Baldwin’s reading, the phenomenal body functions like a transcendental
subject in the sense that both impose meaning on the world (Baldwin 2003, 18; cf. 19).11
Baldwin quickly points out that there is indeed a difference between the two: “My body
is that meaningful core which behaves like a general function, and which nevertheless
exists, and is susceptible to disease” (Baldwin 2003, 18). I take it that for Baldwin the
fundamental difference between the body and a pure transcendental subject is that the
former does not exist outside the world it constitutes.
Baldwin claims that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenal/objective body distinction is
almost identical to Husserl’s Leib/Körper distinction from Ideas II (Baldwin 2003, 25; cf.
Husserl 1989, 64).12 It is almost identical and not perfectly identical because there are
some differences between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl vis-à-vis their respective notions of
the body. According to Baldwin, Husserl privileges the intersubjective aspect of human
beings (i.e. “spirit”) over the subjective aspect (i.e. “psyche”) and that the intersubjective
aspect is fundamentally understood “within the natural science” (Baldwin 2003, 25). By
contrast, Baldwin argues that if the subjective aspect of the human being in MerleauPonty is understood via psychology, this psychology itself is never understood within the
natural science (Baldwin 2003, 25-6). Baldwin further contends that the more
fundamental difference between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is with respect to the issue of

Cf. “[T]his bodily imposition of meaning constitutes the basis for an idealist, or at least
anti-realist, theory of meaning which fills out sketchy immanenist idealism” (Baldwin 2003, 19).
11

12

In 1939, H. L. Van Breda was one of the people in charge of the Husserl Archives at
Louvain. According to Van Breda, Merleau-Ponty, in a letter dated “March 20, 1939,” wrote “I
am currently pursuing a study of the Phenomenology of Perception for which it would be
extremely useful for me to acquaint myself with volume II of the Ideen” (Van Breda 1992, 151).
For a detailed account of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl, see Toadvine 2002, 227-86.
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constituting the world. That is, there is a notion of absolute or pure subject in Husserl
whereas in the Merleau-Ponty there is no such notion (Baldwin 2003, 26).
Like Baldwin, Drew Leder, in his essay, “Merleau-Ponty and the Critique of
Kant,” argues that the body for Merleau-Ponty is a “transcendental organizer of the
world” (Leder 1983, 71). Like Baldwin, Leder interprets The Structure of Behavior as
closer to Kant’s transcendental position than to Hegel’s position. In fact, Leder goes so
far as to say that The Structure of Behavior “is perhaps Merleau-Ponty’s most Kantian
work in its primarily epistemological focus” (Leder 1983, 70; cf. Baldwin 2003, 6). Both
Baldwin and Leder recognize the importance of Kant’s Critique of Judgment over against
the Critique of Pure Reason for Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental position (Leder 1983,
63, 68; cf. Baldwin 2003, 5).
There are, however, differences between Baldwin and Leder insofar as their
respective transcendental interpretations of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body are
concerned. Where Baldwin interprets Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental idealist, Leder
interprets Merleau-Ponty to be a transcendental phenomenologist à la Husserl (especially
the later Husserl—I take it the Husserl of the Crisis of the European Sciences) (Leder
1983, 61, 74; cp. Baldwin 2003, 12, 25-6). In fact, Baldwin explicitly states that MerleauPonty’s phenomenology is not “a form of transcendental phenomenology in Husserl’s
sense” (Baldwin 2003, 30 n. 9). While Baldwin sees a fundamental discontinuity between
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty vis-à-vis their respective notions of the subjects, Leder does
not see such a discontinuity (Baldwin 2003, 12, 2-26; cf. Leder 1983, 74). In fact, Leder
interpret’s Merleau-Ponty’s idiosyncratic reading of Husserl as the position through
which Merleau-Ponty criticizes Kant’s transcendental idealism (Leder 1983, 74). In his
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transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body, Baldwin mentions
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenal/objective body distinction and Husserl’s Leib/Körper
distinction (Baldwin 2003, 25). In his interpretation, Leder does not mention such
distinctions. Leder’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Kant is a more
adequate interpretation because Leder supports his interpretation by citing the relevant
passages on Kant from both The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of
Perception, while Baldwin does not always provide textual support for his claims (Leder
1983, 62, 64-5, 67-9, 73; cf. Baldwin 2003, 4-5, 10, 15, 19). Leder argues that despite
Merleau-Ponty’s efforts of criticizing Kant’s notion of the transcendental subject, in
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is a “residue of subjectivism”
(Leder 1983, 72). In contrast, Baldwin says that despite Merleau-Ponty’s efforts of
criticizing psychologism, Merleau-Ponty’s “phenomenology is in the end a sophisticated
form of psychologism” (Baldwin 2003, 15; cf. 18, 21, 14). Although both Baldwin and
Leder mainly interpret Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body in a transcendental manner
because the body constitutes the world or bestows meaning on it, they differ in how they
understand the bodily constitution of meaning (Baldwin 2003, 18-20, 22; cf. Leder 1983,
62-3, 72-3). While Leder seems to be aware of the importance of already constituted
meaning or historical meaning that the body takes up for Merleau-Ponty, Baldwin is not
aware of this phenomenological insight (Leder 1983, 72-3; Baldwin 2003, 18-20, 22).
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§ 3. Quasi-Transcendental Interpretations of Merleau-Ponty

In his book Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, Martin C. Dillon argues that for MerleauPonty the lived body is “a phenomenal body, an organism that retains its inherence within
the world” (Dillon 1988, 131).13 Dillon does not explain the sense in which the lived
body inheres in the world. According to Dillon, with the notion of the lived body,
Merleau-Ponty incorporates what Dillon takes to be two different, classical conceptions
of the body: the body as mechanistic and the body as intentional (Dillon 1988, 131).
Dillon contends that for Merleau-Ponty “it is rather the case that the same lived body
manifests itself in both roles,” that is, as the “immanent agency of my conscious life and
the transcendence of worldly objects” (Dillon 1988, 143). Dillon’s point is that the lived
body for Merleau-Ponty is simultaneously a conscious subject and a material object,
always reversing or alternating its roles between these two poles. For instance, it can
touch itself as a subject and be touched as a materially (conscious) object. In Dillon’s
view, the distinguishing feature of the lived body is its “corporeal reflexivity,” that it
senses things, which simultaneously involves a sensing of one’s own body and this tacit
awareness of the self is foundational for an explicit, reflective awareness of oneself
(Dillon 1988, 143). If the lived body is the phenomenal body as Dillon points out and if
for Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal body or the intentional body is distinct from the
objective body or the physical body, then Dillon equivocates on the notion of lived body

Although Dillon has scattered references to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived body
throughout his entire book, it is only in “The Lived Body,” the eight chapter of “Part Two—The
Implicit Ontology of the Phenomenology of Perception” that he provides a sustained and detailed
account of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of lived body (Dillon 1988, 130-50). As a side note, in the
entire Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty never employs the phrase, “the lived body”
[“le corps vécu”].
13
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by saying that it is both.14 On the one hand, Dillon says that the lived body is the
phenomenal body (Dillon 1988, 131). On the other hand, Dillon says that the lived body
is both the phenomenal body and the objective body (Dillon 1988, 143).
Dillon clearly states that “[t]he lived body is not a transcendental subject” (Dillon
1988, 147). However, Dillon qualifies this claim. He says that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
lived body must not be understood as functioning in the same way as “the transcendental
ego does for Kant and Husserl, that it is to be conceived as the agency underlying the
organization of experience or as the foundation of transcendental constitution” (Dillon
1988, 146; cf. 147-8). Dillon does not discuss what constitution means for either Kant or
Husserl and whether there are any differences between their uses. In any event, Dillon’s
argument is that one must not interpret Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived body in a
transcendental sense—in the sense of either Kant’s transcendental ego or that of
Husserl’s—mainly because the lived body has, in addition to its meaning bestowing
function, an “interrogative function” or a function of questioning the world and
responding to the world through its “motility” or movement (Dillon 1988, 146). More so,
Dillon believes that the “body does not synthesize the world ex nihilo; the body seeks
understanding from the bodies with which it interacts” (Dillon 1988, 146). I take Dillon
to mean that if for Merleau-Ponty the lived body synthesizes the world, it does not do so
ex nihilo. This would mean that Dillon interprets Kant’s and Husserl’s respective notions
of transcendental ego to be synthesizing the world ex nihilo. Overall, I do not interpret
Dillon as saying that the lived body for Merleau-Ponty cannot be understood in any
transcendental sense; instead, Dillon is making a more nuanced claim, notably, MerleauDillon runs the risk of conflating Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the phenomenal
or the lived body and the objective or the physical body especially when he says that “the lived
body is a body, a worldly object among other worldly objects” (Dillon 1988, 147).
14
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Ponty’s notion of the lived body simply cannot be understood in the same manner as
Kant’s or Husserl’s transcendental ego. Thus, Dillon leaves a door open for interpreting
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body in a transcendental manner.
In his book The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, Renaud
Barbaras argues that the body does not have a place of its own it because the body
occupies a place between subject and object (Barbaras 2004, 7). Barbaras does not devote
a single chapter to a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body. Instead, in “Part
One: Toward Ontology,” the part that is mainly devoted to the Phenomenology of
Perception, Barbaras begins with a critical assessment of the Phenomenology of
Perception as a whole and throughout “Part One,” the discussion of the body emerges
within such a context. So let me first explain the critical assessment and then move on to
discuss how Barbaras understands Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body.
In “The Dualism of Phenomenology of Perception,” Chapter 1 of “Part One” of
The Being of Phenomenon, Barbaras contends that the modus operandi of the
Phenomenology of Perception remains fundamentally negative (Barbaras 2004, 6). That
is, regardless of the fact what the phenomenological descriptions are—the descriptions of
the perceptual field (Barbaras 2004, 6), existence (Barbaras 2004, 9), phenomenon
(Barbaras 2004, 16), the cogito (Barbaras 2004, 13), the other [l’auturi] (Barbaras 2004,
39), the body (Barbaras 2004, 37), and the relation between the perceived and ideality
(Barbaras 2004, 47), to name a few—Merleau-Ponty approaches them via negativa. That
is to say, in the Phenomenology of Perception, Barbaras argues that Merleau-Ponty
proceeds according to a logic of neither/nor. Simply put, according to Barbaras, there is
nothing positive in the Phenomenology of Perception or if there is something positive, it
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is only the result of a double negation, neither A nor non-A. Hence, Barbaras claims that
there is no new position sensu stricto or a position that is thought on its own terms in the
Phenomenology of Perception, especially with regard to the account of the body.
Barbaras states that with the experience of “one’s own body,” Merleau-Ponty
brings the body to the forefront and prima facie it seems that the experience of own’s one
body would not be reducible to the dualities of subject and object, of fact and sense
(Barbaras 2004, 26). Barbaras further emphasizes, that with the notion of the body, it also
seems that Merleau-Ponty is putting forth a “new concept of experience,” a concept that
would either have no recourse to consciousness or would redefine subjectivity altogether
(Barbaras 2004, 7). But Barbaras believes that if one goes deeper than this prima facie
reading, it would become apparent that for Merleau-Ponty the body is understood only
through a double negation of the body as it is understood in objective thought (i.e.
intellectualism and empiricism): neither the “organic”/physical body nor the
“psychic”/mental body (Barbaras 2004, 7).15 Barbaras nowhere in the entire book makes

In other words, Barbaras’ criticism boils down to the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s account
of the body never overcomes its residual Cartesianism, that the body and mind [l’esprit] are
essentially distinct in thought but in the “practice of life,” they are inseparable, that is, they are in
a substantial union (Barbaras 2004, 8). Although Merleau-Ponty does contest Descartes' real
distinction of the body and soul from the First Meditation and the union of the body and soul of
the Sixth Meditation and that Merleau-Ponty does not simply reduce the union to the “irrational”
or to life itself (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 205/241; cf. 533 n. 50-1/241 n. 1-2, 98-9/124-6), it is,
however, Barbaras’ contention that Merleau-Ponty “does not work through the reversal that
would be consistent with this ‘irrational’ as the very place of rationality and with reducing the
real distinction to the rank of being a simple appearance” (Barbaras 2004, 8). In the last analysis,
according to Barbaras, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body is only thought through in a dualistic
manner, without however fully reconciling the relation of the body to its consciousness. Not only
that but Barbaras is convinced that Merleau-Ponty remains a prisoner of the philosophy of
subjectivity or consciousness, which is why Barbaras argues that the Phenomenology of
Perception remains dependent upon the intellectualism that it criticizes. To put it differently,
according to Barbaras, Merleau-Ponty is dependent on the very categories that he criticizes,
especially and above all, the categories of “consciousness,” “object,” “subject” etc. More so,
Barbaras believes that Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body as it is presented in the
15
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an explicit distinction between the phenomenal and the objective body. Although, in
Barbaras’ defense, it must be said that he is indeed aware of the distinction in an implicit
manner (Barbaras 2004, 8; cf. 21). The evidence that Barbaras provides for his claims is
that the body remains for Merleau-Ponty only a vehicle or a “mediator” for consciousness
to get to the thing itself (Barbaras 2004, 7). Overall, according to Barbaras, the body in
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception acts as a mediator between subject and
object without Merleau-Ponty ever calling into the question the terms of opposition nor
ever fully accounting for the distinction and the union of the body and soul in any
rigorous and positive sense.16
Throughout the book, Barbaras has some brief remarks about Merleau-Ponty’s
relationship to the transcendental tradition. Barbaras recognizes that Merleau-Ponty is
concerned with a new transcendental perspective at the end of The Structure of Behavior
(Barbaras 2004, 4-5).17 Although Barbaras interprets Merleau-Ponty as concerned with a

Phenomenology of Perception is inadequate for both the experience of the other (Barbaras 2004,
36-8) and a theory of expression (Barbaras 2004, 44).
As Barbaras explains in extenso: “The very terms of the opposition, however, are not
called into question. While in the first moment, the body seemed to designate an original
existential mode that is beyond facticity and ideality, in fact it appears as something divided by
means of the subject-object opposition; it appears as the still mysterious place where the subjectobject relation is tied together. This is why finally the body can be described only across the
symmetrical exclusion of the two terms of the opposition. The body is neither the subject nor the
object, but the mediation of the subject and object. And this mediation is not thought all the way
through, precisely because it is thought as mediation. Merleau-Ponty oscillates between a unitary
conception of the body and a dualistic vision which turns the body into the ‘means’ of
consciousness. Merleau-Ponty never reaches the point of conceiving the identity and difference
of consciousness and its body together” (Barbaras 2004, 7).
16

Barbaras writes: “the notion of the form liberates a transcendental perspective”
(Barbaras 2004, 4). “This detour through Gestalt psychology would, however, be unnecessary if it
did not allow us to conceive transcendental consciousness differently” (Barbaras 2004, 4). “This
new meaning of transcendental consciousness—only sketched in The Structure of Behavior,
where Merleau-Ponty is still bothered by the Kantian reference—is the object of the
Phenomenology of Perception” (Barbaras 2004, 5). With respect to the last remark, Barbaras is
17
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new transcendental philosophy in general and a new notion of transcendental
consciousness in particular, Barbaras fails to provide any details regarding such issues.
However, in Barbaras’s defense, it must be pointed out that the issue of interpreting
Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental philosophy is not the subject matter of The Being of
the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology. In the conclusion to the book, Barbaras
mentions in passing that via Heidegger, the later Merleau-Ponty—the Merleau-Ponty of
The Visible and the Invisible—is led to “overcome the viewpoint of transcendental
subjectivity” (Barbaras 2004, 316). This would suggest that Barbaras implicitly interprets
the early Merleau-Ponty—especially the Merleau-Ponty of The Structure of Behavior and
of the Phenomenology of Perception—as concerned with the “viewpoint of
transcendental subjectivity.”
In his essay, “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,” Taylor Carman argues
that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body must be understood as radically different from
Husserl’s phenomenology of the body (Carman 1999, 223). Carman’s evidence for such a
claim is that Husserl’s entire phenomenological project in general and his account of the
body, more specifically, his theory of intentionality is predicated upon a “conceptual
dualism” between consciousness and reality whereas Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body

referring to the following sentence from The Structure of Behavior: “If the essence of the critical
solution consists driving existence back to the limits of knowledge and of discovering intellectual
signification in concrete structure, and if, as has been said, the fate of critical thought is bound up
with this intellectualist theory of perception, in the event this were not acceptable, it would be
necessary to define transcendental philosophy anew in such a way as to integrate with it the very
phenomenon of the real. The natural ‘thing,’ the organism, the behavior of others, and my own
behavior exists only by their meaning [sens]; but this meaning [sens] which springs forth [jaillit]
in them is not yet a Kantian object; the intentional life which constitutes them is not yet a
representation; and the ‘comprehension’ [la ‘comprehension’] which gives access to them is not
yet an intellection” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224).
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in general and his theory of intentionality undercuts or does not presuppose such a
dualism (Carman 1999, 208).
Carman begins his interpretation of Husserl by contending that Husserl’s mature
phenomenology is based on two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between
immanence or internal states of consciousness and transcendence or the external domain
of material things, and on the other, the distinction between concrete entities or spatiotemporal things and abstract entities or ideal essences (Carman 1999, 205-6). According
Carman, it is because Husserl never really questions such distinctions, among other
distinctions, that the body in his phenomenology “appears as a kind of phenomenological
anomaly” (Carman 1999, 206). But what does Carman mean by such a statement?
Drawing upon Ideas II, Carman maintains that for Husserl, the body is a
phenomenological “anomaly” because it has no autonomous place of its own or that it
only exists as an intermediary thing between the external world of physical objects and
internal sphere of conscious thoughts (Carman 1999, 206). Carman strongly believes that
precisely because the body is an intermediary thing, Husserl’s theory of intentionality is
“[m]entalistic” or rather Husserl fails to understand bodily intentionality—the awareness
of one’s own body in its directedness toward the world through its capacities or “bodily
skills” rather than through “cognitive attitudes” or thoughts about the body (Carman
1999, 206). On Carman’s reading, the only way Husserl attempts to bridge the
“intentional gap” between mind and world or the gap between the immanent or conscious
sphere of thoughts with the transcendent or material domain of things is through
localizing sensations in one’s body through the sense of touch, a point I will come back
to shortly (Carman 1999, 206).
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In phenomenology, the theory of intentionality is central—consciousness is never
a bare consciousness but is always consciousness of something. According to Carman,
Husserl’s theory of intentionality is predicated on a “strict categorical distinction between
consciousness and reality” (Carman 1999, 208). I take it what Carman is suggesting is
that Husserl gets the body wrong because he gets intentionality wrong. Carman is perhaps
saying that the relation between transcendental consciousness and the body is
problematic in Husserl’s phenomenology. Carman explains that after Husserl performs
the phenomenological reduction, this leads Husserl to the bracketing or “abstracting” of
all transcendent things or mind-independent things, which in turn leads Husserl to reflect
on their contents in an immanent way insofar as they are given in consciousness (Carman
1999, 208-9). According to Carman, after the reduction to the immanent sphere of
transcendental consciousness, everything for Husserl is purified from the natural attitude
(Carman 1999, 209). The completion of the reduction, according to Carman, leads
Husserl to the acknowledgement of the separation of the immanent sphere of pure or
transcendental consciousness and the transcendent domain of material things.
Carman believes that Husserl was neither a metaphysical dualist nor a closeted
materialist mainly because Husserl does not take a position on the mind-body problem
and that Husserl recognizes the importance of transcendental reflection, respectively.
However, it is Carman’s contention that Husserl remains a dualist and more precisely, a
conceptual dualist because Husserl, on Carman’s reading, retains the dualism between
reality and consciousness, which is established by the completion of the reduction and the
abyssal gap that emerges between transcendental or pure consciousness and material
things (which includes the body). As Carman explicitly says, “it is precisely this
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conceptual dualism, this idea that consciousness and reality are separated by an ‘abyss of
meaning,’ that prevents Husserl from acknowledging the body as the original locus of
intentional phenomena in perceptual experience” (Carman 1999, 209). There will be
nothing natural in transcendental consciousness and the natural world would have
nothing of transcendental consciousness.
In Husserl’s defense it must be said that in Ideas II he makes a distinction
between the body as Leib and the body as Körper (Husserl 1989, 64). The German word
Leib can be translated as a ‘lived body’ or an ‘animate organism’ whereas the German
word Körper can be translated as ‘physical body’ or ‘material body.’ Some bodies are
merely physical bodies but others are Janus-faced, that is, they can be apprehended in a
merely physical way (i.e. Körper) and/or as being alive (i.e. Leib). With this distinction,
Husserl argues that the individual is a “concrete unity of soul and body” (Carman 1999,
210; cf. Husserl 1989, 139). Carman is very well aware of Husserl’s Leib-Körper
distinction. However, Carman contends that this distinction, which simply posits the
concrete unity of the soul and body is inadequate to undercut the conceptual dualism that
is at work in Husserl’s phenomenological project as a whole (Carman 1999, 210). In fact,
Carman asserts that it is only on the basis of the conceptual dualism between reality and
consciousness that we will understand the body in Husserl and its relation to
intentionality and perception (Carman 1999, 210).
Carman says that for Husserl the body and more precisely bodily intentionality as
it is described in Ideas II, is fundamentally established by the localization of the
touching-touched relation and not the other way around (Carman 1999, 211). In other
words, the body does not establish the intentional relation between the one touching and
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the one being touched, instead, on Carman’s reading, the body for Husserl is a result of
such a relation and only achieves its significance because of this relation. As Carman put
its,
My perceptual acts are themselves always bodily, of course. On Husserl’s
account, however, those bodily acts in no way constitute the body as a body for
the embodied subject. The body is itself constituted intentionally only in the
reflexive relation it acquires to itself when it perceives one of its organs by means
of another. (Carman 1999, 211)
On Carman’s reading then, for Husserl, touch is primary. And it is because of the
sensation of touch and more precisely, the double sensation of touch (e.g. touchingtouched) that I can localize sensations in my body which, in turn, makes the body my
own body. In short, for Husserl, Carman believes, the body is only a “bearer of
sensations,” an intermediary thing between pure consciousness and the world of physical
things (Carman 1999, 212).18 Overall, Carman believes that the body for Husserl is

Carman only focuses on the body as a “bearer of sensations” in Husserl’s Ideas II.
Although, for Husserl, this is a necessary condition for being a body [Leib], it is not a sufficient
condition. In other words, although Carman is not wrong to suggest this, however, this is not the
whole story of Husserl’s phenomenology of the body. For Husserl, the body [Leib] is not only the
“bearer of localized sensations (sensings)” (Husserl 1989, 152), but also: (1) the “organ of
perception” (Husserl 1989, 61), (2) the medium for “all constitution of spatial thinghood”
(Husserl 1989, 62), (3) the “organ of the will” and the “seat of free movement” (Husserl 1989,
159), (4) the “center of orientation” (Husserl 1989, 165), (5) a “remarkably imperfectly
constituted thing” (Husserl 1989, 167), and (6) an “integral part of the causal nexus” (Husserl
1989, 167). In addition, Carman’s interpretation of Husserl is fundamentally inadequate mainly
because Carman fails to discuss the importance of the distinction between the naturalistic and
personalistic attitudes for Husserl’s phenomenology of the body. In the naturalistic attitude,
Husserl described things and animate beings like human beings within a theoretical attitude, but
in the personalistic attitude, Husserl is concerned with describing those very same things within a
practical attitude. This shift from the naturalistic attitude to the personalistic attitude occurs via
the phenomenological reduction, which brings to the fore what was remained implicit in the
naturalistic attitude, namely, the human being in his or her “environment” [Umwelt], which
includes, according to Husserl, the axiological, practical, ethical, aesthetic, or in short, cultural
meanings (Husserl 1989, 191-2). Husserl is very clear about the relation between the two
attitudes: the naturalistic attitude is “subordinated” to and is only an “abstraction” from the
personalistic attitude (Husserl 1989, 193).
18
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understood through the relation of having rather than of being. That is, the pure
transcendental consciousness has its body and is not identified with its body because the
body is only that in which tactile sensations are localized (Carman 1999, 214; cf. 208).
It is only within the context of such an interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology
of the body that Carman discusses Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body. Carman argues
that many have claimed that Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body in the Phenomenology
of Perception is a simple reiteration of Husserl’s account of the body in Ideas II.
However, he contends that a careful reading of the two would reveal that there are “deep
methodological and systematic differences between them” (Carman 1999, 207).19
According to Carman, Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, rethinks the body through a “radical
reassessment of the very conceptual distinctions on which Husserl’s enterprise rests”
(Carman 1999, 206). In particular, given that for Merleau-Ponty, the lived body is
nothing other than the perceptual subject, it follows, Carman believes, that MerleauPonty’s account of the body will not depend on the Husserlian conceptual dualism
between consciousness and reality (Carman 1999, 209). Instead, Carman argues that the
body for Merleau-Ponty will be that very site where consciousness and reality will
“occupy the very same conceptual space” (Carman 1999, 209).
Carman says that “[f]or equating the perceptual subject with the lived body, as
Merleau-Ponty does, would mean relinquishing the conceptual dualism on which
Husserl’s project rests” (Carman 1999, 208). According to Carman, this perceptual
subject or the lived body is to be understood through what Merleau-Ponty calls the “body
19

Carman points out that Merleau-Ponty does agree with Husserl on only one particular
phenomenological insight concerning the body from Ideas II: I can never distance myself from
my own body as I can from other objects, which would require that my body be given completely
to me as an object open for observation through and through (Carman 1999, 207; cf. Husserl
1989, 159).
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schema” [le schéma corporel] (Carman 1999, 218). Carman argues that for MerleauPonty a body schema must be contrasted with a body image. According to Carman,
images are “objects of awareness” whereas schemata are “capacities or dispositions that
sketch out in advance and so structure our awareness of objects” (Carman 1999, 219).
Carman argues that the body schema for Merleau-Ponty is an “integrated set of skills
poised and ready to anticipate and incorporate a world prior to the application of concepts
and the formation of thoughts and judgments” (Carman 1999, 219). This is what Carman
takes to be Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “habit,” which involves a “motor intentionality,”
an intentionality that is pre-conceptual and pre-reflective. Habits, in short, are bodily
skills or capacities through which the body engages with the world.
Further, Carman contends that the body schema also sheds light on the issue of
phantom limb, a pathological phenomenon where one feels the presence of a limb one
does not have any longer (Carman 1999, 220). This pathological phenomenon occurs,
Carman thinks, because “the tendency of such conditions to dissipate or correct
themselves with the passage of time suggests a kind of recalibration of a long-term with a
short-term sense of bodily position and capacity” (Carman 1999, 220). On the issue of the
phantom limb, Carman mentions in passing Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the
“habitual body” [le corps habituel] or the impersonal body and the “actual body” [le
corps actuel] or the personal body (Carman 1999, 220; cf. Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111).
Carman does not discuss this distinction in any detail. I take it that Carman means that
the long-term and short-term sense of the bodily position and capacity with respect to the
pathological phenomenon of phantom limb is established by the habitual/actual body
distinction, respectively. Carman quickly moves on to highlight his main point, which is,
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that the body schema is the “bundle of skills and capacities that constitute the body’s
precognitive familiarity with itself and the world it inhabits” (Carman 1999, 220). On
Carman’s interpretation, for Merleau-Ponty, cognition would be founded on such bodily
skills and capacities and not the other way around. Although Carman does not explicitly
discuss Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenal/objective body distinction, he seems to be aware of
the distinction, especially when he says that the “body is not an object” in the sense of
having an image or a representation of it but instead and this is what Carman thinks the
phenomenal body is: it is that through which I am engaged in the world via its skills or
capacities with respect to my actual or possible tasks (Carman 1999, 221).
Overall, Carman interprets that Husserl’s notion of the body is at best a “quasiobjective thing” because it is that in which sensations are localized, whereas MerleauPonty rethinks the body through its pre-conceptual and pre-reflective skills and capacities
by undercutting the very distinction between reality and consciousness and its underlying
idealistic framework upon which Husserl’s project is based (Carman 1999, 223).20
Carman also contends that the body, for Husserl, can be only understood through a
relation of having whereas for Merleau-Ponty, it is fundamentally understood through a
relation of being (Carman 1999, 224). According to Carman, for Merleau-Ponty, there is
no intentional gap between the immanent sphere of consciousness and transcendent
domain of external things. Carman believes that this is so because, unlike Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty gets bodily intentionality right.
Since Carman believes that Husserl’s inadequate notion of the body is a
consequence of his notion of transcendental consciousness and given that Carman sees
Although Carman is not clear on this point, but I take it he means Husserl’s notion of
lived body [Leib].
20
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Merleau-Ponty and Husserl as holding radically different positions on the body, it follows
that Carman leaves no room for a transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s
interpretation of the phenomenal body. Or if Merleau-Ponty’s lived or phenomenal body
is interpreted in a transcendental manner, it must not be interpreted as having the same
function as Husserl’s notion of transcendental consciousness because this kind of pure
consciousness “occupies an altogether different sphere of existence from anything natural
or positive” (Carman 1999, 209). More so, according to Carman, because MerleauPonty’s phenomenal body is not given to itself in transparency as an image or
representation, it follows that it is not and cannot be a transcendental consciousness,
especially like that of Husserl’s (Carman 1999, 222). For Carman, Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of the body is the kind of body where consciousness and reality occupies the same
conceptual space. This necessarily means that the body for Merleau-Ponty is not
fundamentally different from anything “natural or positive.” For this very reason,
according to Carman, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body cannot be understood in a
transcendental manner.
Nine years later, in his book Merleau-Ponty, Carman explicitly interprets
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body in a transcendental manner. The discussion of the
body occurs in chapter three titled “Body and World.” It is my contention that in this
book, Carman’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body has not changed in
any significant manner from the one found in his essay, “The Body in Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty.” Carman still interprets Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body through its
skills and capacities (Carman 2008, 106-19; cf. 132-3) and in contradistinction to
Husserl’s phenomenology of the body (Carman 2008, 127-32). But in his book, Carman
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explicitly states that the body for Merleau-Ponty is indeed “a transcendental condition of
perception” (Carman 2008, 82). I take Carman to mean that the sensori-motor and
cognitive skills and capacities of the body condition or make possible a perceptual
world.21 As Carman writes, “[o]ur bodily skills and dispositions carve out a perceptual
world with perspectival horizons and a contrast between figure and ground” (Carman
2008, 133). And it is in this sense, the body is transcendental. However, Carman still
interprets Merleau-Ponty as advocating a position within natural science. Carman writes,
Merleau-Ponty “knows that experience is an objective physical phenomenon inasmuch as
it is realized in the brain and nervous system” (Carman 2008, 96).22 Perhaps, what
Carman means is that the natural capacities and skills of the body make possible a
perceptual world. But even with such a clarification, it is not entirely clear how such a
naturalistic position can be consistent with a transcendental position.
In “Maurice Merleau-Ponty: The Phenomenology of Perception,” the twelfth chapter of
Introduction to Phenomenology, Dermot Moran makes a similar claim. Moran mentions in
passing that for Merleau-Ponty the body is a transcendental condition for experiencing the
perceptual world. Moran writes, “[t]he body discloses the world for us in a certain way. It is the
transcendental condition for the possibility of experiencing objects at all, our means of
communication with the world” (Moran 2000, 425). Moran does not provide any details
concerning the manner in which Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body is a transcendental
condition, however, earlier in the chapter Moran says that Merleau-Ponty “sought to rescue
Husserl’s phenomenology … which emphasized the sense of the world as a product of a
disembodied transcendental ego” (Moran 2000, 404). I take this to mean that the body as
transcendental will not have the same function as Husserl’s transcendental ego, which according
to Moran constitutes the world while at the same time is not part of that constituted world. In
other words, according to Moran, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as transcendental would be
both constituted and constituting with respect to the world. However, ten years later, Moran
further clarifies his position by saying that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental idealist and that
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a transcendental subject is not so different from that of Husserl’s. As
Moran puts it, “Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are committed to the transcendental idealist
claim that the objectivist world is what it is due to its correlation with subjectivity and there is no
world outside of that correlation” (Moran 2010, 175). Cf. “Merleau-Ponty remains a committed
transcendental philosopher, but he rejects the view that transcendental philosophy commits him
to accept an all-constituting intellectual mind which is a transcendental subject” (Moran 2010,
193).
21

Cf. “Merleau-Ponty is not denying that the perceptual understanding has psychological
and causal features” (Carman 2008, 99).
22
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In Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of Perception, Komarine RomdenhRomluc argues that for Merleau-Ponty, the “body is a form of consciousness” (RomdenhRomluc 2011, 102; cf. 3, 62). I interpret Romdenh-Romluc’s position to be similar to that
of Carman’s. I take it that for Romdenh-Romluc, the body is nothing other than a set of
sensori-motor and cognitive skills and capacities (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 101-2). In
other words, the body is an active consciousness or consciousness as acting and
responding to tasks that emerge in its relation to its environment. But this is not what is
interesting in Romdenh-Romluc’s book. Instead, what is interesting is her remark on
Merleau-Ponty’s relation to the transcendental tradition.
According to Romdenh-Romluc, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is “transcendental”
only in a very minimalist sense (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 26). Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophy is “transcendental” to the extent that he “rejects the realist claim that
consciousness is a mere part of the world that exists independently of it” (RomdenhRomluc 2011, 26). However, Romdenh-Romluc immediately points out that this does not
mean that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy can be construed as a transcendental idealism in
either Kant’s or Husserl’s sense (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 3, 20-2, 26, 103, 236).
According to Romdenh-Romluc, in Kant’s or Husserl’s transcendental idealist position,
consciousness exists outside the world that it “constitutes” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 201). Romdenh-Romluc does not explain what she means by “constitution” and does not
discuss whether there are any differences between Kant’s and Hussserl’s respective
notion of constitution. In any event, Romdenh-Romluc argues that Merleau-Ponty’s
position is not a transcendental idealism because for Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and
world are interdependent “parts of a whole” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 26). More so,
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according to Romdenh-Romluc, “the inquiry Merleau-Ponty conducts in PhP [the
Phenomenology of Perception] is an empirical one” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 31). I take
this to mean that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological descriptions in the Phenomenology
of Perception are not offered from a transcendental perspective. This means that a
transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty is possible but only in a minimalist sense.
In Merleau-Ponty, Stephen Priest interprets Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body
as a physical subject rather than as a physical object (Priest 1998, 69).23 Priest argues that
“Merleau-Ponty’s originality lies in the idea that subjectivity is physical” (Priest 1998,
57). Prima facie, it may seem that by interpreting the body as fundamentally physical,
Priest has ruled out any transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the
body. However, at a second glance, this may not be the case. On the one hand, Priest does
explicitly state that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as a physical-subject can never
function in the same manner as Husserl’s notion of the transcendental ego (Priest 1998,

In “Embodiment,” the third chapter of his book, which is titled Merleau-Ponty: A
Guide for the Perplexed, Eric Matthews has a very similar reading of Merleau-Ponty as Priest
does. They both read Merleau-Ponty as a physicalist. Matthews prefers the term materialist
(Matthews 2006, 50). But I take them to mean the same thing. As Matthews writes, “MerleauPonty’s view is as materialistic as anyone’s in the history of philosophy. Where he begins to
diverge from certain traditional forms of materialism is in his claim that the ‘point of view’ just
mentioned is not the only, or the most fundamental, way of looking at human beings” (Matthews
2006, 50). As Matthews sees it, Merleau-Ponty is different from traditional materialists only to
the extent that for Merleau-Ponty, the body as material is both subject and object and not just an
object. Although Matthews and Priest agree that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body is to be
interpreted as a material or physical subject, they disagree about one point: Priest argues that
Merleau-Ponty’s physicalist notion of the body is to be only understood as a subject and never as
an object (Priest 1998, 69). By contrast, Matthews argues that Merleau-Ponty’s materialist notion
of the body is to be understood as both a subject and an object (Matthews 2006, 51). Cf.
Matthews’ position as it is described in Merleau-Ponty: A Guide for the Perplexed is the same
position that he marshaled in Chapter three of his 2002 book titled, The Philosophy of MerleauPonty (Matthews 2002, 67-88). In the latter book, Matthews, like Barbaras, mentions that the
later Merleau-Ponty via Heidegger criticizes transcendental philosophy (Matthews 2002, 161; Cf.
Barbaras 2004, 316). Barbaras and Matthews differ on a singular point: Barbaras does not read
this criticism of transcendental philosophy as fundamentally a criticism of Husserl (although I
suppose one can), but Matthews does.
23
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34). On the other hand, Priest says that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body replaces
Husserl’s notion of a transcendental ego (Priest 1998, 34).24 Thus, it can be argued that
Priest rejects a particular kind of transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of the body, not transcendental interpretation per se. But given that Priest fundamentally
interprets Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body in physicalist terms, it is unclear what
transcendental interpretation may be allowed by Priest’s interpretation. Perhaps, the body
as a physical subject through its actions, experiences, and thoughts conditions or makes
possible a perceptual world.25

§ 4. Indirect Transcendental Interpretations of Merleau-Ponty

There are some scholars who do not directly discuss Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
the body vis-à-vis the possibility of a transcendental interpretation (or the lack thereof),
instead they interpret certain notions in Merleau-Ponty’s early, middle, and/or later works

As Priest says, “Merleau-Ponty replaces the transcendental ego with the body: not the
body of another (as object) but body as subject; that living human that I am. Because of the
impossibility of the transcendental reduction there can be no true account of the subject as the
transcendental ego” (Priest 1998, 34). Cf. Priest also writes, “Merleau-Ponty rejects the
Husserlian idea of transcendental subjectivity revealed by the transcendental reduction because
we are irreducibly in the world” (Priest 1998, 24).
24
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Although Priest does claim that for Merleau-Ponty space functions like a condition of
possibility in the Kantian sense. Even though Priest recognizes that there are differences between
Kant and Merleau-Ponty, Priest interprets parts of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in a
transcendental manner. Priest does not explain how this partial transcendental interpretation is
consistent with his interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as a physical-subject. I
cite Priest: “The main thrust of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of space is essentially Kantian.
Space is constituted by the subject, space is a condition for the possibility of spatial objects and
for the subject’s experience of them. This is familiar from the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic.’
Nevertheless, there are two aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of space that are nonKantian, and the second is radically anti-Kantian. They are the theses that the body plays an
essential role in the constitution of space as it appears to us and the thesis that there exists more
than one space” (Priest 1998, 113-4).
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as attempts to rethink certain transcendental themes or problems. In “On Topic of Art and
Truth: Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and the Transcendental Turn,” Robert Burch
interprets both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective notions of truth and art vis-àvis the limits of transcendental philosophy that was inaugurated by Kant and continued
by Husserl.26
In “Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Tradition,” the fifth chapter of The
Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism,27 Jeffrey A. Bell
interprets the Merleau-Ponty of the Phenomenology of Perception as being engaged in a
transcendental critique of Husserl’s phenomenology (Bell 1998, 127). In addition, Bell
interprets the later Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh from The Visible and the Invisible as a
transcendental notion (Bell 1998, 175).28

26

See Burch 1993, 348-70.

27

See Bell 1998, 124-43.

Following Husserl’s Ideas I to an extent, the early Merleau-Ponty (the Merleau-Ponty
of the Phenomenology of Perception) ascribed to the paradoxical position of “transcendence
within immanence” (Husserl 1982, 133; translation slightly modified). As Merleau-Ponty affirms
in the Phenomenology of Perception: “[w]e must discover the origin of the object at the very
centre of our experience; we must describe the emergence of being and we must understand how,
paradoxically, there is for us an in-itself” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 83). In “The Primacy of
Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences,” his defense of the Phenomenology of
Perception, Merleau-Ponty described it as the “paradox of immanence and transcendence in
perception” (Merleau-Ponty 2007, 93). Why both immanence and transcendence? “Immanence,”
Merleau-Ponty, in a very Husserlian manner, goes on to say, “because the perceived object would
not be able to be foreign to the one who perceives” and “transcendence, because it always
involves a beyond of what is actually given” (Merleau-Ponty 2007, 93). Bell argues that the later
Merleau-Ponty moves beyond this position because such a distinction is conditioned by and is
only understood through what Merleau-Ponty calls flesh. Bell contends that flesh “is to be
identified neither with immanence nor with transcendence” because it is the “transcendental
condition which makes these identifications possible” (Bell 1998, 175).
28
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There are many scholars who focus on Merleau-Ponty’s “new definition of the a
priori” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 229).29 There are also scholars who focus on MerleauPonty’s relation to Kant’s Critique of Judgment in general and Merleau-Ponty’s
interpretation of Kant’s notion of imagination, reflective judgment, and/or the
beautiful/sublime in particular.30 In his essay, “Knowledge, Paradox, and the Primacy of
Perception,”31 Chris Nagel interprets Merleau-Ponty’s notion of perception as a
“transcendental notion” in the Kantian sense as being a condition for the possibility of
knowledge (Nagel 2000, 493). In “Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: Immanence, Univocity
and Phenomenology,”32 Jack Reynolds and Jon Roffe interpret the later Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of flesh as providing a similar transcendental philosophy as that of Gilles
Deleuze’s. Reynolds and Roffe writes, Merleau-Ponty “with this concept [i.e. Flesh] is
much more closely related to what Deleuze thinks is the goal of his own philosophy: to
provide an analysis of the transcendental as the real condition for actual experience”
(Reynolds and Roffe 2006, 241). There are some scholars that focus on Merleau-Ponty’s
search for a new method in the Phenomenology of Perception.33 In his book, Merleau-
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See Dufrenne 1966, 159; Hall 1979, 304-9; Madison 1981, 154; Dillon 1987, 403-23;
Smith 2005, 553-71; Mensch 2007, 259-83; Toadvine 2009, 35, 88; Johnson 2012, 211-8.
30

See Coole 1984, 503-26; Watson 1992, 171-200; Baldwin 2003, 1-33; Watson 2007,
525-50; Watson 2008, 124-34; Johnson 2012, 211-18.
31

See Nagel 2000, 481-98.
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See Reynolds and Jon Roffe 2006, 228-51.

Bryan A. Smyth calls Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology “an exemplary kind of
transcendental practice” (Smyth 2010, 153). As we will see in Chapter 2 and 3, following
Smyth’s insight, I will construct a transcendental framework in which I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of the body. Sebastian Gardner characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s method as an “antinomystrategy” understood in the sense of Kant’s strategy from the section on the antinomies in the
Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Gardner 2007, 24). See also Kant 1998,
A409/B436 – A462/B490. Like Gardner, Justin Tauber calls Merleau-Ponty’s method a kind of a
33
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Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature, Ted Toadvine mentions in passing that Merleau-Ponty’s
The Structure of Behavior offers a “transcendental philosophy of nature” (Toadvine 2009,
22).34 However, the focus of Toadvine’s book is not on Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental
position per se.

“transcendental strategy” similar to Kant’s antinomy-strategy (Tauber 2008, 14). Cf. “One of
Kant’s discoveries, whose consequences we have not yet fully grasped, is that all our experience
of the world is throughout a tissue of concepts which lead to irreducible contradictions if we
attempt to take them in an absolute sense or transfer them into pure being, and that they
nevertheless found the structure of all our phenomena, of everything which is for us. It would
take too long to show (and besides it is well known) that Kantian philosophy itself failed to utilize
this principle fully and that both its investigation of experience and its critique of dogmatism
remained incomplete. I wish only to point out that the accusation of contradiction is not decisive,
if the acknowledged contradiction appears as the very condition of consciousness” (MerleauPonty 2007a, 95). Cf. “The antinomy of which we spoke above is based upon the ambiguous
structure of perceptual experience. The thesis and the antithesis express the two aspects of it: it is
true to say that my perception is always a flux of individual events and that what is radically
contingent in the lived perspectivism of perception accounts for the realistic appearance. But it is
also true to say that my perception accedes to the things themselves, for these perspectives are
articulated in a way which makes access to interindividual significations possible; they ‘present’ a
world” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 219; cf. 215).
“The position established in The Structure of Behavior is foundational because it aims
to reconcile mind and nature, to integrate transcendental philosophy with the real, by starting
from the holistic and meaningful configurations already encountered in the perceptual world”
(Toadvine 2009, 21). Cf. “The ultimate aim of this convergence of Gestalt theory and
phenomenology is the formulation of a transcendental philosophy of nature that captures the truth
of both realism and idealism while avoiding their limitations” (Toadvine 2009, 22).
34
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Chapter One

The “Problem of Perception” in The Structure of Behavior and
A Proposal for Rethinking Transcendental Philosophy

§ 1. Synopsis

The aim of Chapter 1 is to understand why Merleau-Ponty ends his first book
with a task of rethinking transcendental philosophy. The answer will serve as a guiding
clue in interpreting Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental philosopher in the subsequent
chapters of this dissertation. It is my contention that Merleau-Ponty ends The Structure of
Behavior with a proposal to rethink transcendental philosophy because of a singular
problem, the Hegelian “problem of perception.” Let me explain.
In The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty is interested in understanding the
relations between consciousness and nature. It is my contention that in formulating his
own position on the relations between consciousness and nature, Merleau-Ponty’s point
of departure is the organism understood in the Goldsteinein sense. Although MerleauPonty follows Goldstein to by describing the relations between consciousness and nature
via the organism, there is a key difference between Merleau-Ponty and Goldstein on what
they mean by the organism. According to Merleau-Ponty, in his descriptions of the
organism, Goldstein remains too Kantian. That is to say, Goldstein presupposes or takes
for granted the historical development of the organism. In other words, Goldstein fails to
account for the genesis of the organism itself. If Goldstein is too Kantian, then according
to Merleau-Ponty, we have a Hegelian problem, namely, what Merleau-Ponty calls the
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“problem of perception” or the problem of knowing how individual consciousnesses can
integrate their own historical emergence (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 216; cf. 219, 224). My
claim is that this singular problem is what leads Merleau-Ponty to the proposal of
rethinking transcendental philosophy (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224).
In order to explain what Merleau-Ponty means by the “problem of perception,” I
divide the remaining of Chapter 1 into four sections: “§ 2. Goldstein and the Organism as
Holistic,” “§ 3. An Overview of The Structure of Behavior,” “§ 4. The Hegelian ‘Problem
of Perception’,” and “§ 5. Conclusion: A New Transcendental Philosophy?.”
In Sections 2 and 3, I present relevant details as background material to the
“problem of perception.” In Section 4, I explain what Merleau-Ponty means by the
“problem of perception.” In Section 5 or the conclusion, I briefly discuss what remains
unresolved in The Structure of Behavior, namely, the problem of perception. I take this to
be Merleau-Ponty’s key motivation to the writing of the Phenomenology of Perception.
In addition, in conclusion to the chapter I take up the following question: what becomes
of this proposal for a new transcendental philosophy in the subsequent works of MerleauPonty? This question leads us to Chapter 2 where we will take up Merleau-Ponty’s
transcendental project with respect to the Phenomenology of Perception.

§ 2. Goldstein and the Organism as Holistic

In this section, I discuss the work of the neurologist, Kurt Goldstein and in
particular, what he means by the “organism” as it is presented mainly in his book, The
Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man
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(1934). Merleau-Ponty makes use of the “organism” vis-à-vis Goldstein throughout The
Structure of Behavior. As we will see, although the organism in the Goldsteinein sense is
important for Merleau-Ponty’s own position vis-à-vis the relations between
consciousness and nature, it is what leads Merleau-Ponty to the “problem of perception,”
and this problem, in turn, leads Merleau-Ponty to a proposal for thinking transcendental
philosophy anew.
The Organism is fundamentally about a new method for understanding the
organism, one that Goldstein calls “holistic” (Goldstein 1995, 17). Goldstein’s reason for
proposing a new method lies in his conviction that the method of natural science that he
employed for many years was not adequate for studying “living beings, especially man”
because such a method fails to take into consideration the “total organism” (Goldstein
1995, 17).1 According to Goldstein, the method of natural science is usually a method by
which the organism is described in terms of isolated processes rather than taking the
entire organism in its relation to its environment (Goldstein 1995, 18).2 Although
Goldstein does not deny the importance of the “dissecting method of natural science,” as
he calls it, he however wants to understand how the isolated data provided by natural
science is relevant for the entire living organism as such. However, this is not to suggest
Cf. “Having applied for many years the method of natural science and having become
increasingly dissatisfied with my results, I was convinced that we needed an essentially different
method for studying living beings, especially man. I realized that only a method that placed the
total organism of the individual in the foreground - in our interpretation of normal functioning or
disturbances due to a defect - could be fruitful” (Goldstein 1995, 17-8). Also, Goldstein says, “the
book turned out to be principally a methodological discussion. It does not attempt to provide a
presentation of the living world but to discuss the means by which we may arrive at its
comprehension” (Goldstein 1995, 384; italics not original).
1

Cf. “Certainly, isolated data acquired by the dissecting method of natural science could
not be neglected if we were to maintain a scientific basis. But we had to discover how to evaluate
our observations in their significance for the total organism’s functioning and thereby to
understand the structure and existence of the individual person. We were confronted then with a
difficult problem of epistemology” (Goldstein 1995, 18; italics not original).
2
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that Goldstein rejects natural science. Instead, Goldstein made it very clear that in his
holistic approach to the question of life in general and the living organism in particular,
he will exclusively remain within the natural science paradigm. This is important
because his methodological dispute with natural science does not entail any kind of
incorporation or endorsement of “transcendental or vitalistic factors” in his approach
(Goldstein 1995, 28).3 Instead his methodological dispute with natural science is
fundamentally an epistemological one because what is at issue in this dispute is
biological knowledge or how to understand the knowledge claims made about the living
organism. To put it differently, Goldstein is interested in epistemic claims about the
whole organism in its relation to its environment as opposed to epistemic claims that are
just about the isolated processes of the organism. This means that Goldstein “start[s] from
the facts,” the facts that are provided by natural science, and interprets them through his
holistic method in a manner that he believes is more adequate than what he takes to be
the dissecting method of natural science (Goldstein 1995, 285).
Furthermore, in his holistic approach to the living organism, two things must also
be mentioned about his point of departure. First of all, in such a description he proceeds
from what he takes to be “pathological rather than normal phenomena” (Goldstein 1995,
29). The reason for starting from pathological phenomena lies in the assumption that one
can learn more about the living organism as a whole in a more adequate way when it
breaks down or is diseased, modified, or altered from its preferred or regular processes of
3

This point will become very important once we turn to Merleau-Ponty because as will
become clear in §4. “The Hegelian ‘Problem of Perception.’ Although, Goldstein denies that he is
incorporating any transcendental element in his description of the organism, as we will see,
Merleau-Ponty interprets what Goldstein means by the organism as being too Kantian. If
Goldstein remains too Kantian in his descriptions of the organism and not Hegelian enough, this
will be the fundamental point of divergence between Merleau-Ponty and Goldstein vis-à-vis the
organism.
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living (Goldstein 1995, 30). Secondly, in the description of life in general and of the
living organism in particular, he starts with the human being not only because this is his
focus but also because he finds the “concept of simplicity” problematic (Goldstein 1995,
23-4). Even though his point of departure is the human being, he maintains that he will
avoid any kind of “direct” application of knowledge gained in describing human beings
to non-human animals which would be a form of “anthropomorphism” while
simultaneously avoiding any kind of “direct” application of knowledge gained in
describing non-human animals to human beings which would be a form of
“zoomorphism” (Goldstein 1995, 25).
According to Goldstein, this holistic method is to be understood through three
postulates. The first methodological postulate states that in the description of the living
organism, one should initially not give any preference to one phenomenon over another
of the organism (Goldstein 1995, 37-8). For instance, record all the symptoms one can
before deciding what is happening in either a patient or an animal. The second
methodological postulate states that one must describe each phenomenon as correctly as
one can (Goldstein 1995, 38-40). Although Goldstein is not clear about what he means by
“correctness,” I take it that correctness is equated with comprehensiveness of each
phenomenon in question. The third methodological postulate states that each description
of the phenomenon of the living organism must refer to both the entire organism (and not
just one of its parts) and the situation in which the phenomenon appeared (Goldstein
1995, 40). In other words, one must not isolate the phenomenon from the total organism,
its environment, and from the context in which it occurred. All three of these postulates
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make up Goldstein’s holistic method. It is through this method that Goldstein understands
the organism.
With this holistic method, Goldstein defines the living organism as an “actual
Gestalt” or “a whole in which one can differentiate, among the observed phenomena,
between the ‘members’ that really belong to it and the less relevant, contingent
connections of arbitrary parts” (Goldstein 1995, 306-7). In describing the organism as an
actual Gestalt or a whole, Goldstein is indeed appropriating the notion of the “Gestalt” as
understood by the Gestalt psychologists such as Wolfgang Köehler, Max Wertheimer,
and Kurt Koffka. In German, the word “Gestalt” means shape or form. In Gestalt
psychology, the word Gestalt is understood through Christian von Ehrenfels’ two
criteria.4 The first criterion states that the parts are inseparable from a whole and yet, the
whole is not reducible to the sum of its parts, whatever the parts may be (Goldstein 1995,
294-5). The second criterion states two things: on the one hand, a change in a single part
modifies the entire whole; and, on the other hand, if all the parts are changed but the
relations between the parts remain the same, the whole will not change (Goldstein 1995,
294-5). However, this is not to suggest that Goldstein is simply following Gestalt
psychology. Goldstein mentions many differences between his notion of the Gestalt or a
whole contra the one put forth by Gestalt psychologists (Goldstein 1995, 285-304).5 For
our purposes, the relevant and fundamental difference amounts to the fact that the living
organism as a Gestalt or a whole for Goldstein is not a real whole, a mind-independent
entity or “a ground in reality” [Seinsgrund] (Goldstein 1995, 306-7). Instead it is an ideal

In referring to these two criteria, Goldstein does not cite Ehrenfels’ primary texts.
Instead, he cites Köhler (Goldstein 1995, 409 n. 13). See Köhler 1924, 35-7.
4

5

See especially, Goldstein 1995, 300-2.
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whole, a whole that is always for an organism, or “a reason in knowledge”
[Erkentnissgrund] (Goldstein 1995, 306-7). To put it in a different manner, the living
organism must not be understood as a metaphysical entity. Instead, it must be understood
as a regulative ideal in a Kantian sense of the term, that is, as an ideal that regulates or
guides our experience.6 This is what Goldstein calls “the postulate of the archetype
[Urbild] character of the organism” (Goldstein 1995, 345; translation slightly modified).
If it is granted that the organism is understood in an archetypical or a regulative manner,
then it follows that the knowledge of it “can never be final, and that we must content
ourselves with an increasing approximation to the truth” (Goldstein 1995, 316). The first
claim leads to the second claim, namely, “the incompleteness and imperfection in the
determination of that archetype [Urbild]” (Goldstein 1995, 313; translation slightly
modified). In short, in saying that the organism is a regulative ideal, Goldstein means that
the biological knowledge of the organism must be acquired “as science advances”
(Goldstein 1995, 321). This then means that by the organism, Goldstein means a
regulative ideal or an ideal whole is quasi-Kantian and not simply Kantian because the
knowledge of the organism is to be fundamentally understood in a scientific fashion and
not strictly in a Kantian transcendental fashion. To put it differently, Goldstein remains
too Kantian in his definition of the organism to the extent that the organism is not an
entity existing in the world but is fundamentally an epistemic notion or a regulative ideal.
It is not Kantian to the extent that the biological knowledge of the organism is to be
achieved with the advancement of science (Goldstein 1995, 321).
An objection can immediately be raised against Goldstein. If the organism is an
ideal whole that guides our experience, it would seem to suggest that the organism is
6

For further details on this point, see Smyth 2007, 187.
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constantly changing with the advancement of science, which in turn can mean that the
organism is not constant or stable in any definitive sense. Goldstein is not unaware of this
problem. As he puts it, “[t]he problem is to determine conceptually the factor of
constancy that the organism displays, notwithstanding all the modification it undergoes
during its life course” (Goldstein 1995, 323). According to Goldstein, even if the
organism is not a fixed entity, some kind of constancy of the organism must be postulated
because the epistemic claims about the living organism seem to presuppose some kind of
permanence, sameness, or stability of the living organism in question. Without some kind
of constancy, “it would never be possible to identify a given organism as such. It would
not even be possible to talk about a definite organism at all” (Goldstein 1995, 265). For
this very reason, Goldstein suggests that there is indeed a “relative constancy” or a
“structural formation” of the organism (Goldstein 1995, 265).
By relative constancy or structural formation, Goldstein means a kind of selforganization that is perpetually maintained through what Goldstein calls the “total
behavior” or the responses of each living organism to the demands of its respective
environment (Goldstein 1995, 48).7 Goldstein asserts that this is the “basic biological
law” of every single organism because each living organism as an ideal whole or a
regulative ideal is nothing other than a “coming to terms” or self-actualization of the

7

According to Goldstein, examples of constants established by natural science thus
follows: “Thus we obtain a number of constants as characteristics of the nature of an organism constants in the ways of behavior, constants regarding the sensory and motor threshold,
‘intellectual’ characteristics, constants of ‘affectivity,’ ‘psychic’ or ‘mental’ and ‘physical’
constants, constants in the field of temperature, respiration, pulse, and blood pressure, constants
in the sense of a certain proportion of calcium and potassium, and of certain types of reaction
toward poisons (allergies), blood types, and so on. In the living organism, we continually observe
a tendency to approach these relative constants or ‘average mean’; or in better terms, we are only
in position to speak of one and the same organism, if, in spite of temporary changes, these
constants become manifest” (Goldstein 1995, 282).

44

organism through its responses to the particular demands made by its respective
environment (Goldstein 1995, 101-2).8 According to Goldstein, the “total behavior” of a
living organism can be divided into two kinds: “effectual performances” and “deficient
performances” (Goldstein 1995, 48). By “performance” of a living organism, Goldstein
means “any kind of behavior, activity, or operation as a whole or in part that expresses
itself overtly and bears reference to the environment” (Goldstein 1995, 42).9 And
“orientation is what we actually find as the outstanding characteristic in the performances
of an organism” (Goldstein 1995, 84). An effectual, “normal,” or “ordered” performance
of an organism, three ways of saying the same thing according to Goldstein, is one where
the

responses appear to be constant, correct, adequate to the organism to which they
belong, and adequate to the species and to the individuality of the organism, as
well as to the respective circumstances. The individual himself experiences them
with a feeling of smooth functioning, unconstraint, well-being, adjustment to the
world, and satisfaction, that is, the course of behavior has a definite order, a total
pattern in which all involved organismic factors – the mental and the somatic
down to the physicochemical processes – participate in a fashion appropriate to
the performance in question. (Goldstein 1995, 48-9)

By contrast, a deficient, pathological, or “disordered” performance of an organism, again
three ways of saying the same thing, is one where the responses

are not only “inadequate” but also disordered, inconstant, inconsistent, and
embedded in physical and mental shock. In these situations, the individual feels
Goldstein even goes so far as to state that “the basic phenomenon of life is an incessant
process of coming to terms with the environment” (Goldstein 1995, 260).
8

Another definition of performance provided by Goldstein thus follows: “concrete action
in which the organism actualizes itself” (Goldstein 1995, 282).
9
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himself unfree, buffeted, and vacillating. He experiences a shock affecting not
only his own person, but the surrounding world as well. (Goldstein 1995, 49)

In essence, through the holistic method, Goldstein claims that the relative constancy of
each and every single living organism is achieved through its orientation exhibited in
each and every single one of its performances to maintaining or regaining its respective
“preferred behaviors” (Goldstein 1995, 84-90). By “preferred behaviors” Goldstein
means ordered behaviors of the organism or those performances of a particular living
organism in which it responds to the demands imposed by its environment in an adequate
and optimal fashion (Goldstein 1995, 272-3). However Goldstein makes it very clear that
the relative constants of the organism do not explain the orientation of the living
organism toward an ordered, optimal, and adequate state of being in its responses to its
environment. If anything, the orientation explains the relative constancy and not the other
way around. As Goldstein explicitly states:

We must not forget that the criterion of preferred behavior, that is, the constants,
is a more or less preliminary one and that it cannot furnish us an indication of the
actual cause for the orientation of the organismic course of events in actual living.
(Goldstein 1995, 305-6; italics not in the original)

So what, according to Goldstein, explains the orientation that is exhibited in each and
every single performance of each and every single organism understood holistically? The
answer to this question depends on the particular organism in question and what
Goldstein means by “orientation.”
Goldstein, following Karl Ernst von Baer, makes a distinction between
“purpose” and “end” (Goldstein 1995, 324). A “purpose” is “an intended task” whereas
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an “end” is “a given orientation of activity, an intrinsically predetermined effect”
(Goldstein 1995, 324). Like von Baer, Goldstein prefers the term “end” over “purpose”
because the former concept is useful for Goldstein’s holistic understanding of the
organism. According to Goldstein, the notion of “end” is useful because it signifies a
process whereby each organism actualizes its respective intrinsic nature (Goldstein 1995,
324). At the same time, however, Goldstein disagrees with von Baer because von Baer
takes the notion of “end” in a “metaphysical sense” rather than in the sense that Goldstein
is after, namely, as a regulative ideal or as “a guiding notion for the procedure of
knowledge” (Goldstein 1995, 324). And it is through the notion of “end” understood as a
regulative notion that the “concept of wholeness” in general is to be understood
(Goldstein 1995, 324). This is tantamount to saying that the knowledge of the organism
as an ideal whole is to be fundamentally understood through the notion of orientation or
end.
With this distinction between purpose and end, a connection between Goldstein
and the Kant of the Critique of Judgment can be made. In fact, without developing in any
explicit details, Goldstein does mention Kant’s notion of “inner purposiveness” from the
Critique of Judgment (Goldstein 1995, 323).10 Kant is only mentioned once in The
Organism. In addition, there is no direct reference to any of Kant’s works in either the
endnotes or the bibliography. It is not surprising at all that in emphasizing the distinction
between purpose and end, Goldstein turns to the biologist von Baer rather than to the
Kant of the Critique of Judgment. For Goldstein’s notion of orientation understood
through the regulative notion of end remains within a scientific paradigm rather than a
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant calls it “purposiveness without purpose”
[Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck] (Kant 2000, 17).
10
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strictly transcendental paradigm.11 As we will see in the subsequent chapters, the
relevance of the connection and disconnection between, on the one hand, Goldstein and
Kant and, on the other, Goldstein and Hegel, will also shed light on Merleau-Ponty’s
proximity to and distance from Goldstein, especially insofar as his understanding of the
organism as an ideal whole or a regulative ideal is concerned.
Before I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior, let me offer a few
remarks about the notion of orientation as it is exhibited in the total behavior of human
beings. The reason for presenting such remarks lies not only in the fact that in The
Organism Goldstein’s focus is the human being, but also because they will become
important in understanding the points of convergences and divergences between MerleauPonty and Goldstein. In The Organism, Goldstein was primarily interested in the
orientation in the total behavior of human beings. As Goldstein writes,

The problem of how the phenomenon of orientations in human actions arises has
been our particular concern, and we may say that it has been a problem to many
generations of philosophers and biologists. To us, it seems that we cannot
approach this question without a sufficient appreciation of consciousness. It is
ultimately consciousness that determines orientation. Only if we keep this in mind
are we prepared to deal adequately with the phenomenon of speech, ethical
conduct, art, culture, and freedom to act. And only then are we able to understand
that these are exclusively attributes of the human being and are absent in animals.
(Goldstein 1995, 261; italics not original)

According to Goldstein, the orientation as it is exhibited in the total behavior of human
organisms is fundamentally different from other living organisms because human beings
are the only organisms that have “the ability to view a single experience within a larger
11

Goldstein is no doubt influenced by Kant, but Goldstein also has reservations about
transcendental frameworks (Goldstein 1995, 28).
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context, the ‘attitude toward the possible,’ to have freedom of decision regarding
different alternatives” (Goldstein 1995, 240). That is, human organisms have the free and
distinctive capacity of detaching or abstracting themselves in various ways from not only
the contents of their immediate environment but also the relations and configuration of
such contents within a larger frame of reference (Goldstein 1995, 240).12 In the total
behavior of the human being, two interrelated capacities can be distinguished: abstract
and concrete (Goldstein 1995, 243-4). The abstract capacity of behavior is the “ability of
voluntary shifting, of reasoning discursively, oriented on self-chosen frames of reference,
of free decision for action, of isolating parts from a whole, of disjoining given wholes, as
well as of establishing connections, for example, in learning” (Goldstein 1995, 301-2).
By contrast, the concrete element of behavior is an immersion in one’s immediate
environment (Goldstein 1995, 244).
Further, Goldstein argues that the total behavior of a human organism can
“abstractly” be distinguished in terms of three aspects: performances, attitudes, and
processes (Goldstein 1995, 245). All these three aspects involve both the concrete and
abstract capacities either in the foreground or in the background. Performances of a
human organism are the activities which are freely and consciously chosen and
experienced (Goldstein 1995, 245). In performances, abstract behavior is in the
foreground and concrete behavior is in the background. Attitudes of a human organism
are particular states of being like moods, feelings, etc (Goldstein 1995, 245). In attitudes,
concrete behavior is in the foreground and abstract behavior is in the background. Unlike

12

Although Goldstein does not develop the notion of freedom in any detailed manner, it
is however very important for understanding the difference between human and non-human
organisms. Goldstein even goes so far as to claim that the “loss of the attitude toward the
possible” is an “impairment of freedom” (Goldstein 1995, 240).
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performances, attitudes are not consciously willed activities, but attitudes are primarily
experienced or lived directly and only indirectly reflected upon. Processes are the physiochemical events that occur in our body (Goldstein 1995, 245). In the processes, although
Goldstein is not clear about this, I take it that both abstract and concrete behaviors are in
the background because the processes occur without either our voluntary conscious
awareness or our direct experience of them (Goldstein 1995, 245).
More so, in order to consciously reflect on each aspect, each subsequent aspect
is a further abstraction from the whole (Goldstein 1995, 245). For instance, a direct
reflection on attitudes would be more of an abstraction than say a direct reflection on
performances. In addition, for all three aspects “conscious orientation is necessary for
them. But the opposite does not hold” (Goldstein 1995, 247). According to Goldstein,
this is so because in order for attitudes, processes, and even performances to be
recognized as such, it requires a consciousness and more accurately, a conscious
orientation toward them. So my point is that the orientation exhibited in the total behavior
of the human organism is fundamentally chosen through one’s freedom and in a
conscious manner.13 Non-human organisms do not exhibit the kind of freedom in their
behavior that human organisms do. This freedom is characterized by the “attitude toward
the possible.”

Cf. “However, human behavior will never become understandable in its specific
complexity if one does not realize that the very organization of the human being consists in the
potentiality to behave partitively as well as holistically. The phenomena of active self-limitation
and of culture - differentiated as it is into manifold aspects of life and nature - demand that
capacity of shifting, of ‘compartmental’ activities, the ability to represent to oneself different
contents as separated and belonging simultaneously to the same frame of reference. Without that,
and without the ‘attitude toward the Possible,’ abstract behavior could not exist - trait without
which human culture is inconceivable” (Goldstein 1995, 301-2).
13

50

Following Goldstein, in The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty, makes use of
the organism as an ideal whole or a regulative ideal. That is to say, for Merleau-Ponty,
like Goldstein, the organism is “a unity of signification, a phenomenon in the Kantian
sense” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 159). Also, for both, the idea of life in general and of the
living organism in particular is “a reason in knowledge” [Erkentnissgrund] rather than “a
ground in reality” [Seinsgrund] (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 153).14 Even though Goldstein
denies that he is employing any transcendental element in his holistic description of the
organism, by describing the organism as a regulative ideal in a quasi-Kantian sense,
Goldstein is interpreted by Merleau-Ponty as being too Kantian. Even though Goldstein
concedes that the organism is a “historical being” and that the element of “time” is
crucial in understanding the performances of the organism, as we will see, it is MerleauPonty’s contention that what makes Goldstein too Kantian is that Goldstein takes for
granted the historical emergence of the organism as already completed (Goldstein 1995,
387). In other words, according to Merleau-Ponty, Goldstein fails to account for the
historical genesis of the organism itself. I agree with Merleau-Ponty because although
Goldstein asserts that the organism is a “historical being,” an assertion is not an argument
(Goldstein 1995, 387). That is, Goldstein does not bother to explain how the organism is
to be understood as a historical being. He could have explained this in many ways. For
instance, Goldstein could have provided details about the nature of this “historical being.”
How are we to understand the historicity of the organism? Goldstein could have done this

14

See Smyth 2007, 186.
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by focusing on either temporality or history. In addition, Goldstein could have said more
about the kind of freedom that human organisms have.15
If Goldstein is too Kantian, then according to Merleau-Ponty, we have a
Hegelian problem, namely, what Merleau-Ponty calls the “problem of perception” or the
problem of knowing how individual consciousnesses can integrate their own historical
emergence (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 216; cf. 219, 224). It is because of this singular
problem that Merleau-Ponty is led to the proposal of rethinking transcendental
philosophy (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224).

§ 3. An Overview of The Structure of Behavior

In this section, I explain some pertinent details concerning The Structure of
Behavior. Such details will further shed light on what Merleau-Ponty means by the
“problem of perception” and why the “problem of perception” is at the basis of MerleauPonty’s proposal for rethinking transcendental philosophy.
The aim of The Structure of Behavior is “to understand the relations of
consciousness and nature: organic, psychological, or even social” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
3). More precisely, as the subtitle of the introduction indicates, this book is fundamentally
about “[t]he problem of the relations of consciousness and nature” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
v; my italics).16 According to Merleau-Ponty, it is a problem because there seems to be at

There is no thematic discussion of “freedom” in The Organism. In passing, Goldstein
mentions freedom as the distinctive characteristic that separate human organisms from nonhuman, living organisms. See Goldstein 1995, 240, 341-2, 349, 351, 368, 372, 392.
15
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first glance two equally plausible positions on how to understand the relations between
consciousness and nature. On the one hand, there is a position that understands nature as
“a multiplicity of events external to each other and bound together by relations of
causality” in which consciousness is simply a product of nature, a product fundamentally
understood in either a mechanistic or a vitalistic way (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 3). Broadly
speaking, this position is characterized by Merleau-Ponty as a realist position (MerleauPonty 1963, 3). On the other hand, there is a position that understands nature as “the
ensemble of objective relations borne by consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 3). In
such a position, nature is nothing other than the product of consciousness, a product
fundamentally understood as constituted by consciousness. Broadly speaking, this
position is characterized by Merleau-Ponty as an idealist position (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
3).17 In the attempt to understand the relations of consciousness and nature, the entire
book can be read as an attempt at resolving this antinomy between realism sensu stricto
and idealism sensu stricto, and specifically, scientific naturalism and transcendental
idealism by uncovering a prior ground of which each position is only an abstract or
incomplete moment.18 Merleau-Ponty wants to rethink consciousness, nature, and the

16

See the table of contents to the Structure of Behavior, which includes Merleau-Ponty’s
division of the chapters and their respective sections. This is important because the table of
content shows how Merleau-Ponty saw the logic or the structure of the entire book.
Merleau-Ponty says “critical thought” [criticisme] (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 3). By critical
thought, Merleau-Ponty means critical or transcendental idealism (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184, 197202).
17

18

As it will turn out, for Merleau-Ponty, these mutually exclusive positions are partially
correct (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 158). I characterize it as an antinomy not only because MerleauPonty speaks of antinomies throughout The Structure of Behavior but also because MerleauPonty, although not being explicit about his method in the Structure of Behavior, is employing a
method similar to the method employed by Kant in dealing with the antinomies in the
Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. See for instance, Kant 1998, A409/B436
– A462/B490. In addition, in referring to the introduction to The Structure of Behavior in the
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relation between them by not going as far as realism (i.e. scientific naturalism) without
however ending up with a critical or transcendental idealism. This is the ambitious task of
The Structure of Behavior. It remains to be seen in the dissertation whether MerleauPonty succeeds in accomplishing such a task, what Merleau-Ponty means by realism and
idealism, and what the third position beyond realism and idealism would be.
In The Structure of Behavior, the antinomy between realism and idealism vis-àvis the relation of consciousness and nature is taken up by Merleau-Ponty through the
“notion of behavior [le comportement]” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 6). The raison d’être for
such a move lies in the assertion that, although the notion of behavior can be understood
in either a psychological or in a physiological way, it is Merleau-Ponty’s contention that
this notion remains “neutral” to such distinctions (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 4). MerleauPonty wants to think behavior anew through “dialectical thinking” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
226 n. 3). In other words, Merleau-Ponty wants to put forth a dialectical conception of
behavior in general and of work in particular (insofar as human organisms are
concerned).19 It is still far from clear how to understand this dialectical conception of
behavior. For now, it should suffice to say that by dialectical, Merleau-Ponty means a
circular process and behavior understood in a dialectical way would be defined in terms
of the circular process between consciousness (or more precisely organism) and nature.

Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty writes: “Our goal was to understand the relations
between consciousness and nature, from the inside and from the outside. Or again, it was to
connect the idealist perspective (according to which nothing exists except as an object for
consciousness) and the realist perspective (according to which consciousnesses are inserted into
the tissue of the objective world and of events in themselves” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 452/491).
19

In talking about the behavior of human organisms in The Structure of Behavior,
Merleau-Ponty prefers the Hegelian term “work” [le travail] over “action” because according to
Merleau-Ponty the word “action” still has psychological connotations that the word “work” does
not (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162).
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In order to substantiate the claim that behavior is reducible neither to a psychological
description nor to a physiological description and that it is to be understood in an antireductionist way or as a dialectical process between consciousness and nature, MerleauPonty relies fundamentally on Kurt Goldstein’s holistic conception of the “organism” and
the notion of “form” understood in Gestalt psychology.20 Given that our focus is to
understand Merleau-Ponty’s proposal for rethinking transcendental philosophy, I will
only focus on the relevant details that will shed light on the proposal and aid in
understanding it. In view of that, in what follows I will briefly go through the first three
chapters of The Structure of Behavior, highlighting the relevant claims that MerleauPonty makes only to end up with what he calls the Hegelian “problem of perception” and
then in conclusion turn to understand his proposal for rethinking transcendental
philosophy. I will discuss the fourth and final chapter of The Structure of Behavior when
I turn to explain the “problem of perception” in the next section.
In “Reflex Behavior,” the first chapter of The Structure of Behavior, MerleauPonty puts forth a “critique of reflex theory” or what he takes to be the realist position on
the issue of behavior (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 46). In particular, the critique focuses
primarily on what according to Merleau-Ponty is usually considered as “lower” behaviors
or “mechanical reactions” in contradistinction to “higher” or intentional behaviors
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 124-5). In putting forth this critique, Merleau-Ponty relies heavily

20

As a side note, I have already discussed that in explaining what the organism is,
Goldstein relies on the notion of Gestalt or “form,” but as we will see later in this chapter,
Merleau-Ponty goes beyond both by thinking about the form by itself, that is, beyond its
connection to behavior and doing so in a transcendental manner.
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on Goldstein’s holistic conception of the organism.21 Merleau-Ponty argues that the
critique of reflex theory via the organism in the Goldsteinein sense leads to introducing
and highlighting the importance of the notion of “form” as it is understood by Gestalt
psychologists such as Wolfgang Köehler, Max Wertheimer, and Kurt Koffka (MerleauPonty 1963, 46-7). As already discussed in “§2. Goldstein and the Organism as Holistic,”
in appropriating the notion of Gestalt or form, Goldstein relies on Ehrenfels’ two criteria
while at the same time criticizing Gestalt psychology for what Goldstein takes to be
Gestalt psychology’s inherent realism. To remind us once again, Ehrenfels’ two criteria
thus follow: 1) the parts are inseparable from a whole and yet, the whole is not reducible
to the sum of its parts, whatever the parts may be (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 47); 2) on the
one hand, a change in a single part modifies the entire whole and on the other hand, if all
the parts are changed but the relations between the parts remain the same, the whole will
not change (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 47).22
In “Higher Forms of Behavior,” the second chapter of The Structure of Behavior,
Merleau-Ponty—in relying on what Goldstein means by the organism and the Gestalt
notion of form—continues his criticism of reflex theory but now with respect to Ivan
Pavlov’s reflexology and more precisely, “higher” or intentional reactions, reactions
which depend on the “meaning of the situation” and presuppose that they are present to a
consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 125). It is Merleau-Ponty’s contention that the
organism as holistic (à la Goldstein)—which as mentioned before relies to an extent on

See “§2. Goldstein and the Organism as Holistic” for details regarding the organism in
the Goldsteinein sense.
21

In reference to this point, Merleau-Ponty, like Goldstein, does not cite Ehrenfels’
primary texts but rather cites Köhler’s text on it. See Köhler 1924, 35-7; cp. Merleau-Ponty 1963,
230 n. 98-9.
22
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the Gestalt notion of the form—sheds light on the fact that neither the lower or
mechanical behaviors can explain the higher or intentional behaviors. Nor can the higher
behaviors explain the lower behaviors (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 124-5). Instead, MerleauPonty contends that it is through the organism—especially as understood by Goldstein—
that we can understand that “behavior is a form” or a Gestalt understood according to
Ehrenfels’ two criteria (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 127). In saying that behavior is a form, I
take Merleau-Ponty to mean many things. First of all, behavior is always for a
consciousness. That is, it is something perceived. Secondly, behavior is a perceived
whole that is reducible neither to the sum of its parts nor to a single part. In other words,
behavior must be understood through the entire organism and with the context in which it
occurs. Lastly, behavior is a form in the sense that if a single change occurs in the
organism and the relations between all of the parts do not remain the same, then this
particular change will modify not only the entire organism, but also the behavior of the
organism.
With behavior as a form, what Merleau-Ponty is seeking to understand the
structure or the configuration of behavior. In other words, Merleau-Ponty wants to know
how behavior organizes itself before a consciousness and presents itself to consciousness
as a signification or meaning. This is Merleau-Ponty’s anti-reductionist or dialectical
conception of behavior, which he divides into three forms: syncretic, detachable
[amovible], and symbolic (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 103-28; translation slightly modified).23
This classification is based on whether the organization or the “structure in behavior is
submerged in the content or, on the contrary, emerges from it to become, at the limit, the
Alden L. Fisher translates “amovible” as “amovable” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 105). By
contrast, following Bryan Smyth, I translate “amovible” as “detachable” because “detachable”
captures what Merleau-Ponty means by the second form of behavior (Smyth 2007, 183).
23
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proper theme of activity” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 103). Again following Goldstein,
Merleau-Ponty’s classification is fundamentally about the dialectical or circular relation
between a particular living organism and its respective environment insofar as its
orientation or intentional directedness is concerned. Let me pause here and explain
succinctly each form of behavior.
According to Merleau-Ponty, the syncretic form of behavior is the “simplest
forms of behavior,” which can be characterized as “instinctive” and do not involve any
mediation of language in general or signs in particular (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 104-5). In
Merleau-Ponty’s words, at the syncretic level, “behavior is tied to either to certain
abstract aspects of the situations or to certain complexes of very special stimuli. In any
case, it is imprisoned in the framework of its natural conditions and treats unexpected
situations only as allusions to the vital situations which are prescribed for it” (MerleauPonty 1963, 104). By saying that behavior is syncretic if it is tied to its “natural
conditions” rather than its “vital situations,” I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that there is no
volitional force involved. Instead, there seems to be a kind of a programmed response to
one’s environment. Some living organisms mentioned in this category are an
invertebrate, an ant, a starfish, a toad, an earthworm, and a frog (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
104-5). In short, at this level, the fundamental point to note is that the animal is oriented
or intentionally directed via instinct to its respective environment by being immersed in it
without the mediation of any linguistic sign, and there is little to no detachment or
abstraction from its immediate surroundings. It seems that since syncretic behaviors are
instinctive, there cannot be any genuine learning. Merleau-Ponty defines learning as “a
new aptitude for resolving a series of problems of the same form” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
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96).24 Given such a definition of learning, if by instinctive we mean all behaviors
programmed from birth and, if by genuine learning we mean some new kind of behavior
acquired through practice and habituation, then it follows that an organism that is
typically characterized by syncretic behavior cannot be said to learn any new behavior.
In contrast to the syncretic form of behavior, according to Merleau-Ponty, the
detachable [amovible] form of behavior does not simply rely on instinct and does involve
the mediation of signs or what Merleau-Ponty calls “signals” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 105).
By signal, Merleau-Ponty means “a configuration (Sign-Gestalt)” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
106). That is, the animal is not simply immersed in its immediate environment and does
respond to its environment in a meaningful way by grasping to a very limited extent some
relations embedded in its immediate environment. Some living organisms mentioned in
this category are a chicken, a rat, a dog, a cat, a lower monkey, and a chimpanzee
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 105-20). At this level, the fundamental point to note is that the
animal is oriented or intentionally directed to its respective environment via the
mediation of signs as signals or meaningful relations and, although there is detachment or
abstraction from one’s immediate surroundings, this detachment is very limited because
the animal which exhibits this form of behavior cannot step back and take many
perspectives on its immediate environment. In other words, there is indeed a sense of
genuine learning at this level, but it is very limited. It is limited because, although some
new kind of behavior can be acquired through practice and habituation, the repertoire of
new behaviors is limited to the immediate situation.

Merleau-Ponty provides another definition of learning: “a general alteration of
behavior which is manifested in a multitude of actions, the content of which is variable and the
significance constant” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 96).
24

59

Lastly, in contrast to both the syncretic and detachable [amovible] forms, there is
the form of symbolic behavior that is exclusively reserved for human organisms. Here
Merleau-Ponty’s humanism is apparent. For him, the human organism’s relation to its
environment is fundamentally mediated by signs as “symbols” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
120). By symbols, Merleau-Ponty means linguistic signs in the strict sense of the term.
The world is fundamentally expressed by the human organism through language and the
meanings that are immanent in the signs. The human organism is the only one that has
the capacity to express the same object or theme in many ways by stepping back and
taking a perspective on it (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 122). Merleau-Ponty argues that this
capacity to detach or abstract oneself from one’s immediate environment “introduces a
cognitive conduct and a free conduct” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 122). As a side note, this is
what Goldstein called the “attitude to the possible” (Goldstein 1995, 163; cf. 240). In
other words, it is this capacity that provides the human being a sense of freedom and an
orientation to “truth” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 122). For this very reason, Merleau-Ponty
says that at this level, “behavior no longer has only one signification, it is itself
signification” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 122).
At the level of symbolic behavior, the fundamental point to note is that the
human organism is oriented or intentionally directed to its respective environment via the
mediation of signs as symbols and there is detachment or abstraction from its immediate
surroundings to grasp the “structure” or organization of its behavior in relation to its
environment (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 127). A structure is neither a thing nor an idea
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 127). It is also something different from signification (MerleauPonty 1963, 206). Merleau-Ponty defines structure as “the junction [la jonction] of an
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idea and an existence which are indiscernible, the contingent arrangement by which
materials begin to have meaning in our presence, intelligibility in the nascent sense”
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 206-7). Structure is the relational configuration of a form or a
whole. Depending on the shifting of relations, contexts, and/or the perspectives that an
organism takes on its environment, the configuration or arrangement always organizes
and reorganizes itself for and before [devant] the living organisms. This happens
primarily at the level of symbolic behavior, but also in a very limited sense at the level of
detachable [amovible] behavior. Given that the human organism can relate to its
environment in many ways and that such relations are mediated by language, MerleauPonty believes that there is genuine learning only at the symbolic level.
In “The Physical Order, the Vital Order, the Human Order,” the third chapter of
The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty goes beyond the concerns of the forms of
behavior of a living organism to focus on the notion of form itself and to explicate its
respective philosophical implications. Merleau-Ponty turns to the notion of form itself as
understood by Gestalt psychology only to criticize in it what he takes to be its residual
“realist postulates” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 136) and in turn, to establish the “ideality” of
form as such (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184). Merleau-Ponty believes that such a notion of
form will provide a resolution to the antinomy of realism and idealism (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 127; cf. 131). But mainly what Merleau-Ponty hopes to do by establishing the
ideality of form is to replace what he takes to be the substantial or realistic conception of
form with a structural conception of form. By “ideality” of form Merleau-Ponty means
that form is never an in itself or a mind-independent entity but is always a “perceived
whole” or a whole for a consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 143). The form as a
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perceived whole possesses a transposable and an “internal and dynamic unity which gives
to the whole the character of an indecomposable individual” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 142).
Further, with the ideality of form, Merleau-Ponty divides three different
dialectically and hierarchically structured “orders of signification” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
137). By order, Merleau-Ponty does not mean a substance but rather a “structuration” or a
relational arrangement.25 According to Merleau-Ponty, there are three orders of
signification: the physical order or “matter,” the vital order or “life,” and the human order
or “mind” [l’esprit] (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 137). For Merleau-Ponty, these three orders of
signification—matter, life, and mind—do not exist in any realist or mind-independent
sense. Instead, they always require a conscious perspective. More so, there is a “structural
difference” between matter, life, and mind in general or physical forms, living forms, and
human forms in particular (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 132-3). This structural difference is
accounted by the respective type of self-organization that manifests itself in each
perceived form. The self-organization is to be understood through the respective,
“dominant characteristic” that is exhibited in each perceived form: “quantity” is exhibited
in the physical order or matter; “order” is exhibited in the vital order or life;26 and “value
or signification” is exhibited in the mental order or mind (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 131).27
25

Here Merleau-Ponty intimates the connection between structure and signification.

Merleau-Ponty uses the term “order” to mean two different things. On the hand,
Merleau-Ponty uses the term “order” to designate the kinds of hierarchically and dialectically
structured levels of signification (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 137). On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty
uses the term “order” to describe the “dominant characteristic of life (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 131).
In order to differentiate the two senses of order, when using order in the first sense, I will refer to
it as order and when using order in the second sense, I will refer to it as orderp.
26

27

These three dominant characteristics of each respective order of signification—matter,
life, and mind—are also designated by Merleau-Ponty as prime “properties” and even
“universally applicable categories” of the three orders of signification (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
131).
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By saying that “quantity” is the dominant characteristic that is exhibited in the physical
order, I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that the self-organization of the physical order is
primarily expressed in a quantitative manner or through “formula[s]” (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 131). To illustrate this point, Merleau-Ponty relies on an example of the soap
bubble (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 131). Merleau-Ponty says that the soap bubble can be
expressed in a quantitative manner or through formulas which will explain “what happens
at each point is determined by what happens at all others” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 131). A
soap bubble maintains a constant pressure inside and that pressure can be expressed by a
mathematical formula.28 This is what Merleau-Ponty means that the physical order can be
expressed in quantitative relations.
In contrast to the self-organization of the physical order, the self-organization of
the vital order is primarily expressed through what Merleau-Ponty calls orderp (MerleauPonty 1963, 131). Merleau-Ponty believes that the vital order is structurally different
from the physical order because the former exhibits a self-organization that is to be
understood through orderp and orderp is something that cannot be explained through
quantitative relations. What distinguishes the living form from the physical form is “the
property which it has of itself setting the conditions of its equilibrium, then of creating its

28

Merleau-Ponty does not provide a formula for the pressure inside the soap bubble.
Herbert Stanley Allen and Harry Moore provide a formula that explains the pressure inside a soap
bubble: “Inside a soap bubble, the pressure is greater than atmospheric by a small quantity p.
Considering the equilibrium of the upper hemisphere, this excess pressure acts on the upper
hemisphere, and produces a resultant upward force on the hemisphere of magnitude pπr2, tending
to blow the upper and lower hemispheres apart. The two hemispheres are kept together by the
surface tension forces acting in the two surfaces of the film round the line of contact, and the
bubble expands until the surface tension forces just neutralize the disruptive force πrT. The line
of contact between the hemispheres in each surface is of length 2πr, and hence the total force due
to surface tension keeping the hemispheres together is 2(2πrT), since the film has two surfaces.
Thus 4πrT = pπr2 or T = pr/4” (Allen and Moore 1916, 194-5).
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milieu” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 153-4).29 An example of a living form would be a nonhuman, living organism. Following Goldstein, Merleau-Ponty defines the organism as “a
unity of signification, a phenomenon in the Kantian sense” or as a regulative ideal
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 159). Living forms exist in a dialectical relation with their
respective environments through what Merleau-Ponty calls an “internal norm” (MerleauPonty 1963, 159-60). “By norm,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “here one does not mean an
ought to be [un devoir être] which would make it be; it is the simple observation of a
preferred attitude, statistically more frequent, which gives a new kind of unity to
behavior” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 159-60). That is, living forms, although dependent upon
physical forms, emerge as structurally different and autonomous forms because they
manifest a unity that cannot be explained in simply quantitative formulas. In other words,
quantitative formulas cannot explain why and how living non-human organisms
constantly seek their own orderp or “preferred behavior” in the Goldsteinen sense that we
have already discussed in § 2 above (42-3).
In contrast to both the physical order and the vital order, the self-organization of
the mental order is primarily expressed through “value or signification” (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 131). The mental order is the “human order” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162). MerleauPonty believes that the mental order is structurally different from both the physical and
vital orders because the mental order exhibits a self-organization that is to be understood
through value and signification, which is something that cannot be explained through
quantitative relations or orderp. According to Merleau-Ponty, the “human order” is
characterized by “the capacity of orienting oneself in relation to the possible, to the
Merleau-Ponty says that the vital order is characterized by the “vital situationinstinctive reaction” pair (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162). Merleau-Ponty does not provide a pair for
the physical order. This may be because there is no consciousness at the physical order.
29
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mediate, and not in relation to a limited milieu; they all reveal what we called above, with
Goldstein, the categorial attitude” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 245-6 n. 97).30 This capacity
manifests itself in what Merleau-Ponty, borrowing from Hegel, calls “‘work’”
[“‘travail’”] or “the ensemble of activities by which man transforms the physical and
living nature” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162; cf. 175).31 According to Merleau-Ponty,
“work” or human action always goes hand in hand with the “perceived situation”
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162). They both are a pair that characterizes the human order. The
object of perception in the perceived situation is “the actions of other human subjects,”
which is identical with work (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 166).32 And the human order emerges
as a new form because the human organism has the capacity to reject its perceived
situation if it is not suitable to its internal norms by prospectively adopting a new value or
bestowing a new meaning on the situation at hand (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 245-6 n. 97).33

As Merleau-Ponty puts it differently, this is “the capacity of going beyond [dépasser]
created structures in order to create others” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 175; cf. 165).
30

31

To explain the production of new structures by the human organism, Merleau-Ponty
does not like the term “action” instead he prefers the term work because it does not have the
psychological connotations that action may have (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162).
Cf. “Nascent [commençante] perception has the double character of being directed
toward human intentions rather than toward objects of nature or the pure qualities (hot, cold,
white, black) of which they are the supports, and of grasping them as experienced realities rather
than as true objects” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 166).
32

See Smyth 2007, 197. Cf. Merleau-Ponty highlights the importance of a “prospective
analysis”: “The whole in the organism is an idea, as Spinoza thought. However, while Spinoza
believed he was able to rediscover the unity of the body beyond the fragmented extension of the
imagination in a law homogenous with the law of physical systems, it does not seem possible to
understand life by a regressive analysis which goes back to its conditions. It will be a question of
a prospective analysis which will look for the immanent signification of life, the latter again
being no more a force of attraction than cause is a force of propulsion. ‘Signification’ is to the
final cause what the relation of function to variable is to the ‘producing cause’” (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 160; my italics). Also, in “An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty,” MerleauPonty writes: “Behaviors reveal a sort of prospective activity in the organism, as if it were
oriented toward the sense of certain elementary situations, as if it entertained familiar relations
33
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Although each subsequent order of signification exhibit a self-organization that
cannot be explained by the preceding order, the three orders of signification are not
mutually exclusive orders. The three dialectically and hierarchically structured orders of
significations—physical, life, and mind—are distinct and yet inseparable from one
another because each subsequent order of signification dialectically integrates the
previous one while at the same time emerges from the previous one as a “new
structuration” or a new order of signification (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184). “The relation of
each order to the higher order is that of the partial to the total” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
180). This means that each order forms a whole with itself (physical, vital, and human)
and all three orders in relation to one another are parts of a whole that is neither the sum
of all the parts (i.e. physical + vital + human ≠ whole) nor reducible to any one part (i.e.
the whole ≠ physical order or vital order or human order). The three orders of
signification must be understood as wholes, forms, or “partial totalities,” which are
arranged in terms of their degrees of progressive integration and individuality (MerleauPonty 1963, 139). As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “matter, life, and mind must participate
unequally in the nature of form; they must represent different degrees of integration and,
finally, must constitute a hierarchy in which individuality is progressively achieved”
with them, as if there were an ‘a priori of the organism’ privileged conducts and laws of internal
equilibrium which predisposed the organism to certain relations with its milieu” (Merleau-Ponty
2007b, 284; my italics). This means that human behavior which is oriented to the possible is not
primarily and exclusively concerned with a theoretical relation to the world, but also and most
importantly with a practical relation to the world, which itself has to do with orienting oneself to
the future or looking prospectively. To put it differently, human behavior which makes use of
symbols or linguistic signs is not always oriented theoretically, that is, towards knowledge, but
also lives practically in the world. The distinction between the practical and the theoretical has to
do with Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between lived versus known (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 173). In
Merleau-Ponty’s words, “consciousness is a network [réseau] of significative intentions which
are sometimes clear to themselves and sometimes, on the contrary, lived rather than known
[connues]. Such a conception will permit us to link consciousness with action by enlarging our
idea of action” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 173).
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(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 132-3). The vital order or dialectic remains founded on the
physical order or dialectic but, at the same time, the vital dialectic is “liberated” from it
because the vital order is a more integrated kind of individuality—an individuality that is
dependent upon the physical order but is not reducible to the physical order because the
self-organization of the vital order cannot be explained in quantitative relations. The vital
order is a “new structuration” or new relational configuration of signification because
orderp cannot be explained through quantitative relations (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184). The

mental order emerges from the vital and the physical orders as a more integrated kind of
individuality, an individuality that is dependent upon both the vital and the physical order
but is not reducible to them because the self-organization of the mental order cannot be
explained in quantitative relations or through orderp. This is what Merleau-Ponty calls the
“double relation” between the orders or relational arrangements of signification, that is,
each order of signification remains dependent on the lower dialectic while at the same
time, remains autonomous from it as well.34
In a nutshell, in this chapter, Merleau-Ponty contra any realist or substantialist
interpretation of form, establishes the “ideality of the physical form, that of the organism,
and that of the mental [le psychical]” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184). If it is granted that
Merleau-Ponty is successful in establishing the ideality of form in Chapter 3 of The
Structure of Behavior, I take it that he can then be read as following Goldstein’s idealist
interpretation of the notion of form in contradistinction to the Gestalt psychologist’s
realist notion of form. However, such a statement must be qualified. That is, MerleauDetails regarding this “double relation” will follow shortly. The point that I want to
make here is that this ideal and dialectical double relation between the three orders of
significations anticipates what will be called in the Phenomenology of Perception, the
phenomenological notion of Fundierung or the founding/founded relation (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
414/454; cf. 128-9/159-60).
34
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Ponty is not simply following Goldstein because Merleau-Ponty further develops the
philosophical consequences of the notion of form, which Goldstein did not explicate in
any detailed manner, and it remains to be seen whether Merleau-Ponty’s ideality of form
is understood in the quasi-Kantian, idealist sense à la Goldstein or in some other sense
(e.g. a Hegelian, historical sense). In any event, by establishing the ideality of form and
of the three orders in particular, Merleau-Ponty can be read as going beyond both
Goldstein and Gestalt psychology vis-à-vis the notion of Gestalt or form.

§ 4. The Hegelian “Problem of Perception”

In “IV. The Relations of the Soul and the Body and the Problem of Perceptual
Consciousness,” the fourth and final chapter of The Structure of Behavior, MerleauPonty’s goal is to differentiate the ideality of the “double relation” between the three
orders of signification from “the classical solutions and in particular with respect to
critical idealism” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184). The reason why Merleau-Ponty wants to
do this is because Merleau-Ponty is worried that his position on the ideality of the double
relation might be mistaken for the ideality as understood in a critical or transcendental
idealism (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184). For this very reason, Merleau-Ponty wants to show
that the notion of ideality he is advocating is fundamentally different from critical or
transcendental idealism. Let me briefly explain.
As mentioned earlier, according to Merleau-Ponty, a Gestalt or form is a
“perceived whole” or whole always for a consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 143). If
this is the case, then all three forms—physical, vital, and human—are also perceived
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wholes. This is exactly what Merleau-Ponty meant by establishing the ideality of the
three forms in Chapter 3 of The Structure of Behavior, respectively: “[w]hat we call
nature is already consciousness of nature, what we call life is already consciousness of
life and what we call mental is still an object vis-à-vis consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 184). More so, each form is dependent upon the previous one while not being
reducible to it, this double relation itself is an ideal one. I am not claiming that the
dependency between the three forms entails ideality. Instead I am claiming that all three
forms are Gestalts and, given that a Gestalt is a perceived whole or whole given to a
conscious being, it follows that the forms cannot be mind-independent entities but must
be mind-dependent entities or ideal. Overall, if Merleau-Ponty has made the relationship
between consciousness and nature an ideal one, does this not immediately suggest that
Merleau-Ponty is espousing an idealism, whether transcendental or not?
First of all, it must be mentioned that Merleau-Ponty agrees with transcendental
or critical idealism that in order to go beyond both realism sensu stricto and skepticism, a
transcendental turn is definitely necessary (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 197). With the
transcendental turn,

We have moved from the idea of a nature as omnitudo realitatis to the idea of
objects which could not be conceived in themselves, partes extra partes, and
which are defined only by an idea in which they participate, by a signification
which is realized in them. (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 201-2)

In other words, according to Merleau-Ponty it is a necessary turn because a
transcendental turn gets rid of extra-mental or mind-independent entities by making all
objects of nature given to or for a conscious being. In other words, a transcendental turn
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is a necessary move in getting rid of realism sensu stricto or the notion of nature as a
mind-independent entity. According to Merleau-Ponty, with the transcendental turn,
nature is no longer understood as “a multiplicity of events external to each other and
bound together by relations of causality” in which consciousness is simply a product of
nature, a product fundamentally understood in either a mechanistic or a vitalistic way
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 3). But does this mean that by making the transcendental turn,
nature must be understood as “the ensemble of objective relations borne by
consciousness” where nature would be nothing other than the product of consciousness, a
product fundamentally understood as constituted by consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
3)?
The simple answer is: no. The evidence for such a claim lies in the fact that,
according to Merleau-Ponty, the transcendental turn is only the “the first phase of
reflection” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 215; my italics).35 And by this transcendental turn
Merleau-Ponty argues that his position “stands in a relation of simple homonymy with a
philosophy in the critical tradition” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 206; my italics).36 This is so
because, following Hegel, Merleau-Ponty argues that the ideality of the double relation
between the three orders of significations can and must be understood in a different
manner than the ideality of transcendental or critical idealism. This can be done if one
Merleau-Ponty also says that the transcendental turn is the “first conclusion” and not
the only one (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 206).
35

Regarding this homonymy Merleau-Ponty says in a footnote, “[w]e are thinking of a
philosophy like that of L. Brunschvicg and not of Kantian philosophy, which, particularly in the
Critique of Judgment, contains essential indications concerning the problems of which it is a
question here” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 248 n. 41). Cf. “Merleau-Ponty distinguishes, then, between
two different senses of ‘transcendental’ philosophy that stand in a relation of ‘simple
homonomy’: while critical idealism trades in significations, objects for consciousness,
phenomenology concerns structures, differential relations from which both consciousness and its
significations arise, ‘intelligibility in the nascent sense’” (Toadvine 2009, 42).
36
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interprets the ideality in Hegelian or a dialectical manner, that is, through the historical
emergence or genesis of consciousness itself (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 207).37 As MerleauPonty, citing Hegel, interprets in a dialectical manner the ideality of the double relation
between the three orders:

For life, as for the mind [l’esprit], there is no past which is absolutely past [il n’y
a pas de passé absolument passé];38 ‘the moments which the mind [l’esprit]
seems to have behind it are also carried [porte] in its present depths.’ Higher
behavior retains [garde] the subordinated dialectics in the present depths of its
existence, from that of the physical system and its topographical conditions to that
of the organism and its ‘milieu.’39 (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 207-8)

In other words, the human dialectic retains the lower dialectics or the physical and vital
dialectics in the present depths of its existence.40 This means that each order of
signification—physical, vital, or human—“eliminates the preceding one as isolated

Cf. “Since every moment of nature refers to perceptual consciousness as its essential
correlate, Merleau-Ponty’s position retains a close proximity to transcendental idealism, the
difference turning on the divergence between these two modes of consciousness [i.e. perceptual
and intellectual consciousnesses]” (Toadvine 2009, 24).
37

38

Merleau-Ponty anticipates the discussion of historical becoming or the constitutive
history of consciousness especially with respect to an “original past, a past which has never been
present” [un passé originel, un passé qui n’a jamais été présent] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 252/289).
Merleau-Ponty also cites this very point of about integrating one’s past in the depth of one’s
living present: “And this is again essential to time, for there would be no present – namely, the
sensible with its thickness and its inexhaustible richness – if perception did not, to speak like
Hegel, preserve [gardait] a past in its present depth, and did not condense that past into the
present” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 250/287).
This passage is from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 248 n. 45).
39

40

Again in very Hegelian manner Merleau-Ponty says about the ideal relation between
the three dialectics: “each formation [mis en forme] appears to us on the contrary to be an event in
the world of ideas, the institution of a new dialectic, the opening of a new region of phenomena,
and the establishment of a new constitutive layer which eliminates the preceding one as isolated
moment, but conserves and integrates it” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 208).

71

moment, but conserves and integrates it” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 208). And that all three
of them are nothing but “a presence to consciousness of its proper history and of the
dialectical stages which it has traversed [franchies]” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 208). In
essence, in interpreting the ideality of the double relation between the three orders of
significations through Hegel, Merleau-Ponty is led to interpret the very notion of Gestalt
in its Hegelian meaning:

By a natural development the notion of Gestalt led us back to its Hegelian
meaning, that is, to the concept before it has become consciousness of self
[conscience de soi]. Nature, we said, is the exterior of a concept.41 But precisely
the concept as concept has no exterior and the Gestalt still had to be thought as
unity of the interior and the exterior, of nature and idea.42 Correlatively the
consciousness for which the Gestalt exists was not intellectual consciousness but
perceptual experience.43 Thus, it is perceptual consciousness which must be
interrogated in order to find in it a definitive clarification. (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
210)

In this passage, Merleau-Ponty is highlighting the Hegelian meaning of Gestalt vis-à-vis
the relations between consciousness and nature. That is, Nature in its totality is always a
consciousness of Nature but the totality is never given as such in any given moment to a
conscious being because Nature in its totality involves its on-going genesis, which
includes Nature’s entire past development. More so, this on-going historical genesis of
Nature itself is something that is presupposed in perceiving Nature. However, by making

41

Merleau-Ponty in a footnote to this sentence refers the reader back to an earlier passage
in The Structure of Behavior (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162).
42

Merleau-Ponty in a footnote to this sentence refers the reader back to an earlier passage
in The Structure of Behavior (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 136).
43

Merleau-Ponty in a footnote to this sentence refers the reader back to an earlier passage
in The Structure of Behavior (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 136).
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this move, that is by interpreting the ideality of Gestalt (or form) in general and of the
double relation between the three orders in a Hegelian or dialectical manner, MerleauPonty is led to a problem: if the human dialectic, on the one hand, depends on the lower
dialectics of the physical and of the vital, and on the other hand, emerges as an
autonomous and highest dialectic or order of signification, then how can one explain the
autonomy of the lower dialectics without however reducing one to the other, especially
the autonomy of the vital order?44 In other words, in following Hegel, for Merleau-Ponty
the problem becomes one of understanding the relation between consciousness at the
level of mind [l’esprit] or intellectual consciousness, and consciousness at the level of life
or perceptual consciousness. To put it differently, what “is the relation between
consciousness as universal milieu and consciousness as enrooted in the subordinated
dialectics? (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 184). In Hegelian terms, perceptual consciousness is
“consciousness in itself” [la conscience en soi] and intellectual consciousness is
“consciousness in and for itself” [la conscience en et pour soi] (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
176). And according to Merleau-Ponty, “[t]he problem of perception lies completely in
this duality” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 176).45 In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “[c]an one think
perceptual consciousness without eliminating it as an original mode; can one maintain its
Cf. “to the extent that consciousness is simply one Gestalt among many, incorporating
matters and life into a more complex whole, it deserves no constitutive priority. Consciousness
would be conditioned by the lower Gestalts of which it is constituted rather than being the
condition for the appearance of any Gestalt as such. But in this case, it is not clear what can be
meant by the describing Gestalts as experiential or perceptual” (Toadvine 2009, 24).
44

Cf. “All the science situate themselves in a ‘complete’ and real world without realizing
[s’apercevoir] that perceptual experience is constituting with respect to this world. Thus we find
ourselves in the presence of a field of lived perception which is prior to number, measure, space,
and causality and which is nonetheless given only as a perspectival view of objects gifted with
stable properties, a perspectival view of an objective world and an objective space.45 The problem
of perception consists in trying to discover how the intersubjective world, the determinations of
which science is gradually making precise, is grasped through this field” (Merleau-Ponty 1963,
219).
45
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specificity without rendering inconceivable its relation to intellectual consciousness?”
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224).
If perceptual consciousness is eliminated as an original mode or the ground, then
the historicity of consciousness that Merleau-Ponty emphasized in the ideality of the
double relation between the three orders would have to be given up. This would mean
that Merleau-Ponty would end up with an idealism that does not take into account the
historical becoming or constitutive history of consciousness. This is not something he
wants to do. In other words, Merleau-Ponty sees in Hegel in general and in the
constitutive history consciousness itself an alternative to transcendental idealism. So
Merleau-Ponty cannot give up perceptual consciousness without ending up with an
idealism that fails to take into consideration the historical becoming or constitutive
history of consciousness. But if intellectual consciousness is eliminated as an original
mode, then Merleau-Ponty believes the world will be rid of the intersubjective dimension
and truth would no longer be an issue. This is so because Merleau-Ponty believes that
intellectual consciousness or consciousness at the level of mind is fundamentally a
consciousness that makes use of “intersubjective significations” and without it there is no
concept of truth (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 215). And by eliminating intellectual
consciousness as an original mode, consciousness at the level of life will remain enclosed
in its “individual perspectives” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 215). The distinction between
“individual perspectives” and “intersubjective significations” is, Merleau-Ponty says, the
distinction between “the lived [du vécu] and the known [du connu]” (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 215). The individual perspectives are “structures” and the intersubjective
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significations are “significations” proper (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224).46 So if perceptual
consciousness is eliminated, the lived is eliminated, and hence there would be no
autonomy of individual perspectives or “structures.” If intellectual consciousness is
eliminated, then the known is eliminated, and hence there would be no autonomy of
intersubjective significations. What the Gestalt in its Hegelian meaning brings to light is
that the known, intersubjective significations, and intellectual consciousness, must be
grasped through the lived, individual perspectives, and perceptual consciousness, or in
Merleau-Ponty’s words, “[t]he objects as ideal unities and as significations are grasped
through individual perspectives” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 215). This is what Merleau-Ponty
calls the Hegelian problem of perception. Merleau-Ponty ends The Structure of Behavior
with this problem. No solution is provided, which means that Merleau-Ponty’s
subsequent works, especially The Phenomenology of Perception can be read as an
attempt to provide a solution to the Hegelian problem of perception. However, at the end
of The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty does provide some suggestions about how
to account for the relations between perceptual and intellectual consciousness. They are
suggestions because Merleau-Ponty at the end of The Structure of Behavior still does not
know if and how this problem will be solved. Having said that let me turn to the
suggestions.

Cf. “What is profound in the ‘Gestalt’ from which we started is not the idea of
signification but that of structure, the junction of an idea and an existence which are
indiscernible, the contingent arrangement by which materials begin to have meaning in our
presence, intelligibility in the nascent state” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 206-7).
46
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§ 5. Conclusion: A New Transcendental Philosophy?

In conclusion, I briefly discuss what remains unresolved in The Structure of
Behavior, namely, the solution to the problem of perception. I take this to be MerleauPonty’s key motivation to the writing of the Phenomenology of Perception.
First of all, because perception remains for the most part presupposed throughout
The Structure of Behavior, according to Merleau-Ponty, in order to think the relation
between perceptual consciousness and intellectual consciousness without reducing one to
the other, it is necessary to “return to perception” and to make it a direct object of his
study (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 220). This will be one of the tasks of the Phenomenology of
Perception. Secondly, in such a return, Merleau-Ponty believes, two notions will help,
namely, Husserl’s “phenomenological reduction” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 249 n. 56) and
the phenomenological notion of “intentionality” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 249 n. 57).47
Thirdly, Kant’s Critique of Judgment will also help in this return to perception and in
turn, would be a factor in the solution to the problem of perception because the Critique
of Judgment “contains essential indications concerning the problems of which it is a
question here” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 248 n.41).
Fourthly, a new notion of transcendental consciousness will be required. That is,
at the end of the book, the Hegelian problem of perception remains a problem without

“To return to perception as a type of originating experience [d’expérience originaire]
in which the real world is constituted in its specificity is to impose upon oneself an inversion of
the natural movement of consciousness [i.e. phenomenological reduction as Merleau-Ponty cites
in the footnote to this passage], on the other hand, every question has not been eliminated: it is a
question of understanding [comprendre], without confusing it with a logical relation, the lived
relation of the ‘profiles’ to the ‘things’ which they present, of the perspectives to the ideal
significations which are intended through them [i.e. the notion of intentionality as Merleau-Ponty
cites in the footnote to this passage]” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 220).
47
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solution because Merleau-Ponty has not figured out how to “make consciousness equal
with the whole of experience, to gather consciousness for itself [la conscience pour soi]
all the life of consciousness in itself [la conscience en soi]” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 223).
This would be in Hegelian terms, “the full self-consciousness [la pleine conscience de
soi]” and this is what Merleau-Ponty calls “transcendental consciousness” (MerleauPonty 1963, 221). However, according to Merleau-Ponty, this transcendental
consciousness “is not ready made [toute faite]; it is to be made [elle est à faire], that is,
realized in existence” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 221).48 It remains to be seen in Chapter 2
what it means for a transcendental consciousness to be made, but for now it can be said
that for Merleau-Ponty a “ready-made” transcendental consciousness is a complete selfconsciousness already fully determined once and for all whereas a transcendental
consciousness to be made is a regulative ideal, a perpetual task to achieve. That is,
transcendental consciousness or the full self-consciousness as a regulative ideal is the
historical, intersubjective life that guides and conditions the thought of each individual
consciousness and which each individual consciousness from within its own historical
development has to constantly integrate and reintegrate. And this is exactly what
Merleau-Ponty meant when he said at the end of The Structure of Behavior that “it would
be necessary to define transcendental philosophy anew in such a way as to integrate with
it the very phenomenon of the real” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224). The “phenomenon of the
real” is historical becoming or the constitutive history of consciousness and rethinking

The distinction between “ready made” [toute faite] and “to be made” [à faire] will be
central for the entire project. Merleau-Ponty at the end of The Structure of Behavior even goes so
far as to say that “the philosophy of perception is not ready made [tout fait] in life,” instead it is to
be made [à faire] (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 219-20). That is, the philosophy of perception itself is a
regulative ideal or a task to achieve rather than already completed and determined once and for
all.
48
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transcendental philosophy anew entails an integration of this historical becoming of
consciousness, which can be done through a notion of transcendental consciousness that
is to be made rather than presumed as ready-made. That is, transcendental consciousness
has to guide, regulate, or orient historical becoming and our experience of it.
Fifthly, this new transcendental philosophy will need to account for the relation
between the everyday world and the world of ideality, or in phenomenological terms the
relation between the “natural attitude” and the “transcendental attitude” (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 248 n. 40).49
Last, but not least, like Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Merleau-Ponty’s new
transcendental philosophy and the notion of transcendental consciousness to be made will
have both theoretical and practical implications. That is, given that the problem of
perception is about the relation of perceptual consciousness and intellectual
consciousness, where the former is concerned with the lived or the practical domain and
the latter is concerned with the known or the theoretical domain, it follows that not only
the relation between the theoretical and practical domains would need to be ascertained
but also the limits of each.50

Merleau-Ponty, citing Fink, writes: “Without leaving the natural attitude one could
show how the problems of totality (Ganzheitsprobleme) of the natural world, pursued to their
root, end up instigating the passage to the transcendental attitude” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 248 n.
40). Cf. Fink 1930, 279.
49

50

As Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that the distinction between the lived and the known
will allow him to broaden the notion of action or the practical domain as such: “What we have
said is sufficient to show that the possession of a representation or the exercise of a judgment is
not coextensive with the life of consciousness. Rather, consciousness is a network [réseau] of
significative intentions which are sometimes clear to themselves and sometimes, on the contrary,
lived rather than known [connues]. Such a conception will permit us to link consciousness with
action by enlarging our idea of action” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 173).

78

Chapter Two

“Radical Reflection”: Merleau-Ponty’s Transcendental Method
in the Phenomenology of Perception

§ 1. Synopsis

In The Structure of Behavior, by describing the relation between consciousness
and nature in a holistic and dialectical manner via the organism (as put forth by
Goldstein), Merleau-Ponty was led to the Hegelian problem of perception.1 The Hegelian
problem of perception is fundamentally a problem of understanding how consciousness
or more precisely, the organism can integrate its own historical emergence in such a
manner that this historical emergence is not fully sublated in its individual thought. It was
argued in Chapter 1 that it is this problem that led Merleau-Ponty to the proposal of
rethinking transcendental philosophy.
In this chapter, my main focus is to read the Phenomenology of Perception with
respect to the proposal for a new transcendental philosophy with which the Structure of
Behavior ends.2 It is my contention that in the Phenomenology of Perception, MerleauPonty proposes a new method to solve the problem of perception—a method that will
More details regarding the problem of perception, see Chapter 1, especially § 4. “The
Hegelian ‘Problem of Perception’” and § 5. “Conclusion: A New Transcendental Philosophy?.”
1

Cf. “What is certain is that if criticism [i.e. critical idealism or transcendental idealism]
can treat perception only as a confused thought and as a first rough sketch of intellection, destined
to be replaced by it, it is to be rejected, and what remains is thus ‘to define transcendental
philosophy answer in such a way as to integrate with it the very phenomenon of the real’
[Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224]. This redefinition of transcendental philosophy, whose goal is to seize
hold of the immediate meaning of perceptual life and to think it as such, will be the
Phenomenology of Perception” (Madison 1981, 150).
2
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account for the historical emergence of the organism itself.3 This method is called radical
reflection. It is also my contention that this method is a transcendental method. The
method is transcendental because it makes explicit the condition that makes the holistic,
autonomous, and interdependent relations between perceptual consciousness and
intellectual consciousness possible. This condition is temporality and once temporality is
taken into account, we can begin to see a solution to the problem of perception.

§ 2. “Radical Reflection” as Merleau-Ponty’s Transcendental Method

Let me begin with a remark on the transition from The Structure of Behavior to
the Phenomenology of Perception. In the Phenomenology of Perception, I maintain that
Merleau-Ponty is still continuing The Structure of Behavior’s holistic and dialectical
descriptions of the relation between consciousness and nature. This is substantiated by
the fact that he is still concerned with seeking a solution to the problem of perception. He
hopes to do so by making perception the direct object of his study, hence the title of his
second book, the Phenomenology of Perception. However, in continuing his holistic and
dialectical descriptions of the relation between consciousness and nature and seeking a
solution to the problem of perception, some changes have occurred in the
Phenomenology of Perception, especially insofar as the method is concerned.

3

I became aware of the importance of method in the Phenomenology of Perception in the
Merleau-Ponty reading group that Bryan A. Smyth coordinated and also in personal
conversations with him. I am extremely thankful to him. However, with respect to a
methodological reading of the Phenomenology of Perception, any mistakes in my project are
mine and not Dr. Smyth’s. For more on details on Merleau-Ponty’s method, see Smyth 2010b,
162. Smyth in this article calls Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology “an exemplary kind of
transcendental practice” (Smyth 2010b, 153).
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In “Titres et Travaux. Projet d’enseignement,” Merleau-Ponty claims that there is
a methodological difference between The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology
of Perception.4 In The Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty studied the relations between
consciousness and nature from the perspective of an “external spectator” [du spectateur
étranger] and now in the Phenomenology of Perception, he will undertake those very
same descriptions—the descriptions of the relations of consciousness and nature—and
explicate them from “within the subject” [à l’intérieur du sujet] (Merleau-Ponty 2000c,
13).5 Simply put, this means that in The Structure of Behavior, the historical perspective
of consciousness remains, at best, presupposed whereas in the Phenomenology of
Perception, it is taken up explicitly. Thus, there is a methodological shift that happens in
the Phenomenology of Perception. This is further substantiated by the fact that MerleauPonty, in his doctoral defense of the Phenomenology of Perception, said that the
Phenomenology of Perception “attempts to define a method for getting closer to present
and living being” (Merleau-Ponty 2007a, 118; italics not original).6 In the
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty calls this method “radical reflection”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxviii/14; cf. 251/288).
The full quote thus follows: “La perception, puisqu’elle est à la junction des deux
ordres, devait devenir notre thème, et c’est sur elle que portent nos deux premiers travaux publiés,
l’un, La Structure du Comportement, considérant de l’extérieur l’homme qui perçoit, et cherchant
à dégager le sens valable des recherches expériementales qui l’abordent du point de vue du
spectateur étranger, l’autre, Phénomenologie de la Perception, se plaçant à l’intérieur du sujet,
pour montrer d’abord comment la savoir acquis nous invite à concevoir ses rapports avec son
corps et son monde, et enfin pour esquisser une théorie de la conscience et de la réflexion qui
rende possibles ces rapports” (Merleau-Ponty 2000c, 13).
4

Cf. “We have shown elsewhere that consciousness, seen from outside [vue de
l’extérieur], could not be a pure for itself. (La Structure du Comportement, pp. 168 and ff.). We
are beginning to see that it is no different for consciousness seen from within [vue de l’intérieur]”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 535 n. 18/260 n. 1).
5

6

This defense took place on November 23, 1946 in front of the Société française de
philosophie.
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Further, it must be mentioned at the outset that the Phenomenology of Perception
remains a “preliminary study” on the question of method in general and the method of
radical reflection in particular because Merleau-Ponty said that in his subsequent works
this method “must then be applied to the relation of man to man in language, in
knowledge, in society and religion, as it was applied in this work [Phenomenology of
Perception] to man’s relation to perceptible reality and with respect to man’s relation to
others on the level of perceptual experience” (Merleau-Ponty 2007a, 118). I take it what
Merleau-Ponty is suggesting is that in the Phenomenology of Perception, the application
of such a method is not exhaustive, which in turn means that Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent
works can be interpreted as attempts of further extending the application of such a
method. Now that I have briefly explained the methodological shift from The Structure of
Behavior to the Phenomenology, let me turn to the method itself.
Let me begin by first explaining where exactly in the Phenomenology of
Perception Merleau-Ponty takes up the question of method explicitly. To this end, I
briefly explain what I take to be the overall structure of the Phenomenology of Perception
and then situate the question of method within this general structure of the entire book.7
The Phenomenology of Perception is divided into three parts, an introduction, and a
preface. The “Preface” is about clarifying what is meant by “phenomenology” (MerleauPonty 2012, lxx/7).8 In “Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to

7

See the detailed table of contents to the Phenomenology of Perception, which includes
Merleau-Ponty’s division of the chapters and their respective sections (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxlxix/531-7). This is important because the table of contents shows how Merleau-Ponty saw the
logic or the structure of the entire book.
8

Merleau-Ponty provides an answer by going through the following themes: description
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxi-lxxiv/8-11), the phenomenological reduction (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
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Phenomena,” Merleau-Ponty’s goal is to motivate a return to perception or the preobjective world. Once we return to the pre-objective world via radical reflection, it is
Merleau-Ponty’s contention that this will lead us to redefine our traditional notions of
subject and object (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 73-4/99-100). In other words, it will lead us to
understand the subject as the subject of perception and the world as it is perceived
through the subject of perception, which Part One “The Body” and Part Two “The
Perceived World” are about, respectively. According to Merleau-Ponty, “[t]o
phenomenology understood as a direct description” (i.e. the Introduction, Parts One and
Two) “a phenomenology of phenomenology [une phénoménologie de phénoménologie]
must be added” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 382/424).9 Part Three, “Being-for-itself and
Being-in-the-World,” is meta-phenomenological or is about a “phenomenology of
phenomenology” [une phénoménologie de phénoménologie]. It is here in Part Three that
Merleau-Ponty turns to the very method that is employed throughout the entire book,
namely, radical reflection itself (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 382-3/423-4).
Broadly speaking then, the Phenomenology of Perception is fundamentally about
a new method, namely, radical reflection.10 Insofar as the general structure of the entire
book is concerned, it can then be said that the Phenomenology of Perception is about four

lxxiv-lxxviii/11-5), the eidetic reduction (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxviii-lxxxi/15-7), and the notion
of intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxi-lxxiv/17-20).
9

Smyth rightly points out that the phenomenology of phenomenology was important for
both Husserl and Fink. As Smyth writes, the notion of a phenomenology of phenomenology “was
central to Fink’s undertaking in his VI. Cartesianische Meditation, but it was first expressed by
Husserl … The notion was also taken up by Merleau-Ponty” (Smyth 2007, 207 n. 11).
Smyth argues that Merleau-Ponty’s Part III or his “phenomenology of
phenomenology” is a response to Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation. Even though Smyth is
indeed right in suggesting this, due to limitations of time and space, I however do not discuss the
relation between Merleau-Ponty and Fink in the current project. See for instance, Smyth 2007,
19-24; Smyth 2011, 669-99.
10
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things, where the first three are phenomenological and the fourth one is metaphenomenological: 1) effecting the return to phenomena or the intentional relation
between the pre-objective subject and the pre-objective world (i.e. the perceived world)
through radical reflection, 2) describing the pre-objective subject via radical reflection, 3)
describing the pre-objective world (i.e. the perceived world) via radical reflection and the
pre-objective subject, and 4) describing the very method employed throughout the
Phenomenology of Perception by the phenomenologist in the pre-objective descriptions
of the body and the perceived world, namely, radical reflection. After having briefly
explained where the new method is discussed explicitly in the Phenomenology of
Perception, I now turn to the method itself.
Merleau-Ponty describes his new method as a reinterpretation of what Husserl
called the method of phenomenology, namely, the phenomenological reduction (MerleauPonty 2012, lxxviii-lxxix/14-6). As a side note, Merleau-Ponty did say at the end of The
Structure of Behavior that the return to perception will involve a “phenomenological
reduction” understood in Husserl’s later philosophy (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 249 n. 56). An
in-depth explanation of Husserl’s phenomenology is neither feasible nor relevant. In what
follows, I provide a brief explanation of the main claims of Husserl’s phenomenological
method that shed light on Merleau-Ponty’s reinterpretation of the phenomenological
method as radical reflection.
Phenomenology begins from what Husserl terms the “natural attitude” [die
natürliche Einstellung], the setting or factual world in which one finds oneself
predisposed with ontological judgments about the world (Husserl 1982, 51).11 Simply
put, it is the world of every day life where one believes that everything appears as
11

Cf. Husserl 1989, 4; Husserl 1999, 20.
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transcendent or existing independently of us or in itself. This belief in the natural attitude
is fundamentally characterized by Husserl as a “primal belief [Urglaube] or protodoxa
[Urdoxa]” (Husserl 1982, 252). According to Husserl, in order to return to the things
themselves or to the “phenomenological attitude” [die phänomenologische Einstellung],
we have to perform what he calls the phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1982, 66).12
The phenomenological reduction involves what Husserl, borrowing a term from the
Sceptics, calls the έποχή or the bracketing of the natural attitude (Husserl 1982, 57-60).13
The έποχή puts the proto-doxic belief, the prejudices, biases, or presuppositions regarding
the natural world out of play or in short, the ontological status of the world in itself is put
into parentheses. But what is left over if everything is put into brackets?
After bracketing the natural attitude, what is left over is the “phenomenological
residuum” or pure or “transcendental consciousness” (Husserl 1982, 65-6).14 That is,
what the phenomenological reduction reveals is a pure consciousness as having a
tripartite structure: “ego ––– cogito ––– cogitatum” (Husserl 1999, 50).15 In
phenomenological jargon, what the phenomenological reduction reveals is intentionality
[der Intentionalität] or that consciousness is always a consciousness of something.16 For
Husserl, what makes a consciousness pure or transcendental is the fact that it is not part
12

Reduction comes from the Latin reducere, which means to “lead or bring back to.”

13

Cf. Husserl 1999, 20-1; Husserl 1989, 29.

Another way of saying the same thing would be that in addition to the έποχή, the
phenomenological reduction is also transcendental, that is, it leads to transcendental
consciousness.
14

Pure consciousness is revealed as having “modes of consciousness” or noēses and its
respective “intentional object[s]” or noēmata (i.e. what is meant by consciousness) (Husserl 1999,
36).
15

The word, “intentionality” comes from the Latin verb “intendere,” which means
directionality or being directed towards something.
16
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of the natural world (Husserl 1999, 24-6). According to Husserl, transcendental
consciousness is not part of the natural world because it constitutes the world as such
(Husserl 1999, 24-6). By constitution, Husserl does not mean any kind of construction
but rather that consciousness makes sense of the world or bestows meaning on it, which
Husserl calls Sinngebung (Husserl 1982, 106-16).17 This is nothing other than saying that
the world of the natural attitude presents itself as it is meant to, by, for, in, and through
transcendental consciousness (Husserl 1982, 92-8).
Further, in order to understand how transcendental consciousness constitutes or
bestows meaning on the world, Husserl argues that one must perform what he calls the
eidetic reduction (Husserl 1982, 128-42). The eidetic reduction is a shift in one’s attitude
from the particulars or the facts to the universals or the essences of all that appears to, by,
for, in, and through transcendental consciousness (Husserl 1982, 128-42). Basically, the
eidetic reduction allows the phenomenologist to have pure immediate givenness of all
things through their respective essences.18 According to Husserl, “it belongs to the sense
of anything contingent to having an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be
apprehended purely” (Husserl 1982, 7). The essence or the essential features of each
particular thing can be grasped or intuited through what Husserl calls a “free fantasy” or

As Riceour explains Husserl’s notion of constitution: “the unfolding of the intendings
of consciousness which are merged together in the natural, unreflective, naïve grasp of things”
(Ricoeur 1967a, 9).
17

Phenomenology has an intuitional basis. This is what Husserl calls the “principle of all
principles”: “that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that
everything originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be
accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is
presented there” (Husserl 1982, 44). What Husserl is saying is that the intentional relation
between consciousness and the world or the world as it presents itself to consciousness in the
phenomenological attitude must be described in its very giveness without any presuppositions.
18
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an imaginative variation (Husserl 1982, 157-60).19 Imaginative variation is a method that
allows one to strip away all the non-essential or contingent characteristics of any object in
any given mode in order to reach its respective invariants or necessary features (Husserl
1982, 157-60; cf. Husserl 1999, 69-73). Without getting into irrelevant details, it can be
said that with the eidetic reduction, what Husserl hopes to achieve is the invariant feature
of each thing, which he believes will lend objectivity to the claims that one makes about
their respective experiences. Overall, the move from the natural attitude to the
phenomenological attitude is a move from the attitude where one takes for granted that
the everyday world as existing in itself or as transcendent to the attitude where the world
presents itself as it is meant for, to, in, by, and through a pure or transcendental
consciousness, that is, to an attitude of “transcendence in immanence” (Husserl 1982,
133; translation slightly modified).20 Now that I have provided a succinct account of
Husserl’s phenomenological method, I will turn to explain how Merleau-Ponty interprets
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction.
Let me start out with a caveat. Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl’s
phenomenology in general and the phenomenological method in particular is not
unproblematic. I say this because his interpretation is neither a straightforward
commentary on Husserl nor a simple appropriation of Husserl’s ideas. Merleau-Ponty’s

19

By contending that essences, universals, or meanings of things are arrived through
imaginative variation, Husserl is also suggesting that thinking is fundamentally dependent upon
the imagination in general and for its role of arriving at the essences in particular.
20

In addition, for Husserl, in the phenomenological attitude each and every single object
in itself or that is transcendent presents itself in perspectives [Abschattungen] or always from one
side at a time and yet, that very same object is also immanent or for a consciousness insofar as it
is not a real object in the world, but an intentional object, an object presented within the field of
immanence of a pure or transcendental consciousness (Husserl 1982, 89-90). In short, the
phenomenological attitude is an attitude of transcendence in immanence.

87

reading of Husserl is a kind of reading that develops those unthematized insights of
Husserl’s thought that Merleau-Ponty claims to find in Husserl’s texts (mainly those texts
that were then unpublished).21 I will not question the accuracy of Merleau-Ponty’s
reading of Husserl primarily because it does not affect the arguments that I am advancing
here. That is, I am more interested in what this contrast says about Merleau-Ponty’s own
method than in the question of accuracy of his interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology
in general and its respective phenomenological method in particular.22
Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty agrees that we begin from the natural attitude
and that we move to the phenomenological or transcendental attitude through the
phenomenological method (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxi-lxxii/8-9). For Merleau-Ponty, the
passage from the natural attitude to the transcendental attitude has to do with the
following questions: does the έποχή bracket the Urglaube or the Urdoxa of the natural
attitude? If the phenomenological reduction is also transcendental, then is this
transcendental consciousness ready-made or is it to be made [à faire]? If the
phenomenological reduction reveals intentionality, then is there only one kind of
intentionality? Is the world that is revealed by the phenomenological method ready-made
or is it to be made [à faire]? Does the eidetic reduction reveal only constituted meanings?

For Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl, see Van Breda 1992, 150-161. For a detailed
account of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl, see Toadvine 2002, 227-86. In addition, in
commenting on Husserl’s unpublished works, Merleau-Ponty said that even if one obtains
everything a philosopher wrote, there is no guarantee that one will get to the ‘thought’ of the
philosopher, instead one should focus on what remains ‘unthought’ [l’impensé] or not fully
thematized in a philosopher’s work (Merleau-Ponty 1970, 181-82; cf. Merleau-Ponty 1964b,
160).
21

That is, even if Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl turns out to be an utter
misinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, it in no way affects how we understand MerleauPonty’s own method. It could very well turn out to be the case that Merleau-Ponty’s own method
is not so different from that of Husserl’s.
22
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That is, is meaning only bestowed by transcendental consciousness on the world or is
there also meaning that is already in the world that transcendental consciousness has to
perpetually integrate? To put it differently, does meaning only go from transcendental
consciousness to world (i.e. centrifugal) or does it also come from the world to
transcendental consciousness (i.e. centripetal)?23 All of these questions are interrelated. I
will not answer these questions individually, however, the following analysis of MerleauPonty’s reinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological method should serve as a
response to such questions.
In his article “Merleau-Ponty and the ‘Naturalization’ of Phenomenology,” Bryan
A. Smyth has pointed out that Merleau-Ponty’s view of the natural attitude is
characterized by what Merleau-Ponty calls “le préjugé du monde” or the belief of
objective thinking that world is ready-made or completely determined once and for all
(Smyth 2000, 157; cf. Merleau-Ponty 2012, 5/27).24 If for Merleau-Ponty the natural
attitude is characterized by “le préjugé du monde,” then the έποχή of the radical
reflection does not bracket the Urglaube or the Urdoxa, instead it brackets “le préjugé du
monde” or the belief that the world is ready-made [toute faite]. This is the first key
difference between Merleau-Ponty and the Husserl insofar as their methodologies are
concerned.

In referring to Husserl’s Ideas, Merleau-Ponty writes, “Idealism essentially admits that
every signification is centrifugal, is an act of signification or Sinn-gebung [sense-giving], and that
there are no natural signs” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 452/491-2). By contrast, Merleau-Ponty is
interested in showing how meaning can be both “centrifugal and centripetal” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 463-4/502).
23

Indeed, Merleau-Ponty argues that objective thought “moves among ready-made things
[les choses toutes faites]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 99/126).
24
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In a way, Merleau-Ponty is both following and diverging from Husserl. MerleauPonty is following Husserl because Merleau-Ponty too brackets the natural world.
However, Merleau-Ponty is diverging from Husserl because for Merleau-Ponty the
natural world is the world of completely determined objects and in bracketing this,
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the proto-doxa or originary belief in the world in general
remains even after the έποχή of radical reflection. Merleau-Ponty does not believe that
one can fully bracket the Urdoxa of the natural attitude. For Merleau-Ponty this Urdoxa is
a “perceptual faith” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 274/311).25 If it is granted that Husserl’s έποχή
is read as suggesting that one must bracket the Urdoxa of the natural attitude, then
Merleau-Ponty can be read as denying that such a bracketing can ever be fully achieved.
Two things must be noted here. First, I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that we can bracket
our belief in the world in itself or the world of completely determined objects. Secondly,
this act of breaking our familiarity with the world is never completed, but must be
perpetually achieved. This is part of the reason why Merleau-Ponty states that “[t]he most
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete
reduction” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxvii/14). I say ‘part’ because once we turn to what
becomes of the eidetic method in Merleau-Ponty, we will fully understand the entire
reason.
According to Merleau-Ponty, “[p]erceiving is pinning one’s faith, at a stroke, in a
whole future of experiences, and doing so in a present which never strictly guarantees the future;
it is placing one’s belief in a world. It is the opening upon a world which makes possible
perceptual truth and the actual effecting of a Wahr-Nehmung [truth-taking], thus enabling us to
‘cross out’ the previous illusion and regard it as null and void” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 310-1/34951). And Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception is a detailed description of this belief in
the existence of the world or perceptual faith. In other words, the entire book is about
understanding what it means to believe or perceive that there is a world to describe and upon such
a belief all epistemic claims are based. This is Merleau-Ponty’s basic phenomenological assertion
and this assertion can never be replaced by an act of a higher form of knowledge (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 417/457).
25
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After bracketing “le préjugé du monde” or the belief in a ready-made world
through the έποχή of radical reflection, one makes the transcendental turn.26 Here lies the
second key difference between Merleau-Ponty and the Husserl insofar as their
methodologies are concerned. For Merleau-Ponty, this transcendental turn does not lead
to a ready-made transcendental consciousness or a “transcendental consciousness in front
of which the world is spread out in an absolute transparency” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
lxxiv/11). This is so because a “consistent transcendental idealism strips the world of its
opacity and its transcendence” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxv/12). By the opacity and
transcendence of the world, Merleau-Ponty means the historicity of consciousness itself.
Merleau-Ponty already announced the notion of a transcendental consciousness
that he is seeking at the end of The Structure of Behavior. In The Structure of Behavior,
Merleau-Ponty said he wants to “make consciousness equal with the whole of experience,
to gather consciousness for itself [la conscience pour soi] all the life of consciousness in
itself [la conscience en soi]” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 223). This would be in Hegelian
terms, “the full self-consciousness [la pleine conscience de soi]” and this is what
Merleau-Ponty calls “transcendental consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 221).
However, according to Merleau-Ponty, this transcendental consciousness “is not ready
made [toute faite]; it is to be made [elle est à faire], that is, realized in existence”
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 221).27 A ready-made transcendental consciousness: perceptual
consciousness = intellectual consciousness, where the integration is completed once and
26

Cf. Smyth 2010b, 157.

The distinction between “ready made” [toute faite] and “to be made” [à faire] will be
central for the entire project. Merleau-Ponty at the end of The Structure of Behavior even goes so
far as to say that “the philosophy of perception is not ready made [tout fait] in life,” instead it is to
be made (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 219-20). That is, the philosophy of perception itself is a regulative
ideal or a task to achieve rather than already completed and determined once and for all.
27
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for all and perceptual consciousness becomes equivalent to and/or subsumed by
intellectual consciousness. A transcendental consciousness to be made: perceptual
consciousness + intellectual consciousness, where the integration is never completed, but
rather becomes a perpetually infinite task. Perhaps, only in death can perceptual
consciousness become equivalent to and fully integrated with intellectual consciousness
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 223-4; cf. 204). Or for Merleau-Ponty that would be the definition
of death: perceptual consciousness = intellectual consciousness. In short, a “ready-made”
transcendental consciousness is a complete self-consciousness already fully determined
once and for all. By contrast, a transcendental consciousness to be made is a regulative
ideal, a perpetual task to achieve—something that each individual organism from within
its own historical development and emergence has to constantly integrate and reintegrate
ad infinitum or as long as it is alive. In fact, to be alive is to be this constant tension
between perceptual consciousness and intellectual consciousness. However, at the end of
The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty only mentioned it in passing but didn’t fully
develop it. I maintain that in the Phenomenology of Perception by focusing on perception
in general and temporality in particular, Merleau-Ponty is able to solve the problem of
perception and thus, account for a transcendental consciousness to be made.
Regarding the transcendental turn, Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of
Perception writes,

A philosophy becomes transcendental, that is, radical, not by taking up a position
within absolute consciousness while failing to mention the steps that carried it
there, but rather by considering itself as a problem; not by assuming the total
making-explicit of knowledge, but rather by recognizing this presumption of
reason as the fundamental philosophical problem. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 64/90)
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What Merleau-Ponty is saying is that a philosophy does not become transcendental by
beginning with an “absolute consciousness.” I take it that by “absolute consciousness,”
Merleau-Ponty means the complete integration of perceptual consciousness into
intellectual consciousness. If the complete integration of perceptual and intellectual
consciousness were possible, this would mean that an individual organism has
explicitated the knowledge of its entire historical development in every single detail.28
But Merleau-Ponty believes that a philosophy becomes transcendental by making such an
absolute consciousness a problem or by constantly integrating the historical stages that
condition the emergence of consciousness or more precisely, the individual organism. In
relation to radical reflection, it can be said that the bracketing of “le préjugé du monde”
leads to the “transcendental field” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 61/87) where the transcendental
field is fundamentally understood as a temporal field or the constant integration of “an
original past, a past that has never been present” [un passé originel, un passé qui n’a
jamais été présent] by the individual organism (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 252/289).29 What
Merleau-Ponty means by temporality will be better understood once we turn to the next
section.
Radical reflection involves both an έποχή or the bracketing of “le préjugé du
monde” and a transcendental turn, which leads not to a ready-made transcendental

Cf. “It is striking to see that classical transcendental philosophies never question the
possibility of carrying out the complete making-explicit that they always assume is completed
somewhere. They are satisfied with the necessity of this possibility, and they thereby judge what
is by what must necessarily be [qui doit être], or by what the idea of knowledge [savoir] requires”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 62/88; translation slightly modified).
28

The full quote thus follows: “[R]eflection only fully grasps itself if it refers to the prereflective fund it presupposes, upon which it draws, and that constitutes for it, a kind of original
past, a past which has never been a present” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 252/289).
29
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consciousness but to a transcendental consciousness to be made.30 A transcendental
consciousness to be made is one where the constitution or making sense of the world is
always to be understood in a temporal manner. A ready-made transcendental
consciousness would be one where the world would be completely determined once and
for all. Merleau-Ponty makes this very clear in the Phenomenology of Perception when
he writes:

The center of philosophy is no longer an autonomous transcendental subjectivity,
situated everywhere and nowhere, but is rather found in the perpetual beginning
of reflection at that point when an individual life begins to reflect upon itself.
Reflection is only truly reflection if it does not carry itself outside of itself, if it
knows itself as reflection-upon-an-unreflected, and consequently as a change in
the structure of our existence. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 63/89-90)

In addition, Merleau-Ponty said at the end of The Structure of Behavior that the return to
perception will rely on the phenomenological notion of “intentionality” (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 249 n. 57). So if transcendental consciousness to be made involves the perpetual
and infinite integration of perceptual consciousness and intellectual consciousness and if
the return to perception is understood through the phenomenological reduction in general
and the notion of intentionality in particular, then it follows that the phenomenological
notion of intentionality sheds light on how to understand this transcendental
consciousness that is to be made.
Merleau-Ponty agrees with Husserl that intentionality can only “be understood
through the reduction” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxxi/17). That is, for Merleau-Ponty, it is

Cf. Merleau-Ponty cites Husserl: “The Cogito must find me in a situation, and it is on
this condition alone that transcendental subjectivity will, as Husserl says, be an intersubjectivity”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxvi/13).
30
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true that what is discovered through the phenomenological reduction is intentionality or
consciousness is always consciousness of something. However, Merleau-Ponty points out
that the notion of intentionality is not what is original in Husserl’s phenomenology.
According to Merleau-Ponty, the notion of intentionality can already be found in both
Descartes and Kant (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 520 n. 57/153 n. 5). As Merleau-Ponty sees it,
what is original in Husserl’s phenomenology is another kind of intentionality. As
Merleau-Ponty writes, “Husserl’s originality lies beyond the notion of intentionality;
rather, it is to be found in the elaboration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath the
intentionality of representations, of a profound intentionality, which others have called
existence” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 520 n. 57/153 n. 5). In effect, Merleau-Ponty interprets
the notion of intentionality discovered through the reduction to be a broader notion than
the one found in either Descartes or Kant (at least the Kant of the Critique of Pure
Reason).31 In short, on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation, what Husserl’s phenomenological
reduction reveals is two kinds of intentionality or a twofold notion of intentionality:
“thetic” intentionality and “operative” intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 453/492). In
Merleau-Ponty’s words,

Husserl distinguishes between an act intentionality – which is the intentionality of
our judgments and of our voluntary decisions (and is the only intentionality
discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason) – and operative intentionality
(fungierende Intentionalität), the intentionality that establishes the natural and
pre-predicative unity of the world and of our life, the intentionality that appears in
our desires, our evaluations, and our landscape more clearly than it does in
objective knowledge. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxxii/18)

31

This does not apply to the Kant of the Critique of Judgment (Merleau-Ponty 2012,

lxxxi/18).
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According to Merleau-Ponty, operative intentionality “rather than positing its object, is at
its object” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 472/510; translation slightly modified). In “MerleauPonty and the ‘Naturalization’ of Phenomenology,” Smyth aptly explains this distinction
in the following way: the thetic intentionality is a directedness with aboutness whereas
the operative or bodily intentionality is directedness without aboutness (Smyth 2010b,
156). In other words, thetic intentionality is an intentionality of reflective acts whereas
the operative intentionality is an intentionality of the unreflected or that which is always
already at work in our conscious reflective acts. Merleau-Ponty argues that operative
intentionality is the conditio sine qua non of thetic intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
453/492). I cite Merleau-Ponty in extenso:

In the hollow space of the subject himself, we thus discovered the presence of the
world, such that the subject could no longer be understood as a synthetic activity,
but rather as ek-stase, and that every active act of signification or of Sinn-gebung
appeared as derived and secondary in relation to this pregnancy of signification in
the signs that might well define the world. We uncovered, beneath act or thetic
intentionality – and in fact as its very condition of possibility – an operative
intentionality already at work prior to every thesis and every judgment; we
discovered a ‘Logos of the aesthetic world,’32 or a ‘hidden art in the depths of the
human soul,’33 and that, like every art, only knows itself in its results. (MerleauPonty 2012, 453/492)

Let me explain what Merleau-Ponty is saying in this passage. As already mentioned, by
intentionality, it is meant that consciousness is always consciousness of something. In
Husserlian phenomenology this something is understood fundamentally via meaning. For

Merleau-Ponty cites the following Husserlian text for this quote: “Husserl, Formale
und transzendentale Logik, 257. ‘Aesthetic’ is, of course, taken here in the broad sense of the
‘transcendental aesthetic’” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 562 n. 43/492 n. 2).
32

33

This is a reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
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Husserl, the eidetic reduction is supposed to isolate these meanings through imaginative
variation. That is to say, the Husserlian eidetic reduction is supposed to make clear the
intuitional basis of phenomenology, namely, by focusing on the essences, meanings, or
invariants of things, three ways of saying the same thing. Although for Husserl, this
intentional relation with the world is fundamentally temporal, but Husserl, at least in
Ideas I, still retains a notion of pure or a-temporal consciousness which he calls the
phenomenological residuum or the transcendental consciousness. And here lies another
difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl (at least with the Husserl of Ideas I).
According to Husserl of Ideas I, transcendental consciousness is constituting with
respect to the world or bestows meaning on the world. But Merleau-Ponty argues that
“[t]he world is always already constituted, but also never completely constituted”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 480/517). That is, there is already meaning in the world and
Merleau-Ponty believes that if pure transcendental consciousness constitutes the world,
then it cannot account for the meaning which is already in the world, assuming there is
such meaning. Merleau-Ponty reinterprets this transcendental consciousness that one is
led back to after the phenomenological reduction. And such a reinterpretation will be
offered by Merleau-Ponty by focusing on the very activity or act of meaning-bestowing.34
Given that the intentional relation with the world is established through meaning,
Merleau-Ponty through an analysis of temporality argues that meaning not only goes
from me to the world (i.e. centrifugal) but also and most fundamentally comes from the
world to me (i.e. centripetal). That is why, for Merleau-Ponty, radical reflection in its
three dimensions—as έποχή, transcendental, and eidetic—will not reveal a transcendental
34

As a side note, Merleau-Ponty is not opposed to Husserl, he will borrow many notions
from Husserl, especially what he takes to be the later Husserl (e.g. the notion of Stiftung or
institution).
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consciousness that simply constitutes the world or bestows meaning on the world.35
If intentionality is discovered through the phenomenological reduction as both
thetic and operative and if the reduction is never complete for Merleau-Ponty, it then
follows that intentionality must itself be understood as fundamentally incomplete. For
Merleau-Ponty, this incompleteness is fundamentally a necessary consequence of making
subjectivity equivalent with temporality as such, as we will see in the next section. And if
subjectivity is temporality and if intentionality is understood through subjectivity, it then
follows that intentionality itself will be temporal or will always be open simultaneously
to both the past and the future. More so, if intentionality is incomplete and if
intentionality has to do with meanings, then meanings too must remain incomplete, that
is, as always already open simultaneously to both the dimension of the past and the
dimension of the future. This is to say for Merleau-Ponty transcendental consciousness
cannot simply be constituting with respect to the world, it must also take into account this
openness of meanings to both the past and the future. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “[t]he
world is already constituted, but also never completely constituted” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 480/517). The transcendental consciousness to be made is about this
incompleteness of constitution and this incompleteness as I have already said is because
of our temporal openness to the past and the future. This is exactly what Merleau-Ponty
meant when he said that the reduction remains incomplete. The reduction is incomplete
because constitution is incomplete. Constitution is incomplete because it relies on
temporality.

35

In other words, Merleau-Ponty believes that there has to be something that is not
simply constituted but also instituted. In this regard, the notion of institution [Stiftung] which
Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl is very important (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 521 n. 66/160 n.
1). See also Merleau-Ponty 2010.
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So far, what I have discussed is that Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection involves
an έποχή, a transcendental turn, and an eidetic analysis. Radical reflection is about doing
philosophy in time. The task of radical reflection is to recover “the unreflective
experience of the world” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 251/288). And it is through this
unreflective experience that radical reflection brings the individual organism “closer to
present and living being” (Merleau-Ponty 2007a, 118). By “present and living being,”
Merleau-Ponty means the pre-objective present or consciousness as temporality is
understood in as a perpetual going beyond itself in the directions of the past and the
future (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 348/390). As previously mentioned, according to MerleauPonty, the intentional structure is fundamentally temporal or intentionality as thetic and
operative has to do with temporality. Radical reflection makes explicit the relation
between operative and thetic intentionalities. This will make more sense once we turn to
our discussion of freedom. For now, it can be said that radical reflection makes explicit
the relation between operative and thetic intentionalities by showing how meaning is both
constituted or centrifugal and instituted or centripetal (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 464/502).
This is nothing other than saying that I find myself implicated in a dialectical or circular
exchange with the world: meaning is not only constituted or bestowed by me on the
world (i.e. centrifugal) but it also comes from the world to me in the form of institutions
(i.e. centripetal). So when we are acting in the world, we constitute or make sense of the
world only by taking up instituted meanings or historical meanings already in the world.
Before turning to the next section, let me briefly remark on how radical reflection aims at
solving the problem of perception from The Structure of Behavior.
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Radical reflection is fundamentally concerned with the unreflected or what
remains implicit in or presupposed by reflection itself. What gets termed as the
unreflected in the Phenomenology of Perception is what was termed perceptual
consciousness in The Structure of Behavior. Perceptual consciousness is what remains
implicit or presupposed by intellectual consciousness. In other words, what I am
suggesting is that the “problem of perception” from The Structure of Behavior becomes
in the Phenomenology of Perception a problem of the relation between reflection and the
unreflective life of consciousness itself. Once we turn to the temporality section, we will
see that this relation is about the “present and living reality” or about consciousness as
temporality understanding its relation to past and the future from the perspective of the
living present. In order to better understand the temporal structure of radical reflection or
how temporality is the transcendental condition par excellence of Merleau-Ponty’s
transcendental method (i.e. radical reflection), we need to turn to the discussion of
temporality.

§ 3. Temporality as the Key Element of the Transcendental Method

Part III of the Phenomenology of Perception is meta-phenomenological or is
about a “phenomenology of phenomenology” [une phénoménologie de phénoménologie]
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 382/424). In Part III of the Phenomenology of Perception, I
interpret Merleau-Ponty as focusing on the very method that has been at the foundation of
all the phenomenological descriptions employed throughout the entire book. In short, Part
III is about a description of what it means to do phenomenology in time. Part III is

100

divided into three chapters: the cogito, temporality, and freedom. This would mean that
the cogito, temporality, and freedom are three key elements in understanding radical
reflection as a transcendental method. Earlier in the Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty said that the “final part” (i.e. Part III) of the Phenomenology of
Perception will be about “the transcendental signification of time [la signification
transcendantale du temps]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 510 n. 60/78 n. 1; translation slightly
modified). This means that the chapters on the cogito, temporality, and freedom must be
interpreted as chapters that are about “the transcendental signification of time.” I take it
that Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the transcendental meaning of time and not simply
an empirical meaning of time because for Merleau-Ponty, time is a conditio sine qua non
of the very phenomenality of all phenomena.
Generally speaking, the chapter on the cogito is about truth, the chapter on
temporality is about becoming, and the chapter on freedom is about action or “work” [le
travail].36 I interpret Merleau-Ponty to be saying that if subjectivity is temporality, then
both the chapters on cogito/truth and freedom/action must be understood through
temporality in general and becoming in particular.37 The argument for this is that the
cogito is fundamentally temporal for Merleau-Ponty because as we will see subjectivity is
Since The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty prefers the Hegelian term “work” [le
travail] over “action” because according to Merleau-Ponty the word “action” still has
psychological connotations that the word “work” does not (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162).
36

37

I interpret temporality as the transcendental condition par excellence, which is why
everything in the Phenomenology of Perception must be understood via temporality. This is how
I am reading Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Cf. “The solution to all the
problems of transcendence is found in the thickness of the pre-objective present, where we find
our corporeality, our sociality, and the preexistence of the world, that is, where we find the
starting point for ‘explanations’ to the extent that they are legitimate – and at the same time the
foundation of our freedom” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 457/496). Cf. “But if we uncover time beneath
the subject, and if we reconnect the paradox of time to the paradoxes of the body, the world, the
thing, and others, then we will understand that there is nothing more to understand” (MerleauPonty 2012, 383/424).
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temporality itself. Since actions are executed by or via subjectivity and if subjectivity is
temporality itself, then actions too will be conditioned by temporality.
If I am correct in suggesting all of this, then for Merleau-Ponty, the foundation of
all things is temporality or it is the medium through which everything must be
understood. In this section, I explain what temporality is for Merleau-Ponty, which in
turn will shed light on the sense in which temporality is the key to understanding
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental method of radical reflection. Since temporality is the
transcendental condition par excellence of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental method of
radical reflection in general and the chapters on cogito and freedom in particular, in what
follows I will first succinctly explain only those relevant details regarding the cogito and
freedom that in turn will aid in better understanding the manner in which MerleauPonty’s notion of temporality is presupposed by these two chapters. Then I will turn to
the discussion of temporality.
Cogito. The first chapter of Part III of the Phenomenology of Perception, “Beingfor-itself and Being-in-the-world,” is entitled “The Cogito.” The overall theme of the
chapter on the cogito is truth. To be more precise, in this chapter, Merleau-Ponty puts
forth a new notion of the cogito and its respective notion of truth. For Merleau-Ponty,
both the cogito and truth are temporal or understood through time.38 As Merleau-Ponty
explicitly says, “we are restoring to the cogito a temporal thickness” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 420/459). In the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes argues that I am only
certain of myself insofar as I think, but am not certain of anything outside of my

38

In this chapter, Merleau-Ponty argues for a notion of the cogito through time or as
historical. Because Merleau-Ponty in the “Cogito” chapter does not take up the issue of time
directly, in the subsequent chapter, he turns directly to the question of time.
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thoughts.39 By certainty, Descartes means indubitability. As is well known, Kant, in the
“Refutation of Idealism” argues that “even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes,
is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience” (Kant 1998, B275).
According to Kant, this is so because to be certain of one’s own thoughts requires a
reference to something outside of us that endures in time. Kant’s claim may be
questioned, but the relevant point for us is that according to Kant, since Descartes leaves
the element of time out of his account of the cogito, he —that is, Descartes—is led to
claim that inner thoughts are certain whereas anything outside of thoughts is dubitable.
It can be said that Merleau-Ponty to an extent is following Kant’s insight from the
“Refutation of Idealism.”40 I say “to an extent” because for Merleau-Ponty the cogito is
to be understood through time. This will make more sense once we get to our discussion
of temporality as a synthesis. For now let me briefly explain what this means. According

39

This claim only applies to the Second Meditation and not the other Meditations,
especially the Sixth Meditation.
Cf. “We can now approach the question of intentionality, too often cited as the
principal discovery of phenomenology, even though intentionality can only be understood
through the reduction. There is hardly anything new in the claim that ‘all consciousness is
consciousness of something.’ In his ‘Refutation of Idealism,’ Kant showed that inner perception
is impossible without external perception, that the world as the connection of phenomena is
anticipated in the consciousness of my own unity, and is the means I have of coming into being as
consciousness. What distinguishes intentionality from Kantian relation to a possible object is that
the unity of the world, prior to being posited by knowledge through an explicit act of
identification, is lived as already accomplished or as already there. In the Critique of Judgment,
Kant himself demonstrated that there is a unity of the imagination and of the understanding, and a
unity of the subjects prior to the object, and that, in an experience of beauty, for example, I
undergo the experience of a harmony between the sensible and the concept, between myself and
another, which is itself without any concept. Here the subject is no longer the universal thinker of
a system of rigorously connected objects, no longer the subject who is, if he is to be able to
[pouvoir] form a world, the positing power [puissance] that imposes the law of the understanding
upon the manifold rather he discovers himself and appreciates himself as a nature spontaneously
conforming to the law of the understanding. But if the subject has a nature, then the hidden art of
the imagination must condition the categorical activity; it is no longer merely aesthetic judgment
that rests upon this hidden art, but also knowledge and this art also grounds the unity of
consciousness and of consciousnesses” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxxi/17-8).
40
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to Merleau-Ponty, all thoughts are expressed in language or speech (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
410/450). The cogito or the “I think” is a thought which itself must be expressed in
language. However, “the expressed is always inseparable from” its expression (MerleauPonty 2012, 411/451). So in uttering the cogito, one expresses it in thought. But MerleauPonty’s point is that the cogito that is expressed in language is not the only one. This
would be a “verbal” or “spoken” cogito (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 422-4/461-4). There is
also a “silent” or “tacit” cogito (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 422-4/461-4). The spoken cogito is
the reflective I or the I that is expressed in thought through language and the tacit cogito
is the pre-reflective I or the I that is in “contact with my own life and my own thought”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 424/463). Merleau-Ponty interprets the cogito through time in the
sense of being temporally extended. If the cogito is temporally extended, then this is
nothing other than saying that there is a pre-objective unity of consciousness. A preobjective unity of consciousness is a kind of unity that is not fully determined once and
for all because such a unity remains open to both the dimension of the past and of the
future to come. As Merleau-Ponty writes, the cogito is “a single experience that is
inseparable from itself, a single ‘cohesion of life,’41 a single temporality that unfolds
itself [s’explicite] from its birth and confirms this birth in each present” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 430/469). In essence, the cogito that is expressed and remains at work in this
expressed Cogito involves temporality or “a never completed synthesis that, although
never completed, is nevertheless self-affirming” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 402/442).
If the cogito is temporally extended, this would mean that the cogito never
coincides with itself. The cogito or the “I think” can never coincide with itself because it
Merleau-Ponty cites that “living cohesion” comes from Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit
(Heidegger 1977, 124-5).
41
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presupposes what Merleau-Ponty calls a “pre-history” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 250/287).
By “pre-history,” I take Merleau-Ponty to mean a past that the cogito perpetually relies
on. In other words, the temporal openness of the cogito makes it impossible for the cogito
to ever coincide with itself at any given moment. Perhaps, only in death can there be a
once and for all self-coincidence of the cogito (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 74/100). If the
cogito never coincides with itself, this would then mean that for Merleau-Ponty there can
be no pre-given adequation of the “I think” with the “I am” in the Cartesian sense. For
Descartes, this adequation entails certainty or indubitability or what is true.42 By contrast,
for Merleau-Ponty, the temporal extension of the cogito opens the possibility for truth
where truth would be something that is to be perpetually achieved. It is a possibility and
not an established certainty because for Merleau-Ponty, perceptual faith in the world’s
existence and not knowledge is at the basis of the temporal extension of cogito. If
Descartes’ cogito is a-temporal, then Kant in the “Refutation of Idealism” can be read as
temporalizing Descartes’ cogito or reinterpreting it through time, and Merleau-Ponty can
be read as following Kant’s insight by temporalizing Descartes’ cogito in a manner where
subjectivity becomes temporality itself. Once we turn to the temporality section, this will
make more sense. But for now, it can be said that for Merleau-Ponty to be conscious is to
be nothing other than the very process of temporalization. As we will see, the process of
temporalization is a process where the living present perpetually and simultaneously goes
beyond itself in the direction of the past and the future.
Freedom. The third chapter of Part III of the Phenomenology of Perception,
“Being-for-itself and Being-in-the-world,” is entitled “Freedom.” The overall theme of
this chapter on freedom is action. In this chapter, Merleau-Ponty wants to account for the
42

This claim only applies to the Second Meditation and not the Sixth Meditation.
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central role of freedom in our active transcendence towards the world and especially
others. Merleau-Ponty’s account of freedom can be read as a direct response to Jean-Paul
Sartre’s account of freedom as it is presented in Being and Nothingness.43 Given that in
the present section my concern is neither with Sartre’s analysis of freedom nor with the
accuracy of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Sartre, I will not discuss such matters. Such a
discussion will take us too far field from our present concern. Instead I will briefly focus
on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of freedom itself.
For Merleau-Ponty, freedom is not a “ready-made freedom” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 463/502). Instead, it is to be made [à faire]. A ready-made freedom is one where
the world is itself taken as ready-made or as completely determined once and for all by a
consciousness.44 A freedom to be made [à faire] or situated freedom is one where
meaning is understood as both constituted or “centrifugal” and instituted or “centripetal”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 464/502; italics not original). This is nothing other than saying that
I find myself implicated in a dialectical or circular exchange with the world: meaning is
not only constituted or bestowed by me on the world (i.e. centrifugal) but it also comes
from the world to me in the form of institutions (i.e. centripetal). So when we are acting

It is not a coincidence that like Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception ends with a discussion on freedom. See Sartre 1956, 559-765. It is
not implausible to say that perhaps even the Phenomenology of Perception as an entire book is in
part a response to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness.
43

It is Merleau-Ponty’s contention that “[c]onsciousness only attributes this power of to
itself only if it passes over in silence the event that establishes its infrastructure and that is its
birth” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 480/517). This event is the birth of consciousness as being thrown
into the world and within a particular historical context. Merleau-Ponty argues that being born is
a “transcendental event” [événement transcendantal] or the conditio sine qua non of the existence
of a particular consciousness, which includes its freedom (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 430/469). For
Merleau-Ponty, the cogito is set the task to retrieve this transcendental event.
44
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in the world, we constitute or make sense of the world only by taking up instituted
meanings or historical meanings already in the world.45
Let me illustrate this point with an example. The first example is of the
unclimbable rock, which Merleau-Ponty takes from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness.46
According to Merleau-Ponty, for Sartre, I make sense of the world through my choosing
(i.e. centrifugal). In other words, there is no meaning in the world itself. A rock appears
as unclimbable or as an obstacle to me because I am seeking to climb it. What MerleauPonty wants to show is that the unclimbable rock as an obstacle to my freedom is not just
for me but is also for any other. In order to interpret this example in this way, MerleauPonty makes a distinction between “express intentions” and “general intentions”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 465/503). Express intentions are my particular orientation or
directedness to tasks with which I am occupied, say, climbing this rock. General
intentions are my operative orientation or directedness to the entire nexus of relations in
which my particular task of climbing the rock appears, which implicate not just me but all
others in a general way.47 The rock, according to Merleau-Ponty, appears as unclimbable
not because the individual constitutes or makes sense of the world in that way. Instead,
the rock is unclimbable because there is a world already that is instituted or meaningful in
Cf. According to Merleau-Ponty, “[m]y life must have a sense [sens] that I do not
constitute; there must be, literally, an intersubjectivity” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 474/512). That is,
there must be a meaning/direction [sens] of my life which emerges from our bonds or “coexistence” and in such a co-existence that our freedom is realized (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
472/510).
45

Sartre’s example of the unclimbable rock appears in Being and Nothingness (Sartre
1956, 627-9; cf. 655-7).
46

“These intentions are general in a double sense, first in the sense that they constitute a
system in which all possible objects are enclosed if the mountain seems large and vertical, then
the tree appears small and diagonal and second in the sense that these intentions do not belong to
me, they come from farther away than myself amd I am not surprised to find them in all psychophysical subjects who have a similar organization to my own” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 465/503).
47
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the way that limits my freedom. For Sartre, as Merleau-Ponty understands him, it is
through one’s individual freedom that meaning of the world in general and the rock as
unclimbable is determined. For Merleau-Ponty, freedom is dependent upon impersonal
meanings that do not come from or are not chosen by the individual. As Merleau-Ponty
says, there is “no freedom without a field” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 464/502). By field,
Merleau-Ponty means a spatio-temporal openness to the world or a “possibility of
situations” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 429/468).48 This means that freedom as a doing only
makes sense within a possibility of situations and such possibilities emerge from our
dialectically meaningful exchange with the world.
In a nutshell, freedom for Merleau-Ponty is a “doing”49 [faire] (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 462-3/501-2) and more accurately, it is a doing that is always situated or within a
particular historical context. 50 Freedom is a “faculty of detachment” [faculté de recul]
but the withdrawal is not to be understood as absolutely or radically changing everything
or a perpetual creation of oneself and the world (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 376/417;
translation slightly modified). It is the faculty that allows human beings to always reject
or surpass their present situation in order to seek a better one.51 Freedom presupposes or

Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty says that “[p]erception gives me a ‘field of
presence’ in the broad sense of that it spreads out according to two dimensions: the dimension of
here—there and the dimension of past—present—future” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 277/315).
48

The French word “faire” means “to make” or “to do.” I am mentioning this because
there is a connection between freedom as “faire” and anything that is “to be made” [à faire] such
as a transcendental consciousness to be made, a world to be made, a truth to be made, etc.
Freedom as faire may also have a connection with what Merleau-Ponty called work in The
Structure of Behavior (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 162).
49

“[O]ur freedom rests upon our being situated, and it is itself a situation” (MerleauPonty 2012, 167/202).
50

Cf. “What defines man is not the capacity to create a second nature—economic, social,
or cultural—beyond biological nature; it is rather the capacity of going beyond [dépasser] created
51
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is based on temporality.52 As Merleau-Ponty clearly writes, freedom “assumes a
preexisting acquisition that it sets out to modify and establishes a new tradition”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 463/502). As situated, my freedom relies on the past while
simultaneously being oriented towards the future (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 463-4/502-3).
“By taking up a present, I again take hold of my past and I transform it, I alter its sense
[sens], I free myself and detach myself from it. But I only do so by committing myself
elsewhere” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 482/519).53 Freedom is a “power of beginning
something else” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 478/516). And “[o]ur commitments sustain our
power [puissance] and there is no freedom without some power [puissance]” (MerleauPonty 2012, 481/519). That is, our freedom is a manner of engaging or committing
oneself in the world to the tasks towards which one orients oneself. Because freedom is
situated and as situated relies on its past, it cannot be an individual project, but
fundamentally an intersubjective project. Freedom relies on and is sustained by our coexistence with others. Our freedom is based upon the meanings already instituted in the
world and such instituted meanings assent to my “universal commitment in the world”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 463/502). According to Merleau-Ponty, the only way one can “fail

structures in order to create others. And this movement is already visible in each of the particular
products of human work [travail humain]” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 175/190).
Earlier in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty said that the “final part”
(i.e. Part III) of the Phenomenology of Perception will be about “the transcendental signification
of time [la signification transcendantale du temps]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 510 n. 60/78 n. 1;
translation slightly modified). This means that the chapters on the cogito, temporality, and
freedom must be interpreted as chapters that are about “the transcendental signification of time.”
52

“The choice that we make of our life always takes place upon the basis of a certain
given. My freedom can turn [détourner] my life away from its spontaneous sens
[meaning/direction], but only through a series of shifts [glissement] by first joining with it, and
not through my absolute creation” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 482/519-20; translation slightly
modified).
53
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to be free” is by refusing to take one’s own present historical situation, whatever that
situation may be (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 483/520).
Temporality. Although references to temporality are scattered throughout the
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty’s detailed account of temporality is
presented in the second chapter of Part III of the Phenomenology of Perception, “Beingfor-itself and Being-in-the-world.” This chapter is titled “Temporality.”54 It must be
mentioned at the outset that Merleau-Ponty’s account of temporality is not always
straightforward. Up to now we have discussed that for Merleau-Ponty consciousness or
subjectivity is never a bare consciousness but is intentional, that is, it is fundamentally
related to the world. More so, this intentionality is both operative and thetic. Thus far, we
have only mentioned in passing that subjectivity is temporality and that temporality is the
transcendental condition par excellence of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental method of
radical reflection. I have not explained what Merleau-Ponty means by temporality. This is
what I intend to do in this subsection.

It is helpful to consult Merleau-Ponty’s analytical table of contents to the
Phenomenology of Perception, which is included in the new translation of English edition
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, lii-lxix/530-7). It shows how Merleau-Ponty understood the structure of
the temporality chapter:
54

“II. Temporality
a. There is no time in things.
b. Nor is time to be found in ‘states of consciousness’.
c. Ideality of time? Time is a relation of being.
d. The ‘field of presence,’ the horizons of past and future.
e. Operative intentionality.
f. Cohesion of time through the very passage of time.
g. Time as subject and subject as time.
h. Constituting time, and eternity.
i. Ultimate consciousness is presence in the world.
j. Temporality [as] self-affection of itself.
k. Passivity and activity.
l. The world as the place of significations.
m. Presence in the world.”
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In “Temporality,” Merleau-Ponty seeks to show that subjectivity is temporality or
a perpetual going beyond oneself in the direction of the past and simultaneously in the
direction of the future. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the goal of this chapter is to “analyze
time” so that we can “gain access to” the “concrete structure [of subjectivity] through
time” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433/472). The general structure of the chapter is that first
Merleau-Ponty criticizes what he takes to be an objective or ready-made notion of time.
In my view, the criticisms motivate Merleau-Ponty to perform the έποχή of the radical
reflection which as already indicated earlier brackets “le préjugé du monde” or the belief
that the world is ready-made [toute faite]. This bracketing includes the bracketing of an
objective conception of time. The έποχή of radical reflection discloses a pre-objective
notion of time that Merleau-Ponty calls temporality and temporality is at the foundation
of radical reflection itself. Temporality is time in its becoming, passage, or transition,
three ways of saying the same thing. To recall, radical reflection is a method for doing
philosophy in time.
In order to arrive at his own position that subjectivity is temporality, I interpret
Merleau-Ponty to be employing a Kantian like antinomy-strategy, which in my view is
also part of the transcendental method of radical reflection.55 That is, with respect to
temporality, I interpret Merleau-Ponty as setting up an antinomy between what he takes
to be two objectivist positions on time:

Gardner characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s method as an “antinomy-strategy” understood
in the sense of Kant’s strategy from the section on the antinomies in the Transcendental Dialectic
of the Critique of Pure Reason (Gardner 2007, 24). See also, Kant 1998, A409/B436 –
A462/B490.
55
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Thesis

Antithesis

Empiricist or real notion of time:

Intellectualist or ideal notion of time:

Time is a series of now points.

Time is synthesized by consciousness.

The solution to the objectivist antinomy will lie in making explicit the pre-objective
ground that both positions dogmatically presuppose. If Merleau-Ponty is successful in
making explicit this pre-objective ground of time, then at least the positions that he has
considered are not tenable positions to describe time phenomenologically and this will
lead him to his own position on time, notably, to a pre-objective notion of time (i.e.
temporality).
Thesis: Empiricist or Real Notion of Time—time is a series of now points. What
Merleau-Ponty calls an empiricist or real notion of time is one that takes time to be a
series of now points (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 435/473-4). According to Merleau-Ponty,
there are at least two ways of understanding time as a series of now points. On the one
hand, there is a position that can be characterized as viewing time as a series of now
points that exist in the things. This is what Merleau-Ponty calls a “common sense” view
of time (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 435/474). On the other hand, there is a position that that
can be characterized as viewing time as a series of now points that exist in the states of
consciousness. This is what Merleau-Ponty calls a psychological view of time or what
time is according to the “psychologists” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 435/474). According to
Merleau-Ponty, both empiricist or real notions of time are untenable for the same reasons,
namely, time as a series of now points—whether in things or in the states of
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consciousness—is inconsistent with either position. I will first explain what MerleauPonty takes to be the common sense view of time and after that I will discuss what
Merleau-Ponty means by a psychological view of time.
Common Sense View of Time—time, as a series of now points, exists in things.
Merleau-Ponty suggests that such a view of time is perhaps best illustrated by what he
takes to be the Heraclitean metaphor of the river (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/472).56
According to Merleau-Ponty, time on such a view would be something that “runs from
the past towards the present and the future” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433/472). In such a
position, time is like a river that flows and there are no “successive events” or events that
stand in a relation of temporal co-existence such as a before [avant] and an after
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433/472). Merleau-Ponty is claiming that if time is viewed as
existing in the things independent of a conscious observer, then citing Heidegger’s Being
and Time, Merleau-Ponty says that time, at best, can only be understood as “‘a succession
of nows’” [“‘une succession de maintenant’”] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 435/474).57 If time
is interpreted as a pure succession of now points, then Merleau-Ponty through a reductio
ad absurdum argument seeks to show that such a position is untenable.
In order to show that time as a series of now points exist in things is absurd,
Merleau-Ponty illustrates his point by relying on the example of the melting of a glacier:

56

I suppose what Merleau-Ponty may have in mind are the following fragments attributed
to Heraclitus: “10.64 (12) Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and again different
waters flow; 10.65 (91) [It is not possible to step twice in the same river] …. It scatters and again
comes together, and approaches and recedes; 10.66 (49a) We step into and we do not step into the
same rivers. We are and we are not” (McKirahan 1994, 122).
Merleau-Ponty claims that he is translating Heidegger’s “Nacheinander der
Jetztpunkte” from Being and Time as “succession of now-points.” However, in his footnote to the
“Temporality” chapter, Donald Landes points out that this actual phrase does not occur in Being
and Time (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 559 n. 5/474 n. 1).
57
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The water that I see rolling by was made ready a few days ago in the mountains,
with the melting of the glacier; it is now in front of me and makes its way towards
the sea into which it will finally discharge itself. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433/472)

Merleau-Ponty argues that a simple event like melting of a glacier cannot be consistently
maintained by a common sense position on time. His first objection is that such a view of
time presupposes a conscious observer that is required for some kind of unification of
time.
If there is no conscious perspective in the description of the melting of the glacier,
then how does one make sense of succession? Merleau-Ponty contends that one cannot
even maintain any kind of succession without implicitly postulating at the very least a
minimal sense of before [avant] (i.e. some form of pastness) and after (i.e. some form of
futureness), something that happened previously and something that happened after it
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473). What else is succession, if not one thing happening after
another or following one another? I cite Merleau-Ponty in extenso:

What I say that the water currently passing by was produced by the glacier two
days ago, I imply a witness fixed to a certain place in the world and I compare his
successive perspectives: over there he witnessed the melting of the snow and he
followed the water along its descent; or perhaps after two days of waiting he sees
from the riverside the pieces of wood float by that he had tossed into the river at
the source. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433/472)

What Merleau-Ponty is suggesting in this passage is that an implicit observer has been
posited or presupposed by a common sense position on time. That is, there is someone
observing and following the melting of the glacier. But where is the inconsistency in
holding that “time runs from the past into the present and the future” and say, positing a
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minimalist notion of an observer who exists in time and “record[s]” the “actual
succession” of the melting of the glacier (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473)?
According to Merleau-Ponty, if one posits even a minimalist notion of observer, it
will undermine the entire position. This is so, according to Merleau-Ponty because once a
“witness” or an “observer” has been introduced, even an observer who simply records the
successive order, this reverses the temporal relationships: time will no longer flow from
the past into the present and the future, but instead time will flow from the future into the
present and will sink into the past (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473). Merleau-Ponty’s
argument is that if a witness or an observer records the successive order, this recording
reverses the temporal relations because recording an event at t1 and then another event at
t2 would entail that t1 happened before t2 (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473). If this is
correct, then Merleau-Ponty believes that event at t1 from the perspective of a witness or
an observer was a futural event at event at t0 and when event at t1 happens, event at t0
becomes past while event at t2 remains futural (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473). Once
event at t2 happens, both events at t0 and t1 become past while event at t3 remains futural
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473).
But Merleau-Ponty goes even further and argues that even if the common sense
view could somehow consistently maintain that a minimalist notion of a subject records
the successive events that occur in time as a series of now points, such a position is still
open to the criticism that the very notion of “now points” is “inconsistent” with a notion
of “succession.” As Merleau-Ponty puts it,

If the objective world is detached from the finite perspectives that open onto it,
and if it is posited in itself, then all that can be found throughout it are ‘nows.’
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Moreover, these nows, not being present to anyone [personne], have no temporal
character and one could not succeed one another. The definition of time, which is
implicit in the comparisons made by common sense and which could be
formulated as a ‘a succession of nows,’ does not merely commit the error of
treating the past and the future as presents; it is in fact inconsistent, since it
destroys the very notion of the ‘now’ and the very notion of succession. (MerleauPonty 2012, 435/473-4)

According to Merleau-Ponty the now points in themselves have no “temporal character”
because they are not “present to anyone” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 435/473). I take it that for
Merleau-Ponty, succession of events is phenomenologically inconceivable if there is no
conscious perspective. If there is nothing in the very notion of now points that
characterize them in terms of either succession or simultaneity, then to say that a now
point succeeds another now point would be to make absurd claim. Merleau-Ponty
believes that the only way a now point can succeed another now point is by introducing a
conscious perspective. But once a conscious perspective is introduced, Merleau-Ponty
argues that now points can no longer be understood in terms of succession but must be
understood in terms of simultaneity. But if the now points are understood in terms of
simultaneity rather than succession, this would collapse all now points into some sort of
an eternal now point. Thus, it would destroy the very notion of a now point. Let me
explain.

According to Merleau-Ponty, if time is understood in terms of now points, then
these now points should be understood in terms of simultaneity rather than succession.
That is, if time is truly a series of now points, then Merleau-Ponty claims that “the future
[l’avenir] and the past” would have to be understood as “a sort of eternal preexistence or
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afterlife,” respectively (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473). If understood in this way and
applied to the melting of the glacier example, it can then be said that the observer records
the event of the melting of the glacier in its order as “the water that will pass by
tomorrow is currently at the source, the water that has just passed by is now a bit further
down into the valley” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473; my italics). The past event (i.e. the
glacier, say event at t1) and the future event (i.e. the melting of the glacier and flowing
into the river, say event at t2) would have no temporal relation of succession between one
another. They would be seen as simultaneous events and such a simultaneity of events
cannot occur without collapsing this order of all now points in some sort of simultaneous
state of an eternal now. This state of an eternal now can neither be understood in terms of
now points nor in terms of succession but instead of one singular point which exists in
terms of a pure simultaneity. Or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, on such a view, the order of
now points will be understood in the following sense: “the future [l’avenir] is not yet, the
past is no longer, the present is strictly speaking merely a limit, the result being that time
collapses” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473). It is in this sense that the notion of now points
is inconsistent with the notion of succession. For this very reason, I interpret MerleauPonty as saying that such a common sense notion of time as a series of now points is led
to an absurdity.
Psychological View of Time—time, as a series of now points, exist in states of
consciousness. What if it is argued that time as a real process happens in consciousness or
that the succession of now points do not exist in things, but rather “in the states of
consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433/474)? Can this move avoid some of the
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previously mentioned objections and problems?58 Merleau-Ponty’s answer to the
previously mentioned question is: “We would gain nothing by transporting the time of
things into ourselves if we repeat ‘in consciousness’ the error of defining time as a
succession of nows” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 434/473). Although Merleau-Ponty is not
clear about this point, I take it what Merleau-Ponty means is that this position is not so
different from the common sense position because the succession of now points remains
except where they occur has changed. In shifting from the world to consciousness while
retaining the succession of now points, this may avoid some problems, but the arguments
that were raised against the consistency between succession and now points remain even
against this position.
Antithesis: Intellectualist or Ideal Notion of Time—time is synthesized by
consciousness. An intellectualist or ideal notion of time as Merleau-Ponty understands it
is “[c]onstitued time” or “the series of possible relations according to the before [avant]
and the after” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 438/477).59 On such a position, consciousness
“constitutes” time in the sense of taking time “as an immanent object of consciousness”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 437/476). Merleau-Ponty does not disagree with the claim that
As a side note, Merleau-Ponty interprets Henri Bergson’s analysis of time as a
psychological one (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 435/474). Given that in the present section my concern
is neither with Bergson’s analysis of time nor with the accuracy of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of
Bergson, I will not discuss such matters. Such a discussion will take us too far field from our
present concern, which is to understand what Merleau-Ponty means by temporality. Instead I will
focus on Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of such a position only to understand what such criticisms say
about Merleau-Ponty’s own position.
58

I believe that constituted time refers to Kant’s notion of time as inner sense or the a
priori form of intuition from the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998, A30-A37/B46-B53). This
can be substantiated by the very opening lines of the “Temporality” chapter. Merleau-Ponty
writes, “If we have, in the preceding pages, already encountered time along the road that led us to
subjectivity, this is primarily because all of our experiences – insofar as they are our own – are
arranged according to the before [l’avant] and the after, because temporality, in the Kantian
language, is the form of inner sense, and because temporality is the most general characteristics
of ‘psychical facts’” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 432/471).
59
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temporal sequences require a before [avant] and an after, instead Merleau-Ponty argues
that the before [avant] and the after are “the final registering of time” or “the result of
time’s passage” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 439/478).
I take Merleau-Ponty’s argument to be that consciousness constitutes time by
synthesizing all of its dimensions—past, present, and future—and in doing so, two
problems emerge: on the one hand, the consciousness that synthesizes these dimensions
remains outside or unaffected by the synthesized temporal dimensions and on the other
hand, the synthesis of time is completed once and for all (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 438/477).
That is, time becomes “completely deployed” where this a-temporal consciousness can
move freely from the past, present, and the future as if these three dimensions exist as
sign posts that consciousness can survey (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 437/476).
The solution to the antinomy between an empiricist or real notion of time and an
intellectualist or ideal notion of time is that both positions dogmatically presuppose a preobjective ground, which is the very “passage or transition in itself” of time or time in its
very becoming (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 439/478). On an empiricist or real view, according
to Merleau-Ponty, time is fundamentally understood as a series of now points, whether in
the things or in the states of consciousness. On such a view, the very passage or transition
of time, at best, is posited as something that a subject records or at worst, becomes
impossible or inconsistent with a notion of time as a succession of now points. On an
intellectualist or ideal view, according to Merleau-Ponty, time is fundamentally
understood as constituted or synthesized by consciousness. On such a view, the very
passage or transition of time is, at best, presupposed in the relations of before and after
and at worst, overlooked for the result of the passage, namely, the before/after relations.
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In order to return to the pre-objective ground—the passage or transition of time itself—I
maintain that Merleau-Ponty brackets any objective conception of time (i.e. both sides of
the antinomy) via the έποχή of the radical reflection.
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of time mainly relies on Husserl’s 1893-1917 lectures
on internal time-consciousness.60 An alternative to both the empiricist/real and the
intellectualist/ideal notions of time, Merleau-Ponty puts forth a phenomenological
experience of time or as one lives time. Merleau-Ponty’s main argument is that the
phenomenological experience of time discloses that time requires a synthesis. In this
regard, Merleau-Ponty is in agreement with what he takes to be the intellectualist or ideal
position on time. However, Merleau-Ponty argues that this synthesis belongs to time
itself and is not performed by a consciousness, whether empirical or transcendental. More
so, this synthesis is never completed, it must necessarily remain incomplete. Time is a
synthesis that separates and brings together the past, present, and future. Merleau-Ponty
then claims that time in its very synthetic movement is nothing other than subjectivity or
consciousness itself.61 For Merleau-Ponty, to be conscious or a subject is to be a process
of self-affection, where one is the very openness to both the future and the past.
Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argues that temporality must be understood
through what Husserl called “retentions” and “protentions” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
439/478). According to Husserl, “[r]etention constitutes the living horizon of the now; in
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Husserl later revised his notion of immanent temporalization in the manuscripts now
known as the Bernau manscripts (Husserl 2001). To a very limited extent, it can be argued that
Merleau-Ponty also relies on Heidegger’s account of temporality as it is presented in Being and
Time (Heidegger 1962).
61

Merleau-Ponty makes no distinction between a subject and a consciousness.
Throughout the Phenomenology of Perception in general and the “Temporality” chapter in
particular, he uses them interchangeably.
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it I have a consciousness of the ‘just past’” (Husserl 2003, 45). Retention is part of the
living present or the field of presence that accounts for that which has elapsed, notably,
the dimension of the past.62 By contrast, a “protention,” according to Husserl, is part of
the living present or the field of presence that accounts for that which is to come, notably,
the dimension of the future (Husserl 2003, 54). According to Merleau-Ponty, the living
present is not a now point but the perpetual passage which has a two-fold openness: an
openness to the dimension of the past and an openness to the dimension of the future. In
explaining this tripartite temporal structure, Husserl’s favorite example is that of the
melody (Husserl 2003, 45).63 When one hears a melody, one never simply hears
disjointed notes, there is always already a continuity and harmony to the very unfolding
of the notes. The first note that is heard (i.e. A) becomes retained when one hears the next
note (i.e. B) and when one hears the third note (i.e. C) both notes A and B are retained.
So from the point of view of A, both B and C are protentions. From the point of view of
B, A is retained (i.e. A') and C is protended or is to come. From the point of view of C,
both A and B are retained as (A'' and B').64
I interpret this aforementioned structure as not only the structure of the melody
but of temporality in general and anything understood in a temporal manner. This can be

62

Husserl actually describes the phenomenological experience of time in a tripartite
manner: the primal impression [Urimpression], retention, and protention. The “primal
impression” is never simply a now-point or instant (Husserl 2003, 30). It is the living present.
Merleau-Ponty prefers Husserl’s term “field of presence” [Präsenzfeld] over “primal impression”
[Urimpression].
Merleau-Ponty mentions in passing Husserl’s example of the melody (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 430/469).
63

For an illustration of this description, see what Merleau-Ponty takes as Husserl’s
diagram of the phenomenological experience of time (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 440/479). See also
Husserl’s diagrams (Husserl 2003, 29, 98, 238, 376).
64
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substantiated by the fact that Merleau-Ponty does not employ Husserl’s example of the
melody but takes the structure that I have thus far explained to be the essential
phenomenon of the experience of temporality as such. Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty
argues that A, A', A", B, B', B", and C are all linked to one another through a “synthesis
of transition” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 443/482). Two things must be noted here. This
synthesis is not performed by a subject or a consciousness, but rather this synthesis
belongs to time itself. That is, the synthesis of transition is “time’s ‘synthesis’” (MerleauPonty 2012, 447/486). Since this synthesis belongs to time, no external synthesis would
be required to synthesize time (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 444/483). Secondly, this synthesis is
not only incomplete, but must necessarily remain incomplete otherwise time will be
destroyed (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 438/477). As Merleau-Ponty clearly states, “But it is
equally true that this synthesis must always be started over, and to assume that
somewhere time has been completed amounts to negating time” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
438/477).
Phenomenologically speaking, time is already a consciousness of time (MerleauPonty 2012, 444-5/483-4). “Time presupposes a view upon time” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
433/472). In saying this, Merleau-Ponty is not claiming that time is an object for a
conscious being. If by object we mean something that we can observe in every facet at
any given moment, then time can never become an object of consciousness in this
particular sense (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 75-8/101-104). In fact, Merleau-Ponty makes a
more radical claim: time is subjectivity or consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,

We are not saying that time exists for someone: this would be again to lay it out
and to immobilize it. We are saying, rather, that time is someone or, in other
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words, that the temporal dimensions – insofar as they perpetually fit together –
affirm each other, never do more than make explicit what was implied in each
one, and each express a single rupture or a single thrust that is subjectivity itself.
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 445/484)

But in saying that temporality is subjectivity or consciousness, I take it that MerleauPonty is not saying that subjectivity as temporality is equivalent to temporality as
consciously perceived. Instead, Merleau-Ponty is making two distinct claims. On the one
hand, Merleau-Ponty maintains that subjectivity is temporality. This is a metaphysical
claim. It is a claim about the nature of consciousness itself. On the other hand, MerleauPonty says that we can become aware of ourselves as temporality through conscious
reflection as long as temporality is not made an object of thought in the previously
mentioned sense. This is an epistemological claim. It is a claim about how we know
ourselves as temporality. According to Merleau-Ponty, we can become aware of time in a
pre-objective manner if we understand subjectivity or consciousness as nothing other
than the very movement of time or a synthesis in transition (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
448/487). The latter conditions the former. Subjectivity or consciousness is a perpetual
going beyond oneself in the direction of the past and simultaneously in the direction of
the future. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “subjectivity, at the level of perception, is nothing
other than temporality, and this is what allows us to leave to the subject of perception his
opacity and historicity” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 248/286; italics not original). That is, our
experience of time or ourselves is always that of an experience of the living present and
“the living present is torn between a past that it takes up and a future that it projects”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 348/390). The living present is nothing other than a transcendence
or a going beyond itself in two opposite directions and at the same time: past and future
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(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 173/208). However, this transcendence is not a passive
transcendence, that is it is not something that simply happens to us, but what it means to
be a subjectivity or consciousness is to be an “active transcendence” or a perpetual taking
up of the past and carrying it forward into the future (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 457/496).
Overall, for Merleau-Ponty, the three temporal dimensions—past, present, and
future—are understood in the following sense: the past is “a previous future [un ancien
avenir] and a recent present [un présent récent],” the present is “an impending past [un
passé prochain] and a recent future [un avenir récent],” and the future is a “present [un
présent] and even a past to come [un passé à venir]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 445/484). The
three dimensions of time are not separate from one another, instead they are interrelated
via their inter-definitions or definitions of one dimension only through the other two.
Although the dimensions are neither reducible to nor deducible from one another,
Merleau-Ponty does maintain that the living present has a “privileged status” mainly
because it is our openness to the past and the future (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 447/486).
If we are going to illustrate time through an image or a metaphor, then MerleauPonty prefers the image of a fountain. As Merleau-Ponty writes,

We say that there is time as we say that there is a fountain: the water changes
while the fountain remains because its form is preserved; the form is preserved
because each successive burst takes up the functions of the previous ones. Each
burst of water goes from being the thrusting one in relation to the one it pushes
forward, and becomes in turn the one pushed in relation to another; and even this
comes, in short, from the fact that from the source right through to the fountain’s
jet the bursts of water are not isolated: there is one single thrust, and a single gap
in the flow would suffice to break up the jet. (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 445/484)
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He likes the image of a fountain because such an image illustrates the totality or unified
wholeness of time itself in its very continuation. That is to say, what Merleau-Ponty is
illustrating with such an image is that temporal distinctions such as past, present, and
future can be made without threatening the unity and continuity of time. In saying that
subjectivity or consciousness is temporality, Merleau-Ponty, following Husserl, claims
that there cannot be a second, a-temporal consciousness behind consciousness (MerleauPonty 2012, 446/484-5; cf. 448/487).65 If there is an a-temporal consciousness that stands
behind consciousness, Merleau-Ponty believes that this would lead to an infinite regress
of consciousnesses (i.e. a consciousness behind another consciousness and this relation
would repeat ad infinitum). This is substantiated by the following passage where
Merleau-Ponty writes, “if the consciousness of time was built from successive states of
consciousness, then a new consciousness would be necessary for the awareness of this
succession, and so on” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 446/484-5; italics not original). MerleauPonty argues that the only way to avoid an infinite regress of consciousnesses is to posit a
consciousness that is temporality behind which there is no a-temporal consciousness
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 448/487).66 According to Merleau-Ponty, an a-temporal
consciousness “would have nothing in common with our experience” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 448/487). If experience is temporally structured, then the only consciousness that is
required to account for experience would be one that is temporality itself. Lastly, it can
Cf. “The impression (in the narrower sense, in opposition to re-presentation) must be
taken as primary consciousness that has no further consciousness behind it in which it would be
intended” (Husserl 2003, 94). Merleau-Ponty translates the latter part of the passage as: “a
consciousness that would no longer have behind it any consciousness in order to be conscious of
itself” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 446).
65

66

In eliminating an a-temporal consciousness behind consciousness, it can be argued that
Merleau-Ponty is using what is known as Ockham’s razor. Ockham’s razor is “that entities should
not be multiplied beyond necessity” (Baggini and Fosl 2010, 209).
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be said that for Merleau-Ponty the intimate relationship between subjectivity and time is
one where time is understood as “‘self-affection of itself’” [“‘affection de soi par soi’”]
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 449/488):

time, as a thrust and a passage toward a future, is the one who affects; time as a
spread-out series of presents, is the one affected; the affecting and the affected are
identical because the thrust of time is nothing other than the transition from one
present to another. Subjectivity is precisely this ek-stase. (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
449-50/488-9)

That is, temporality is time affecting itself in its very movement and this self-affection is
what it means to be existing. This is what time is pre-objectively and what the
phenomenological experience of it discloses.

§ 4. Conclusion: What is a Body?

In Chapter 1, I explained why Merleau-Ponty in The Structure of Behavior ends
with the proposal for a new transcendental philosophy. I claimed that in describing the
relations between consciousness and nature via the organism (à la Goldstein), MerleauPonty was led to what he called the problem of perception or how consciousness can
integrate its own historical emergence. In Chapter 2, I argue that Merleau-Ponty in the
Phenomenology of Perception proposes a new method by which such a historical
emergence can be integrated. This method is radical reflection. Although the cogito,
temporality, and freedom are the three key elements in understanding radical reflection, I
argue that for Merleau-Ponty temporality is the key element of this method because it is
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the transcendental condition par excellence for the experience of everything that exists.
In other words, temporality is at the basis of radical reflection itself. If subjectivity or
consciousness is temporality and radical reflection is something that a subject does, then
it follows that radical reflection must be understood via temporality. More so, anything
that is described through radical reflection must be understood through temporality.
In radical reflection lies a response to the problem of perception. In the language
of The Structure of Behavior, radical reflection makes explicit that all three, dialectical
orders of signification—matter, life, and mind—can remain interdependent without
however being reduced to one another if the relation between them is understood as a
temporal relation. In this way, intellectual consciousness can remain dependent upon
while simultaneously autonomous from perceptual consciousness because they both are
related to one another via temporality. To put it differently, perceptual consciousness or
the vital order of signification in the Phenomenology of Perception is understood through
the unreflective in reflection or intellectual consciousness and the dimension of the
present are understood through the dimension of the past. And as we will see, for
Merleau-Ponty, past and present do not exist as separate dimensions, but exist in a
relation with one another and fundamentally open to the future. In the next and final
chapter, I return to discuss the question of embodiment in Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception. In particular, I seek to answer the following question:
given all the interpretive details presented heretofore, what light do they shed on
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as it is presented in the Phenomenology of
Perception?
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Chapter Three

A “Body”—A Transcendental Interpretation

§ 1. Synopsis

In Chapter 1, I argued that in describing the relations between consciousness and
nature, Merleau-Ponty takes the organism (as understood in the Goldsteinein sense) as his
point of departure. In making use of such a notion, I contend that Merleau-Ponty was led
to what he called the Hegelian “problem of perception” or the problem of knowing how
consciousness can integrate its own historical emergence. Merleau-Ponty was led to this
problem because according to Merleau-Ponty Goldstein took for granted the historical
emergence of the organism. I take it that for Merleau-Ponty, Goldstein was too Kantian
or not Hegelian enough. I ended Chapter 1 with the claim that it is the Hegelian “problem
of perception” that leads Merleau-Ponty to call for a rethinking of transcendental
philosophy.
Presupposing a continuity between The Structure of Behavior and the
Phenomenology of Perception, in Chapter 2, I argued that Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception is fundamentally about a new transcendental method,
notably, what Merleau-Ponty calls “radical reflection.” I claim that it is with this new
transcendental method that Merleau-Ponty seeks to solve the Hegelian “problem of
perception.” This method solves the problem of perception by revealing temporality as
the transcendental condition par excellence. The relations between perceptual
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consciousness and intellectual consciousness from The Structure of Behavior are
reinterpreted and redescribed in the Phenomenology of Perception as temporal relations.
In short, temporality is what makes possible the autonomy of and interdependence
between both consciousnesses. In the present chapter, I interpret Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of the body within the transcendental framework that is offered in Chapters 1 and 2. I
seek to show that for Merleau-Ponty the body is neither a thing nor an idea, but it is
fundamentally a structure and more precisely, a transcendental structure.

§ 2. Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of the Body: The Term “Body” is Used as a Paleonym

In his book, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature, Ted Toadvine argues that
“Merleau-Ponty’s aim in this text [i.e. the Phenomenology of Perception] is not the
formulation of a philosophy of embodiment per se” (Toadvine 2009, 50).1 I agree with
Toadvine’s claim for three reasons. First, I read the Phenomenology of Perception as
continuous with the project of The Structure of Behavior, namely, that Merleau-Ponty in
the Phenomenology of Perception has not given up the goal of The Structure of Behavior:
to describe the relations of consciousness and nature.2 Secondly, I read the
Phenomenology of Perception as an attempt to solve the Hegelian problem of perception
with which The Structure of Behavior ends. Last, but not least, and this point follows

1

Instead, Toadvine claims that the “analysis of the body is propaedeutic to the real heart
of his [i.e. Merleau-Ponty’s] project: the revindication of the perceived world in its ontological
primacy” (Toadvine 2009, 50).
2

Cf. “In the very first lines of The Structure of Behavior he had written, ‘our goal is to
understand the relations of consciousness and nature’ [Merleau-Ponty 1963, 3]. This is the
program which the Phenomenology of Perception attempts to carry through and which, moreover,
constitutes the constant theme of all his work” (Madison 1981, 150; italics not original).
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from the second one: following Bryan A. Smyth, I maintain that the Phenomenology of
Perception is fundamentally about a search for a new method (Smyth 2010b, 153; cf.
Merleau-Ponty 2007a, 118).3
This is not to say that the body has no place in the Phenomenology of Perception.
Instead, I am claiming that the Phenomenology of Perception is not a phenomenology of
the body per se. It is book on methodology and what it means to do phenomenology in
time. It is my contention that any discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body must
be understood against the backdrop of the Hegelian problem of perception from The
Structure of Behavior and within the methodological framework of the Phenomenology
of Perception (i.e. radical reflection).
Although Merleau-Ponty discusses the body in “Part One,” which is titled “The
Body,” the references to the body are scattered throughout the Phenomenology of
Perception. In “Part One” of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty criticizes
what he takes to be the objective or ready-made notion of the body. It is my contention
that the limitations that Merleau-Ponty finds in an objective conception of the body
motivate Merleau-Ponty to perform the έποχή of the radical reflection. As already
indicated in Chapter 2, the έποχή of the radical reflection brackets “le préjugé du monde”
or the belief that the world is ready-made [toute faite]. This bracketing includes the
bracketing of an objective conception of the body. The έποχή of radical reflection thus

3

I will recite a footnote from Chapter 2, which is an important one. I became aware of
the importance of method in the Phenomenology of Perception in the Merleau-Ponty reading
group that Bryan A. Smyth coordinated and also in personal conversations with him. I am
extremely thankful to him. However, with respect to a methodological reading of the
Phenomenology of Perception, any mistakes in my project are mine and not Dr. Smyth’s. For
more on details on Merleau-Ponty’s method, see Smyth 2010b, 162. Smyth in this article calls
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology “an exemplary kind of transcendental practice” (Smyth 2010b,
153).
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discloses a pre-objective notion of the body. This will make more sense once we turn to
the descriptions of synthesis and the phenomenon of the phantom limb.
Let me begin with a caveat. There are some textual and perhaps even hermeneutic
difficulties that I find in discussing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as it is presented
in the Phenomenology of Perception. Throughout the entire book, Merleau-Ponty
employs many distinctions concerning the body: 1) the “habitual body” [le corps
habituel]4 as opposed to the “actual body” [le corps actuel]5, 2) the “phenomenal body”
[le corps phénoménal]6 as opposed to the “objective body” [le corps objectif],7 3) the
“virtual body” [le corps virtuel]8 as opposed to the “real body” [le corps réel],9 4) the
“present body” [le corps présent],10 5) the “knowing body” [corps connaissant],11 6) the
“living body” [le corps vivant],12 7) the “active body” [le corps en face],13 8) the “passive

4

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111, 89/117, 93/120, 105-106/133-134, 110/138, 153154/188-190, 341/383.
5

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111.

6

For instance, see Merleau-Ponty 2012, 108/135-136, 517 n. 20/136 n. 1, 217/254, 537 n.
51/274-275 n. 8, 241/279.
7

For instance, see Merleau-Ponty 2012, 108/135-136, 517 n. 20/136 n. 1, 217/254, 537 n.
51/274-275 n. 8, 241/279.
8

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 164/199.

9

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 78/104, 107/134, 260/297.

10

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 88/115.

11

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 295/334, 339/382, 431/470, 548 n. 23/363 n. 2.

12

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 55-56/82-83, 78/104, 90/117, 108/136, 146/180, 316/356,

445/484.
13

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 102/130.
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body” [le corps passif],14 9) the “constituted body” [le corps constitué],15 10) “one’s own
body” [le corps propre],16 11) the “human body” [le corps humain],17 12) the “perceiving
body” [le corps percevant],18 and 13) the “perceived body” [le corps perçu]19. Are these
different types or kinds of bodies? Or are they for the most part equivalent to one
another?
There is no straightforward answer to these two questions, at least, not with
regard to all the distinctions that Merleau-Ponty makes. At times, Merleau-Ponty does
not explain what he means by these different terms that describe the body—assuming
there is a singular notion of ‘the’ body to which these distinctions refer. More so,
Merleau-Ponty employs certain distinctions to which he never returns to throughout the
entire book and such distinctions I believe are crucial to an understanding of his notion of
a body (e.g. the distinction between the habitual body and the actual body). The issue of
understanding what Merleau-Ponty means by a body is further complicated by the fact
that Merleau-Ponty does not bother to explain the relations between the different
distinctions he makes (e.g. the relation between the phenomenal body/objective body visà-vis the habitual body/actual body). In addition, throughout the Phenomenology of
Perception, Merleau-Ponty employs the three most common phrases: “the body” [le
14

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 191/226, 406/447.

15

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 147/182.

16

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 49-51/74-77, 52/79, 74/100, 92-99/119-126, 100/127,
103/130, 108/135, 123/153, 128/159, 145/179, 149-155/184-190, 191/226, 203-205/239-241,
209/245, 211-213/247-249, 215/252, 242/279, 246/284, 256/293, 260/297, 262/299, 278/316,
295/334, 328/370, 331/373, 341/383, 355/397, 406/446, 452/492 and 522 n. 71/163-164 n. 1.
17

For instance, see Merleau-Ponty 2012, 55/82.

18

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 344/386.

19

See Merleau-Ponty 2012, 367/408, 369/411.
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corps], “a body” [un corps], and “my body” [mon corps].20 From all the previously
mentioned distinctions, it is not always clear which terms from the aforementioned
distinctions these phrases (i.e. “the body,” “a body,” and/or “my body”) refer to when
Merleau-Ponty employs them. However, other frequently used terms besides “the body,”
“a body” and “my body” are the “living body,” the “human body,” and “one’s own
body.”
By mentioning these textual and perhaps even hermeneutic difficulties I am not
claiming that Merleau-Ponty is inconsistent in his use of the term “body” or that he
equivocates on the notion of the body. All I am claiming is that he is not always clear
about the definitions of the terms that he employs in describing the body and the relations
between such terms. I do believe that for the most part, the context of the discussion of
the body in the Phenomenology of Perception does indicate which term of which
distinction is invoked, criticized, and/or endorsed by Merleau-Ponty. This, however, does
not rule out the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s lack of clarity might lead some scholars to
different and even contradictory interpretations of his notion of the body.
It is my contention that in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty uses the
term “body” as a paleonym or a traditional word used in a non-traditional way, with a
new meaning grafted to it. I am not saying that every use of the term “body” in the
Phenomenology of Perception is to be understood as a paleonym, instead I am making a
more nuanced claim. That is, the body as a paleonym applies only to the notion of the
body that Merleau-Ponty is fundamentally interested in and the one that he puts forth in
the Phenomenology of Perception. It is also my contention that Merleau-Ponty puts forth
20

There are too many references to “the body,” “a body,” and “my body” in the entire
book for me to list them here.
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a structural notion of the body or that the body is to be understood as a structure.21 It is
this notion of the body (i.e. the structural notion) that is used as a paleonym and as we
will see, it is this notion of the body that I interpret as transcendental for Merleau-Ponty.
In what follows, I seek to explain this structural notion of the body. If I am successful in
showing this particular transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the
body as a structure, then in the last analysis what I will be suggesting is that any
interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of what it means to be a body (i.e. to be
embodied) cannot and must not be understood in either physicalist or mentalist terms.22
In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty clearly states that my body
is a “stabilized structure” [la structure stabilisée] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 334/376).23 As it
has already been discussed in Chapter 1, in The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty
argues that a form or whole in the Gestalt sense has two parts: structure and meaning
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 206). A structure is neither a thing nor an idea (Merleau-Ponty
1963, 127). It is also something different from signification or meaning [sens] (Merleau-

21

To the best of my knowledge, no one in the English secondary literature has interpreted
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body in structural terms in general and the body as a structure in
the transcendental manner in particular. As early as The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty
said, “[b]y going through behaviorism, however, one gains at least in being able to introduce
consciousness, not as psychological reality or as cause, but as structure” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 5;
italics not original).
22

Cf. “The theory of form is aware of the consequences which a purely structural
conception entails and seeks to expand into a philosophy of form which would be substituted for
the philosophy of substance. It has never pushed this work of philosophical analysis very far. This
is because ‘form’ can be fully understood and all the implications of this notion brought out only
in a philosophy which would be liberated from the realistic postulates which are those of every
psychology. One can only fall back into the materialism or the mentalism [spiritualisme] which
one wanted to surpass as long as one seeks an integral philosophy without abandoning these
postulates” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 132; italics not original). “‘Structure’ is the philosophical truth
of naturalism and realism” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224).
23

Cf. “the organism has a distinct reality which is not substantial but structural”
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 129; italics not original).
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Ponty 1963, 206). Merleau-Ponty defines structure as “[t]he junction [la jonction] of an
idea and an existence which are indiscernible, the contingent arrangement by which
materials begin to have meaning [sens] in our presence, intelligibility in the nascent
sense” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 206-7). To my knowledge, the clearest explanation of
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of structure as it is presented in The Structure of Behavior is
offered by James M. Edie in his essay, “The Meaning and Development of MerleauPonty’s Concept of Structure.” According to Edie, a structure is

more than a simple combination of parts or elements, but rather the new reality
which emerges from the special form in which a number of necessarily
interdependent parts or elements combine in such wise that the whole would not
be what it is if it were composed of different elements, nor would the elements
which constitute a given whole be the same if they were to be found in a different
whole or in isolation. (Edie 1981, 45; italics not original)

As Edie points out, structure is the relational configuration of a whole or a form
understood in the Gestalt sense. What is peculiar and interesting about Edie’s explanation
of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of structure is that he emphasizes, I think quite rightly, that
Merleau-Ponty via the notion of structure accounts for the emergence of a “new reality”
through the particular arrangement of parts or elements. If the body for Merleau-Ponty is
a structure, this would then mean that it is neither a thing nor an idea, but instead it is
altogether a “new reality” that emerges from the particular arrangement of its parts or
elements.
For Merleau-Ponty, the body as a structure that emerges as a “new reality” is a
whole and it is my contention that this whole must be understood through Ehrenfel’s two
criteria that Merleau-Ponty explicitly endorses in The Structure of Behavior (Merleau-
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Ponty 1963, 47).24 To apply Ehrenfel’s first criterion to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the
body as a “new reality,” it can be said that the body is a whole in the sense that—
although inseparable from its parts or elements—it would be reducible neither to any one
of its parts nor to the sum of its parts. To apply Ehrenfel’s second criterion to MerleauPonty’s notion of the body as a “new reality,” it can be said that the body is also a whole
in the following ways: on the one hand, a change in a single part or element will modify
the entire body as a whole as such and on the other hand, if all the parts or elements are
changed but the relations between the parts or elements remain the same, the entire body
as a whole will not change. The phenomenon of the phantom limb is a prime example in
how the body as structure is to be understood.25
There remains, however, a fundamental difference between The Structure of
Behavior and the Phenomenology of Perception. As I have already discussed in Chapter 2
that there is a methodological shift that occurs between The Structure of Behavior and the

24

In his book Implications of Immanence: Toward a New Concept of Life, Leonard
Lawlor explains Ehrenfels’ two criteria in a very clear manner: “a whole is an indecomposable
unity of internal, reciprocal determinations, meaning that if one of the parts change but still
maintain the same relations among themselves, then the whole does not change … In other
words, not being the sum of its parts, the whole is not an aggregate” (Lawlor 2006, 73). Cf. “It is
not a question of risking one hypothesis among others, but of introducing a new category, the
category of ‘form,’ which, having its application in the inorganic as well as the organic domain
… For the ‘forms’ … are defined as total processes whose properties are not the sum of those
which the isolated parts would possess. More precisely, they are defined as total processes which
may be indiscernible from each other while their ‘parts,’ compared to each other, differ in
absolute size; in other words the systems are defined as transposable wholes. We will say that
there is form whenever the properties of a system are modified by every change brought about in
a single one of its parts and, on the contrary, are conserved when they all change while
maintaining the same relationship among themselves” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 47).
25

In “§ 4. A Body as a Synthesis in Transition and the Phenomenon of the Phantom
Limb,” I discuss the phenomenon of the phantom limb vis-à-vis the body as a structure. Another
example that I discuss in the same section is that of an insect substituting its leg when it is
severed. When a leg is severed, a change has occurred in the entire organism and this change
demands that the organism adjusts to the demands made on it by its environment. More so, this
change modifies the entire organism as such.
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Phenomenology of Perception. I have also explained that the upshot of this
methodological shift is that the element of temporality which remained, at best,
presupposed in The Structure of Behavior is taken up explicitly in the Phenomenology of
Perception via the new transcendental method (i.e. radical reflection). If this is correct,
then the notion of structure from The Structure of Behavior must be interpreted in
temporal terms. This then means that if in the Phenomenology of Perception the body is a
structure—a structure understood in the way it was described in The Structure of
Behavior—and if in the Phenomenology of Perception, temporality is revealed as the
transcendental condition par excellence, then it follows that the notion of body as a
structure in the Phenomenology of Perception must itself be understood in temporal
terms. In support of such a claim, I cite what I take to be one of the most important
passages on the body in the entire Phenomenology of Perception. This is a passage from
“Sensing” [Le Sentir], Chapter 1 of Part Two of the Phenomenology of Perception:

[M]y body ties a present, a past, and a future together. It secretes time, or rather it
becomes that place [lieu] in nature where for the first time events, rather than
pushing each other into being, project a double horizon of the past and future
around the present and acquire an historical orientation … My body takes
possession of time and makes a past and a future exist for a present; it is not a
thing, rather than suffering time, my body creates it. (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
249/287; all italics are mine)

In this passage, Merleau-Ponty explicitly describes the body as that which “secretes” or
“creates” time. This passage suggests that the body for Merleau-Ponty is to be understood
as a process of temporalization in the sense of being the “place” or the “site” [lieu] where
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time is generated as pre-objective temporality.26 As I have already discussed in Chapter 2
that in describing the movement of time, Merleau-Ponty employs the image of a
foundation (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 445/484). The body is the fountain from which the past
and the future originate. In view of that, it can be said that what Merleau-Ponty means by
the term “body” is that it is not a “thing” or a physical entity. By this, I take MerleauPonty to mean that the body that he is interested in is not reducible to the status of
physicality. In other words, Merleau-Ponty is not denying that there is no such thing as a
physical body understood in a scientific, objective, or everyday sense. Instead, I take
Merleau-Ponty to mean that it is not the whole story of embodiment or even the most
interesting part insofar as the body as a structure is concerned. If the body is a structure,
then it cannot be reduced to any one of its parts or elements —whether physical or
otherwise.
The body as a structure—or a “new reality” that emerges from the particular
arrangement of its elements—is the site for temporality or the place where time is
generated. Before turning to explain the manner in which the body as a structure
generates time, let me offer a few remarks regarding the experience of one’s body as a
structure.27
Phenomenologically speaking, according to Merleau-Ponty, my experience of my
own individual body as a structure reveals what he calls “the metaphysical structure of
my body” [la structure métaphysique de mon corps]: my experience of my body as a
26

For details concerning temporality, see Chapter 2.

27

In the next section, I argue that for Merleau-Ponty the body as a structure is temporal in
the sense of being a synthesis in transition. After that, I will apply such an analysis to shed light
on how, according to Merleau-Ponty, we should understand the phenomenon of the phantom
limb. As we will see, I interpret Merleau-Ponty as saying that the phenomenon of the phantom
limb is fundamentally a structurally temporal phenomenon.
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structure reveals itself as “at once an object for others and a subject for me” [à la fois
objet pour autrui et sujet pour moi] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 170/205; italics not original on
‘metaphysical’). In “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Mortricity,” Chapter 3 of
Part One—“The Body”—of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty in a
footnote raises the following two questions: “why there are two perspectives upon myself
and my body—my body for myself [mon corps pour moi] and my body for others [mon
corps pour auturi]—and how these two systems can be compossible [sont compossibles]”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 517 n. 20/136 n. 1; translation slightly modified).28 According to
Merleau-Ponty, the answer to the first question is that phenomenologically speaking, in
experience my body simply reveals itself to me in this twofold manner (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 517 n. 20/136 n. 1). Concerning the second question, Merleau-Ponty says that it
would be inadequate to simply say that my body for myself belongs to the “phenomenal
body” or my body as experienced from the first-person perspective and that my body for
others belongs to the “objective body” or my body as experienced from the third-person
perspective (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 517 n. 20/136 n. 1). I take it that it would be
inadequate if these two dimensions of the metaphysical structure of my body imply a
distinction that is at the same time a separation. This can be substantiated by the fact that
in the very same footnote Merleau-Ponty nonetheless says that he is interested in
understanding how these two dimensions “coexist” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 517 n. 20/136
n. 1).

28

Cf. “It is not enough, in effect, to say that the objective body belongs to the ‘for others’
[‘pour auturi’] and that my phenomenal body belongs to the ‘for self’ [‘pour moi’]. Nor can we
refuse to raise the question of their relations, since the ‘for self’ [‘pour moi’] and the ‘for others’
‘for others’ [‘pour auturi’] coexist in the same world, as is attested by my perception of another
person [d’un auturi] who immediately reduces me to the status of an object for him” (MerleauPonty 2012, 517 n. 20/136 n. 1; translation slightly modified).
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Merleau-Ponty is fundamentally concerned about the compossibility or the
coexistence of twofold dimensions of the metaphysical structure of my body: how is it
possible or compossible that the experience of my body as a structure reveals myself to
me in and through these two dimensions “à la fois” or “at once?” It is my contention that
the compossibility or coexistence of these two experiential dimensions can be accounted
for through what Merleau-Ponty calls the “structure of implication” [la structure
d’implication] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 150/185). The structure of implication can be
understood through what in phenomenology is called “Fundierung” or the foundingfounded relation (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 414/454). By “Fundierung,” Merleau-Ponty
means:

The founding term … is primary in the sense that the founded term is presented as
a determination or a making explicit [une explication] of the founding term,
which prevents the founded term from ever fully absorbing the founding term;
and yet the founding term is not primary in the empirical sense and the founded is
not merely derived from it, since it is only through the founded that the founding
appears.29 (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 414/454; cf. 128-9/159-60)

By this double relation of founding and founded, I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that the
founding term and the founded term are implied by one another. Each term is understood
and revealed through each other. By saying that the “founded term is not primary in the
empirical sense,” I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that it is primary in an original or
transcendental sense—as a condition for the very appearance of the founded term. By
saying that “the founded is not merely derived from” the founding term, I take Merleau29

“le terme fondant … est premier en ce sens que le fondé se donne comme une
détermination ou une explication du fondant, ce qui lui interdit de le résorber jamais, été
cependant le fondant n’est pas premier au sens empirique et le fondé n’en est pas simplement
dérivé, puisque c’est à travers le fondé que le fondant se manifeste.”
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Ponty to mean that the founded can be neither deduced from nor reduced to the founding
term mainly because the founding term reveals itself only through the founded term. In
other words, with the phenomenological notion of Fundierung, I take Merleau-Ponty to
be seeking what I call a Distinction without Separation (DwS) between two terms (i.e. the
founding and the founded).
If it is granted that Merleau-Ponty’s structure of implication is to be understood
through the phenomenological notion of Fundierung, it then becomes clear how the
experience of my body as a structure reveals myself to me in and through these two,
compossible dimensions “à la fois” or “at once.” The founding term in the metaphysical
structure of my body would be the body for me or what Merleau-Ponty calls the “subject
for me” [sujet pour moi]. The founded term in the metaphysical structure of my body
would be the body for others or what Merleau-Ponty calls the “object for others” [objet
pour autrui]. They do not exist independently of one another, instead, they are
interdependent. Although both perspectives are neither reducible to nor deducible from
one another, they co-exist with one another in a dialectical or circular process. The
experience of my own body reveals itself to me through the first-person perspective,
which is the founding perspective, but this first-person perspective is not detached or
separated from a third-person perspective, which is the founded perspective.
At any moment in time, the body as a structure is never, at least exclusively, on
the side of the body for others or on the side of a subject for me. That is, since the body is
a structure, it cannot be in either dimension at any given moment. This is so because as a
structure, the body is not reducible to any one of its parts or elements. At the same time,
even if the body as a structure is not reducible to these two dimensions, it would still
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embody in a holistic sense both dimensions “at once” [“à la fois”]. One dimension
implies the other and vice versa.
I claim that for Merleau-Ponty the body as a structure reveals itself in experience
a body—the metaphysical structure of which is fundamentally that of a partes intra
partes or parts inside parts.30 However, this must be qualified. The ‘parts’ (i.e. partes) in
the partes intra partes relation between my body as a subject for me and my body as an
object for others must be understood as parts of a whole in the Gestalt sense that we have
already discussed in Chapter 1 and earlier in the present Chapter. The ‘inside’ (i.e. intra)
in the partes intra partes relation must not be understood as a spatial relation of a
contained to a container or vice versa but as a temporal relation of implication—a part
that temporally encroaches upon or is intertwined with another part. In other words, this
partes intra partes relation between the body as a subject for me and the body as an
object for others would be one where the first-person experience of one’s body would be
temporally distinct and yet, at the same time be temporally inseparable from the thirdperson experience of one’s body for others. For example, a pain that is one conscious of
or experiences from the first-person perspective is fundamentally distinct, but inseparable
from localizing that pain on one’s body where the place of localization would be visible
to a third-person perspective. Say one is experiencing a pain in one’s foot. In explaining
to a doctor where the pain is, one can point to the exact place on one’s foot where it hurts.
The pain felt from inside and the pain localized on the outside of one’s body would be
temporally distinct but inseparable because the experience of the pain is available to
one’s conscious self, but this temporal awareness which is that of a first-person
30

Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior is devoted to a criticism of a notion of the
organism that is understood as “a material mass partes extra partes” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 1).
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awareness is not available from a third-person perspective. More so, the body as a
structure would never simply be one or the other, at any given moment in time. The
manner in which this relation of implication is temporal would make more sense once we
turn to our discussion of the phenomenon of phantom limb. For now, to further
substantiate my claim that the metaphysical structure that is revealed through the
experience of my own body is a partes intra partes relation, I rely on a phrase from the
Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty says that my body as a structure is a
“functional whole” [tout fonctionnel] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 173/208).
According to Merleau-Ponty, the body as a structure is not reducible to a
collection of physical organs (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 173/208). Merleau-Ponty says that
we have learned such a conception of the body through natural science (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 455/495; cf. (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 9, 213-4).31 Merleau-Ponty believes that to
understand the body in this manner is to understand it “abstractly” or exclusively in terms
of its parts (in this case, only physical parts sensu stricto) (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
173/208). By contrast, to understand the body concretely would be to not reduce the body
to its physical organs but to fundamentally take into account the total “living function” of
the body as a structure (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 173/208).32 That is, the physical organs
must be “reintegrated into this functional whole [ce tout fonctionnel] from which they are
31

As Merleau-Ponty writes, “Science accustoms us to considering the body as an
assemblage of parts, and so too does the experience of its breaking apart in death” (MerleauPonty 2012, 455/495). Cf. “science teaches that organs, a brain and—each time that I perceive an
external thing—‘nerve influxes’ in this visible object would be found by means of analyses. I will
never see anything of all that. I could never make an actually present experience [un experience
actuelle] of my body adequately correspond to the signification, ‘human body,’ as it is given to
me by science and witnesses” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 213-4). Cf. “The object of science is defined
by the mutual exteriority of parts and processes” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 9).
32

Cf. “The genesis of the whole by composition of the parts is fictitious” (Merleau-Ponty

1963, 50).
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cut out [découpés]” via their living function (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 173/208). If one does
that, I take Merleau-Ponty to mean that it will become clear that the body as a structure is
not reducible to the status of physicality in general and the physical organs in particular.
In other words, I interpret Merleau-Ponty to be saying that even at the physical
functioning level of the body, there is a partes intra partes relation between my body for
me and my body for others and in this case, a relation of implication where the living
functions of all organs co-exist in a synergic and synaesthetic manner.33 More so, it is
Merleau-Ponty’s contention that even this “functional whole” is made possible because
of the fact that the body as a structure is fundamentally temporal (i.e. the synthesis of the
living functions is itself a matter of temporal implication) (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
241/279).34

§ 3. A Body Generates Time: The Habitual and the Actual Dimensions

According to Merleau-Ponty, the body as a structure generates time and in
Chapter 2, I have already discussed that temporality, for Merleau-Ponty, is nothing other
than a synthesis in transition [la synthèse de transition]. I will not repeat those details
33

To better understand this, see my previously mentioned example of pain from a firstperson perspective and a third-person perspective (125-6).
34

“We withdraw the synthesis from the objective body in order to give it to the
phenomenal body, that is, the body insofar as it projects a certain ‘milieu’ around itself, insofar as
its ‘parts’ know each other dynamically [ses ‘parties’ se connaissent dynamiquement l’un l’autre]
and its receptors are arranged in such a way as to make the perception of the object possible
through synergy” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 241/279; italics not original). Cf. “So the connection
between the segments of our body, or between our visual and our tactile experience, is not
produced gradually and through accumulation. I do not translate the ‘givens of touch’ into ‘the
language of vision,’ nor vice versa; I do not assemble the parts of my body one by one. Rather,
this translation and this assemblage are completed once and for all in me: they are my body itself”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 151/186).
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here. Instead, in the present section, I use the details of that analysis to shed light on how
Merleau-Ponty understands the very nature of the body as a structure that generates time.
As we will see shortly, these details will also become very useful in our description of the
phenomenon of the phantom limb.
If a body as a structure generates time, and time in its pre-objective sense (i.e.
temporality) for Merleau-Ponty is nothing other than a synthesis of transition, it then
follows that the body as a structure that generates time is a synthesis in transition. In “The
Body as An Object and Mechanistic Physiology,” Chapter 1 of Part One of the
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty says that “our body comprises two distinct
layers, that of the habitual body [le corps habituel] and that of the actual body [le corps
actuel]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111). It is my contention that the body as a structure
that generates time in the sense of a synthesis in transition divides the body into these two
dimensions: one habitual and the other actual. By using the word “actuel,” I take it that
Merleau-Ponty does not mean “real” in the sense of not being imaginative, illusory,
fictitious etc. In fact, the French adjective “actuel” means present (as opposed to past or
future), current, at the moment, ongoing, etc. One can translate “le corps actuel” as the
present body, the current body, the body at this moment in time, the ongoing body, etc.
What I am suggesting is that the terms “habitual” and “actual” must be understood as
temporal modalities or dimensions.
Merleau-Ponty says that “my body must be grasped not merely in an
instantaneous, singular and full experience, but moreover under an aspect of generality
and as an impersonal being [un être impersonnel]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 85/111-2). I
interpret Merleau-Ponty to be saying that the first description applies to the actual body
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whereas the second distinction applies to the habitual body. In other words, my habitual
body is an aspect of my general or impersonal body (i.e. the body that has a sedimentary
history) whereas my actual body is a personal or ongoing body. Merleau-Ponty describes
the habitual body as an aspect of “[i]mpersonal time” [le temps impersonnel] and the
actual body as “personal time” [le temps personnel] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 85/112).
Merleau-Ponty explains what he means by impersonal: “this past that remains our true
present does not move away from us; rather in lieu of being displayed before our gaze, it
always hides behind it” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 85/112; italics not original). This means
that the time that is impersonal is one that is never transparently given to us in toto.
Impersonal time is something that “hides” behind the present.
Merleau-Ponty’s description of the two temporal dimensions as distinct “layers”
[couches] is informative here. When something is layered, something is usually on top
and something else is usually on the bottom. The habitual body as an aspect of
impersonal, general, or anonymous time is the temporal layer that runs beneath or
“always hides behind” [se cache toujours derrière] the actual body as personal or
ongoing time. Merleau-Ponty believes that the habitual body as an aspect of impersonal
time is something that is assumed in living or being alive. He writes, “[a] margin of
almost impersonal existence thus appears around our personal existence, which, so to
speak, is taken for granted, and to which I entrust the care of keeping me alive”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 86/113).
In saying that a body as a structure generates time and this generation of time
must be understood through these two dimensions—the habitual and the actual—I can
anticipate an objection to such an interpretation. The objection can go something like
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this: although Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between the habitual body and the
actual body, he does not return to this distinction in the later chapters of the
Phenomenology of Perception, and if such a distinction is indeed important in
understanding Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body, then perhaps Merleau-Ponty would
have provided details regarding it.
In his book, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature, Ted Toadvine suggests that
the habitual body is “an aspect of the (anonymous) ‘natural self’” and the actual body is
“synonymous with the ‘personal self’” (Toadvine 2009, 144 n. 16).35 I agree with
Toadvine because in “Others and the Human World,” Chapter 4 of Part Two of the
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty does equate the “natural self” with the
anonymous or impersonal time.36 I cite Merleau-Ponty: the “natural self” [un moi
naturel] or the “anonymous life is merely the limit of the temporal dispersion that always
threatens the historical present” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 362/404). To the best of my
knowledge, Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception does not use the phrase
“personal self” [un moi personnel]. But I take it that by “personal self” Toadvine means
the individual self rather than the general or anonymous self.
If the habitual body is an aspect of the natural or general self, and the actual body
is equivalent to the personal or individual self, then I would add that the habitual body as

35

I quote the entire passage: “I am suggesting that what Merleau-Ponty terms the ‘habit
body’ (corps habituel) in distinction from the ‘present body’ (corps actuel) names that aspect of
our anonymous selves that has been formed through the sedimentation of personal and cultural
habits. The ‘present body’ is therefore synonymous with the ‘personal self,’ while the ‘habit
body’ is an aspect of the (anonymous) ‘natural self’ (and, according to Merleau-Ponty’s explicit
remarks concerning the interweaving of the natural and the cultural in human beings, ultimately
indistinguishable from it in fact)” (Toadvine 2009, 144-5 n. 16).
36

For references to “natural self,” see Merleau-Ponty 2012, 174/209, 213/249, 362/404,

464/503.

147

an aspect of the general or impersonal self and the actual body as the individual or
personal self can also be understood through what Merleau-Ponty calls “operative
intentionality” and “thetic intentionality,” respectively.37 I have already discussed the
distinction between operative intentionality and thetic intentionalities in Chapter 2. Here I
want to point out only that the operative intentionality is the “condition of possibility” of
thetic intentionality (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 453/492). In other words, operative
intentionality as the entire past with all of its intentional threads is always already at work
in any aboutness or explicit awareness of something. If this is accurate, then the habitual
body is an aspect of the natural or general self, which is itself equivalent to the operative
intentionality and the actual body is equivalent to the personal self, which is itself
equivalent to thetic intentionality.
I can anticipate another objection to my interpretation of a body as a structure
generates time and that this generation of time must be understood through the habitual
body and the actual body. The objection can go something like this: even if it is granted
that this distinction between the habitual and the actual is a distinction of two temporal
modalities, such a distinction only concerns the dimension of the past and the dimension
of the present, respectively, but leaves out the dimension of the future. By relying on the
discussion of temporality as it is presented in Chapter 2, my response to such an objection
would be that for Merleau-Ponty time is not a series of separate dimensions. Both the
habitual and the actual are fundamentally related and open to the future. In fact, the actual
body is not a body in the present in the sense of a now point and the habitual body is not a
body in the past in the sense of a discrete, isolated point or dimension that has no
37

For “operative intentionality,” see Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxxii, 440-441, 453, 472, 560

n. 13.
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connection to the future and/or the present. To recall from Chapter 2, for Merleau-Ponty,
pre-objective time or temporality is a synthesis in transition in the sense where the
present is a perpetual going beyond itself in two different, simultaneous directions: the
past and the future.
The distinction between the three dimensions of time in general and the
habitual/actual temporal modalities or dimensions in particular must be understood
through what I have called a Distinction without Separation (DwS). I say this because,
according to Merleau-Ponty, time temporalizes itself in its very movement and in this
process of temporalization, the three dimensions of time—past, present, and future—
neither coincide with one another nor separate themselves from one another. For
Merleau-Ponty, if any one of its dimension separates itself from the other dimensions, it
would destroy time. This means that the past, present, and future must remain distinct
while simultaneously remain inseparable. In short, if the distinction between the habitual
body and the actual body is indeed a temporal one and given that the dimensions of time
are distinct, yet inseparable from one another, then there must be what I am calling a
Distinction without Separation (DwS) between the habitual body and the actual body.

§ 4. A Body as a Synthesis in Transition and the Phenomenon of the Phantom Limb

Merleau-Ponty illustrates the distinction between the habitual body and the actual
body through the phenomenon of “phantom limb” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 78/104).38
Typically, a phantom limb is the experience of a limb that is no longer there, for instance,
38

For Merleau-Ponty’s remarks/discussion on the phenomenon of the phantom limb, see
Merleau-Ponty 2012,78-89/104-106, 101/128-129, 150/185, 513 n. 19/106 n. 1, 516 n. 10/130 n.
2.
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if someone’s limb has been amputated or if someone is born without a particular limb. It
is Merleau-Ponty’s contention that the phenomenon of phantom limb cannot adequately
be explained in either physiological or psychological terms. According to Merleau-Ponty,
a purely physiological explanation cannot account for the fact that my limb that is no
longer part of my material body is experienced by me as being part of my body (MerleauPonty 2012, 78-9/104-5). Merleau-Ponty believes that a physiological account would
need to rely on some kind of “‘psychical’ determinants,” which would invoke some states
of consciousness not reducible to or explained through physiology (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
79/105).
By contrast, according to Merleau-Ponty, a purely psychological explanation
would not be adequate in itself because it cannot explain “the fact that the phantom limb
disappears when the sensory conductors that run to the brain are severed” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 79/105). I take Merleau-Ponty to be saying that it is not the case that either the
physiological explanation or the psychological explanation is false, instead, I take
Merleau-Ponty to mean that each explanation independent of one another would remain
incomplete. Merleau-Ponty believes that the physiological explanation needs an element
of a psychological explanation and vice versa. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “we must
attempt to understand how the psychical determinants and the physiological conditions
gear into each other” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 79/105). Merleau-Ponty argues that what is
needed is “a common ground” or a ground where the physiological explanation and the
psychological explanation can complement each other (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 79/105).
Merleau-Ponty proceeds in a dialectical manner to show that whatever the common
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ground is, it cannot be a physiological ground nor a psychological ground, but must be a
third kind that is neither reducible to nor deducible to physiology or psychology.
Merleau-Ponty says that at first glance it seems “difficult” to find a neutral ground
which would be neither physiological nor psychological but that which takes both
positions into account without contradiction (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 79/105). This is so
because, according to Merleau-Ponty, the facts on both sides mutually exclude their
respective explanations (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 79/105). Merleau-Ponty explains that the
facts of the physiological order belongs to the order of the “in-itself” [en-soi] or the order
of the cause-and-effect neural processes and that they are “in space” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 79/105). In contradistinction to such facts, Merleau-Ponty argues, the facts of the
psychological order belong to the order of the “for-itself” [pour-soi] or the “cogitations”
(e.g. order of thoughts, emotions, memories etc). The physiological order is a thirdperson order whereas the psychological order is a first-person order. Merleau-Ponty can
think of no theory or explanation that would adequately combine the two seemingly
mutually exclusive positions (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 79/106).
Merleau-Ponty proposes the “idea of an organic thought” [l’idée d’une pensée
organique] to account for the relations between the order of the in-itself and the order of
the for-itself (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 80/106). I take the idea of an “organic thought” to be
one that would not be reducible to the physiological or the psychological but would
something that is to be understood in a holistic sense or as a whole understood in the
Gestalt sense. He offers an example of an insect to explain this holistic idea of the
organic thought (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 80/106).39 Merleau-Ponty says that there is a
39

As a side note, Merleau-Ponty says that he has already explained the idea of an organic
thought in The Structure of Behavior (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 39 ff./47 ff.).
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difference when an insect’s leg is severed and when it is tied (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
80/106). When the leg is severed, the insect substitutes it with the other working leg and
still comports in the world (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 80/106). Merleau-Ponty believes that
this is not because there is a preprogrammed mechanism that allowed the insect this
configurational substitution (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 80/106). Nor does Merleau-Ponty
believe that this occurred because the “animal is conscious of a goal” or a telos (MerleauPonty 2012, 80/106). If the animal was conscious of a telos, Merleau-Ponty contends that
the substitution would have to be re-enacted every single time the insect moved
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 80/106). But Merleau-Ponty says that this is not the case because if
the leg of an insect is tied, it does not substitute the tied leg with the untied leg to fulfill a
task or a goal (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 80/106). Merleau-Ponty goes on to explain that the
insect is in a constant dialogue with the world through its actions. The world offers a
“practical signification” to the insect or creates a meaningful situation by posing a
question to it and eliciting a response from it (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 81/107). Such a
response requires the total being of the insect as an “organism” rather than any one sector
of its being (i.e. either physiological or psychological) (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 81/108). I
take it that Merleau-Ponty’s point is that even at the level of animality, where it might be
thought that there is only a relation of stimuli and response, he believes that the organism
acts with its entire or total being (i.e. an organism that is not reducible to any of one its
elements—whether physiological or psychological).
In returning to the phenomenon of the phantom limb, Merleau-Ponty contends
that the idea of an “organic thought” can be only understood in a pre-objective manner or
when we have bracketed “le préjugé du monde” or the belief of objective thinking that
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world is ready-made or completely determined once and for all (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
82/109). On a physiological explanation, the phantom limb “is the mere suppression or
the mere persistence of interoceptive stimulations” but one that should not be “given” as
a representation since there is no limb that is physically there (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
82/109). On a psychological explanation, the phantom limb is reduced to a “memory” [un
souvenir] but one that is simply “the actual absence of a representation” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 82/109). According to Merleau-Ponty, both of these positions are inadequate
because both positions are holding on to either the presence or the absence of the limb
that is no longer there when in fact Merleau-Ponty seeks to show is that the limb in a
sense is both present and absent (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 82-3/109-10). The experience of
the phantom limb is “equivocal” or “ambivalent” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 83/110). It is
present to the experiencing subject to the extent that s/he is unaware of the fact that the
limb is missing and still attempts to make use of it (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 83/110). It is
absent to the extent that the physical limb is not really there in a very strict sense
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 83/110). As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the experience of the phantom
limb is one where the limb “is sensed as vaguely implicated” in one’s total being
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 83/10). Merleau-Ponty immediately points out that neither the
quasi-presence nor the real absence of the phantom limb in one’s experience is a matter
of choice (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 83/110). It is not as if one refuses in a volitional manner
to not see the material absence of the phantom limb when one reaches out to pick up, say
a piece of chalk with one’s arm. By the same token, it is not as if one refuses in a
volitional manner to not see the psychological presence of the phantom limb when one
feels pain in a leg that one does not have. If Merleau-Ponty is accurate to suggest that
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both the physiological and psychological explanations “distort” the phenomenon of
phantom limb, then the question becomes: how does one understand the phenomenon of
phantom limb (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 83/110)?
According to Merleau-Ponty the simple answer would be that one understands the
phenomenon of phantom limb through the distinction between the habitual body and the
actual body (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111). To be more precise, Merleau-Ponty says that
“[g]estures of manipulation that appear in the first [i.e. the habitual body] have
disappeared in the second [i.e. the actual body]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111). Insofar
as my personal, actual, or individual body is concerned, I take Merleau-Ponty to mean
that in the present moment, I do not in fact have, say, an arm. But, insofar as my habitual
body is concerned, I interpret Merleau-Ponty to mean that the power or the past-capacity
to use the arm still persists in the present or current body.40 As Merleau-Ponty explicitly
says, “the problem of how I can feel endowed with a limb that I no longer have in fact
comes down to knowing how the habitual body can act as a guarantee for the actual
body” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111). How is it that I am open to the possibility of
manipulating objects with a limb that I do not in fact have? Merleau-Ponty claims that
this is because the past-potentiality to manipulate objects through that particular limb
remains or persists as part of one’s entire present-being. Or as Merleau-Ponty puts it,
with the phantom limb, the potentiality to manipulate or the power that “something is
manipulable for me” becomes the power that is “manipulable in itself” (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 84-5/111-2).41

40

Cf. “To have a phantom limb is to remain open to all of the actions of which the arm
alone is capable and to say within the practical field that one had prior to the mutilation”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111).
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Merleau-Ponty claims that the phenomenon of the phantom limb is like the
phenomenon of repression (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 88/115). As Merleau-Ponty sees it,
sometimes a person with a phantom limb is open to the very same possibilities as the
person without a phantom limb because the actual body represses or continues to hold on
to those capacities that are no longer available in the actual body but only exist as part of
the habitual body.42 Merleau-Ponty says, “[i]mpersonal time continues to flow, but
personal time is arrested” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 85). To put it differently, the habitual
body operatively informs the present or actual body that it is open to certain past-powers
when in fact it is not.
If the distinction between the habitual body and the actual body is fundamentally
about two temporal modalities, then the relation between the habitual body and the actual
body vis-à-vis the phenomenon of the phantom limb is fundamentally about the synthesis
in transition between the two temporal dimensions. There is a synthesis that belongs to
temporality and not an epistemological subject that performs it actively (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 438/477; cf. 453/492). It is a synthesis that is perpetually effected (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 438/477). In addition, this synthesis that belongs to temporality in its very
movement is neither fixed nor ever completed (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 396/436) and that
its unity is always “presumptive” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 72/98). It is a synthesis that
constantly makes, remakes, and unmakes itself by and as the very process of

41

Cf. “At the same moment that my usual world gives rise to habitual intentions in me, I
can no longer actually unite with it if I have lost a limb. Manipulable objects, precisely insofar as
they appear as manipulable, appeal to a hand that I no longer have” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
84/111).
42

Cf. “[T]he advent of the impersonal, repression is a universal phenomenon. It clarifies
our condition of being embodied by relating this condition to the temporal structure of being in
the world” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 86/112).
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temporalization because such a movement “produces a new present that retains the past”
while simultaneously transcends this new present towards the future to come (MerleauPonty 2012, 250/288). With this synthesis in transition, the question that we must ask
now is: how the actual body with no limb gets synthesized in relation to and
simultaneously with the habitual body that retains the past-capacities of a body that no
longer is de facto present?
Merleau-Ponty writes, “the specific past, which is our body, can only be
recovered and taken up by an individual life because this life has never transcended it,
because it secretly feeds in its present, as is seen in the disease in which the bodily events
become the events of the day” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 87/114). In my view, the synthesis
is out of sync. It is jammed. Merleau-Ponty believes that every “memory” [mémoire] or
emotion because it retains its intentional connection to one’s entire past being can
operatively “reopen lost time” and motivate one’s present body to act in the manner of a
past body that is no longer a de facto present body (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 88/115).
Conversely, one can say that the experience of the phantom limb is that of a “previous
present” that has never completely become past. “The phantom limb is thus, like a
repressed experience, a previous present [un ancient présent] that cannot commit to
becoming past [à devenir passé]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 88/115). The individual or
personal self no longer gears with the general or impersonal self. The very process of
temporalization lacks the smooth and synchronized implication of the present with the
past and openness to the future, the past as implied in the present and thrown into the
future, and the future as always becoming-past and becoming-present.43 The habitual
43

Cf. the past is “a previous future [un ancien avenir] and a recent present [un présent
récent],” the present is “an impending past [un passé prochain] and a recent future [un avenir
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body and the actual body fail to hold the same temporal wave-length. The protentions are
no longer supported or informed by the retentions, at least not completely.
At this juncture in the Phenomenology of Perception, in his discussion of the
habitual body and the actual body vis-à-vis the phenomenon of phantom limb, MerleauPonty connects the habitual body with the organism. Here we make a full circle to The
Structure of Behavior in general and Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of what Goldstein means
by the organism. If we recall, Merleau-Ponty claimed that Goldstein presupposes the
historical emergence of the organism or does not account for the constitutive history of
the organism. By saying that my organism is “not an inert thing,” but “a pre-personal
adhesion to the general form of the world, as an anonymous and general existence,” I
take Merleau-Ponty to be accounting for the historical becoming of the organism itself
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 86/113). Merleau-Ponty can be read as saying that the habitual
body = the organism. But this needs to be further qualified. Merleau-Ponty also says that
“most of the time personal existence represses the organism without being able to
transcend it or to renounce it, and without being able to reduce the organism to itself or
itself to the organism” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 86/113). That is, since for Merleau-Ponty
the organism is understood in a holistic sense or as a whole in the Gestalt sense, it
follows that the organism cannot be reduced to the habitual body. But what this does
suggest is that habitual body is a crucial aspect in understanding Merleau-Ponty’s
position on the organism as holistic and how it is fundamentally different from that of
what Merleau-Ponty takes to be Goldstein’s position of the organism as holistic.

récent],” and the future is a “present [un présent] and even a past to come [un passé à venir]”
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 445/484).
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§ 5. Conclusion: A Body is neither a Thing nor an Idea but a Structure

In the present chapter, I argue that what Merleau-Ponty means by a body is that it
is neither a thing nor an idea but it is a structure. As a structure, a body generates time.
The experience of one’s own body as a structure reveals itself as a body that is a subject
for me and an object for others. This double openness—an openness to me and an
openness to the others—is one that occurs simultaneously. The manner in which a body
as a structure generates time is that of a synthesis in transition. This generation of time is
the creation of a twofold dimension of the body as habitual and as actual. The habitual is
an aspect of the impersonal, general, or the sedimented, temporal dimension of the body
as a structure. The actual is the personal, individual or the spontaneous taking up of the
sedimented, temporal dimension of the body as a structure.44 Both of these dimensions
are open and thrown to the future to come and never occur in isolation from one another.
Temporally speaking, the sedimentations (i.e. the habitual body) create
expectations and sometimes the sedimentations create expectations that are not always
allowed by the body in its present or on-going situation (i.e. the actual body). The
phenomenon of the phantom limb is a temporary breakdown of the body as a structure
that generates time as a synthesis in transition. More precisely, the phenomenon of the
phantom limb illustrated a sort of a momentary out-of-syncness of the auto-productive
synthesis of the habitual body with the actual body and the actual body with the habitual
body. The phenomenon of the phantom limb reopens time via memory and/or past
emotions and such a re-opening operatively motivates one to relive one’s past. “The
44

Cf. “The structure ‘world,’ with its double moment of sedimentation and spontaneity,
is at the center of consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 132/163; italics not original).
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patient knows [sait] his disability precisely insofar as he is ignorant of it, and he ignores
it precisely insofar as he knows [sait] it” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 84/111). Such is what
Merleau-Ponty calls the “paradox of all being in the world [l’être au monde]” (MerleauPonty 2012, 84/111).
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Conclusion:

What is Merleau-Ponty’s Post-Kantian Transcendental Philosophy?

In his book, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: A Search for the Limits of
Consciousness, Gary Bent Madison writes,

In the very first lines of The Structure of Behavior he [i.e. Merleau-Ponty] had
written, ‘our goal is to understand the relations of consciousness and nature’
[Merleau-Ponty 1963, 3]. This is the program which the Phenomenology of
Perception attempts to carry through and which, moreover, constitutes the
constant theme of all his work. (Madison 1981, 150; italics not original).

It is not implausible to argue with Madison that “[t]he problem of the relations of
consciousness and nature” dominates Merleau-Ponty’s thinking since the Gestaltist
holism of The Structure of Behavior through the methodological phenomenology of the
Phenomenology of Perception and to the ontology of Flesh in his last and posthumously
published text—The Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-Ponty 1963, v; my italics).
However, since Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception says that
“[p]roblems cannot be divided into dominant and subordinate ones, for all problems are
concentric” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 433/472), I would perhaps make the following modest
claim: the problem of the relations of consciousness and nature orients Merleau-Ponty’s
entire thinking. If this problem orients his entire thinking and if it is this problem that
leads Merleau-Ponty to the proposal for thinking transcendental philosophy anew, then it
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can be argued that Merleau-Ponty’s entire philosophy can be interpreted as an attempt to
rethink transcendental philosophy.
The goal of this dissertation has been to interpret Merleau-Ponty’s earlier works
in a transcendental manner. To be more precise, the goal has been to provide the
transcendental framework in which Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body must be
understood. I argued that this framework is to be found in both The Structure of Behavior
and the Phenomenology of Perception.
In Chapter 1, “The ‘Problem of Perception’ in The Structure of Behavior and
A Proposal for Rethinking Transcendental Philosophy,” I argued that in interpreting
Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental philosopher, one must begin with the penultimate
sentence of The Structure of Behavior and ask why Merleau-Ponty ends his first book
with a proposal for rethinking transcendental philosophy (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224). I
found that Merleau-Ponty was led to this proposal mainly because of his point of
departure, that is, the organism in the Goldsteinein sense. I maintained that MerleauPonty found that Goldstein in his descriptions of the organism remains too Kantian or not
Hegelian enough. Goldstein failed to account for the historical becoming, the constitutive
history, or the historical emergence of the organism—three ways of saying the same
thing. This is what Merleau-Ponty calls the Hegelian “problem of perception.” If I am
correct in suggesting this, then Merleau-Ponty is led to a proposal for rethinking
transcendental philosophy because of his problematic point of departure (i.e. the
organism as understood in the Goldsteinein sense), which in turn, leads Merleau-Ponty to
a Hegelian “problem of perception.” This would then mean that for the most part
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental philosophy can be seen as attempt to solve the Hegelian
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problem of perception. I say “for the most part” because the solution to the Hegelian
problem of perception would serve as a prolegomenon for a post-Kantian transcendental
philosophy, and hence, the latter part of the title of the dissertation (i.e. “Towards
Understanding Merleau-Ponty’s Post-Kantian Transcendental Philosophy”).
In Chapter 2, “‘Radical Reflection’: Merleau-Ponty’s Transcendental Method
in the Phenomenology of Perception,” I turned to Merleau-Ponty’s second book, the
Phenomenology of Perception. Throughout the dissertation, I presupposed that The
Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of Perception must be read together
because I see a continuity between the two works. I found that the Phenomenology of
Perception is continuous with The Structure of Behavior because Merleau-Ponty is still
occupied with further understanding the relations between consciousness and nature.
Admittedly, in the Phenomenology of Perception, nature is not discussed in a thematic
manner as it has been in The Structure of Behavior. In the technical terminology of The
Structure of Behavior, the Hegelian “problem of perception” is about the relations
between what Merleau-Ponty calls perceptual consciousness or consciousness at the level
of life and intellectual consciousness or consciousness at the level of thought. The turn to
a thematic discussion of perception in the Phenomenology of Perception is a clear
indication that there is a continuity between the two books. In other words, I interpreted
Merleau-Ponty to be seeking a better understanding of perception in the Phenomenology
of Perception so that he can overcome the difficulty from The Structure of Behavior of
accounting for the autonomy of consciousness at both levels without however reducing
the one to the other.
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Reading the Phenomenology of Perception, I found that, contrary to popular
belief, the Phenomenology of Perception is not a book on the body or embodiment per se.
Merleau-Ponty is not interested in providing a phenomenology of the body. MerleauPonty’s Phenomenology of Perception can perhaps be read in this way only if one ignores
its relation to The Structure of Behavior and the reasons why Merleau-Ponty wrote the
Phenomenology of Perception in the first place. As is well known, The Structure of
Behavior was published in 1942, but it was completed in 1938. In 1938, it seems that
Merleau-Ponty was still not sure about how to solve the Hegelian problem of perception.
In 1938, he hoped that perhaps phenomenology will show him a way to solve the
Hegelian problem of perception, which in turn, would lead him to adequately describe the
relations of consciousness and nature (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 220, 249 n. 56, 249 n. 57).1
In Merleau-Ponty’s 1946 doctoral defense of the Phenomenology of Perception,
he clearly states that the book is fundamentally about a method that will allow him to
adequately account for the “present and living being” (Merleau-Ponty 2007a, 118) or
what he in The Structure of Behavior called “the phenomenon of the real” [le phénomène
du réel] (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 224). For this very reason, I interpreted Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception as a search for a new method that will integrate or account
for “the phenomenon of the real.” I argued that in the Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty calls this method “radical reflection.” I claimed that radical reflection is a
transcendental method or a kind of transcendental reflection because it seeks to
understand the genesis of its own operations. What makes reflection as reflection
possible? It is the unreflected or the unreflective life that reflection presupposes. This
1

Kant’s Critique of Judgment can also be included in this list (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 248

n. 41).
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unreflective life, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, is “an original past, a past that has never been
present” [un passé originel, un passé qui n’a jamais été présent] (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
252/289). Radical reflection is set the task to perpetually uncover this past.
I maintained that in becoming aware of its own genesis, what reflection as
transcendental or radical reflection reveals is not simply the “original past” but
temporality as the transcendental condition par excellence—at least insofar as the
Phenomenology of Perception is concerned. I discussed the way that temporality, for
Merleau-Ponty, must be understood in terms of the interlocking of the past, present, and
future where each dimension is neither reducible to nor deducible from the other
dimensions. Indeed, this account for the most part relies on Husserl’s tripartite temporal
structure—retention, Urimpression, and protention—as it is discussed in his 1893-1917
lectures on internal time-consciousness. Overall, I claimed that for Merleau-Ponty,
temporality is a synthesis in transition where the living present perpetually transcends
itself into two simultaneous directions: the past and the future.
With this transcendental framework that I have developed in Chapters 1 and 2, in
Chapter 3, “A ‘Body’—A Transcendental Interpretation,” I turned to Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of a body as it is presented in the Phenomenology of Perception to offer a
transcendental interpretation of it. I found that any discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion
of the body is complicated by the many distinctions that Merleau-Ponty employs. In
reading the Phenomenology of Perception in conjunction with The Structure of Behavior,
I argued that the notion of the body, for Merleau-Ponty, must be understood as neither a
thing nor an idea, but as a structure. It was my contention that the experience of my body
as a structure reveals what Merleau-Ponty calls the metaphysical structure of my body:
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my body as a subject for me and my body as an object for others. In addition, I claimed
that the body as a structure generates time and in generating time, it generates a twodimensional, temporal body: a body that is both a habitual body (i.e. an aspect of the
impersonal or general body) and an actual body (i.e. a personal or individual body). I
relied on the phenomenon of the phantom limb to describe the interrelations between the
habitual body and the actual body. By the same token, I explained the phenomenon of the
phantom limb as a phenomenon that must be understood in temporal terms.
If it is granted that my interpretation of Merleau-Ponty is accurate, it can then be
said that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body is transcendental in the sense of being a
transcendental structure. It is a structure that generates time or for Merleau-Ponty, the
body as a structure is the very generation of time and if temporality is the transcendental
condition par excellence, then the body must be understood as transcendental in this
particular sense. In saying this, I am not claiming that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental
idealist. If by transcendental idealism we mean an idealism where the historical genesis
that serves as the condition for the phenomena of the world and reflection is neglected,
then Merleau-Ponty is not and has never been a transcendental idealist. In the “Thing and
the Natural World,” Chapter 3 of Part Two of the Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty criticizes Kant for failing to explain the “appearance of appearance”
[l’apparence comme apparence] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 315/355).2 I take it that MerleauPonty, in a very Hegelian manner, means that Kant fails to explain the historical genesis
of appearance or that Kant does not explain phenomenon in a historical manner. If
Merleau-Ponty is correct, then what prevents Merleau-Ponty from becoming a
2

In the chapter titled “Phenomenal Field,” Merleau-Ponty says that it is precisely through
radical reflection that he seeks to uncover the “phenomenon of the phenomenon” [phénomène du
phénomène] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 65/91).
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transcendental idealist in the Kantian sense is the importance of historical genesis in two
senses: 1) the genesis of one’s own individual consciousness (i.e. one’s own historical
becoming, constitutive history, or historical emergence) and 2) the genesis of
intersubjective, human relations (i.e. History proper or human history).3
Is Merleau-Ponty a transcendental idealist in the Husserlian sense? In the
“Preface” to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty concedes that “Husserl’s
transcendental is not Kant’s” and explains that Husserl criticizes Kant’s transcendental
idealism for being “worldly” [mondaine] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxvii/14). By this, I take
Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl to mean that Kant takes the world as completely
determined where Husserl does not. In other words, according to Merleau-Ponty, Kant
does not bracket le préjugé du monde or the belief of objective thinking that the world is
ready-made or completely determined once and for all and Husserl does. So in a manner,
Merleau-Ponty is more sympathetic to Husserl’s transcendental idealism than that of
Kant’s. However, this does not simply mean that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental
idealist in the Husserlian sense. Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl is, to say the least,
ambiguous. It is not entirely clear that Merleau-Ponty simply agrees with Husserl or
distances his position from Husserl. For instance, in “Phenomenal Field,” fourth chapter
of the “Introduction” to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty finds the
notion of a transcendental consciousness problematic, if by such a notion we mean a
consciousness that constitutes or makes sense of the world while remaining independent
of it. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,
3

In Humanism and Terror, Merleau-Ponty described human history in Marxist terms.
According to Merleau-Ponty, history is a “holistic system moving toward a state of equilibrium,
the classless society which cannot be achieved without individual effort and action, but which is
outlined in the present crises as their solution—the power of man over nature and the mutual
reconciliation of men” (Merleau-Ponty 2000a, 130).
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This passage from the created [naturé] to the creating [naturant], or from the
constituted to the constituting, would complete the thematization begun by
psychology and would no longer leave anything implicit or implied in my
knowledge. It would make me take full possession of my experience and would
achieve the adequation between the reflecting and the reflected upon. Such is the
standard perspective of a transcendental philosophy as well as, at least in
appearance, the program of a transcendental phenomenology. (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 61/87)

In the footnote to this passage, Merleau-Ponty writes: “Transcendental phenomenology is
presented in these terms in the majority of Husserl’s texts, including those published
during his later period” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 511 n. 15/87 n. 1).4 Without questioning
the accuracy of Merleau-Ponty’s claim, if it can be argued that the early and perhaps even
the later Husserl’s transcendental idealism or transcendental phenomenology is
fundamentally based on a notion of a transcendental consciousness that simply constitutes
or makes sense of the world without being conditioned by any kind of facticity, then one
can argue that Merleau-Ponty is not a transcendental idealist in the Husserlian sense.
Whether Merleau-Ponty is accurate in his reading of Husserl is not a question that
I want to pursue here. However, one thing is clear: Merleau-Ponty does not want to
endorse a notion of a transcendental consciousness that simply constitutes or makes sense
of the world. Again, I take it that with a notion of a transcendental consciousness that
simply constitutes the world, what worries Merleau-Ponty is again that the historical

4

Cf. Towards the end of the very same chapter, Merleau-Ponty writes, “The center of
philosophy is no longer an autonomous transcendental subjectivity, situated everywhere and
nowhere, but is rather found in the perpetual beginning of reflection at that point when an
individual life begins to reflect upon itself. Reflection is only truly reflection if it does not carry
itself outside of itself, if it knows itself as reflection-upon-an-unreflected, and consequently as a
change in the structure of our existence” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 63/89-90).
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genesis would no longer be a problem (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 64/90).5 If there is a notion
of transcendental consciousness in Merleau-Ponty, it would have to be a transcendental
consciousness to be made [à faire], something that I have explained in depth in Chapter
2.
Even if the issue of the transcendental consciousness can be resolved, MerleauPonty in the Phenomenology of Perception still finds Husserl’s eidetic reduction (i.e. the
reduction that is supposed to lead back to pure essences) fundamentally problematic
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxvii/14; cf. 555 n. 18/434 n. 1). As Merleau-Ponty has famously
said in the “Preface” to the Phenomenology of Perception: “The most important lesson of
the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
lxxvii/14). I take it that the reduction and in particular, the eidetic reduction
fundamentally remains incomplete for Merleau-Ponty because the constitution of the
world via essences require that one must take into account the genesis of sense [sens]
itself. If Husserl can be read as saying that the Sinngebung [the meaning-bestowal] of
transcendental consciousness is fundamentally and perhaps, exclusively centrifugal (i.e.
meaning only goes from transcendental consciousness to the world), then Merleau-Ponty
5

Cf. “As the mediating subject, we are never the unreflective subject whom we seek to
know; but no more can we become entirely conscious, nor reduce ourselves to transcendental
consciousness. If we were consciousness, we would have the world, our history and perceived
objects before us in their singularity as transparent systems of relations” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
64/90). Also, Merleau-Ponty says, “In his late philosophy, Husserl acknowledged that every
reflection must begin by returning to the description of the life-world (Lebenswelt). But he adds
that, through a second ‘reduction,’ the structures of the lived world [le monde vécu] must
themselves be put back into transcendental flow of a universal constitution where all of the
obscurities of the world would be clarified. It is, however, clear that there are two possibilities
here: either the constitution makes the world transparent, and then it would not be clear why
reflection would have to pass through the lived world, or reflection retains something of this lived
world, and this would be because it never strips the world of its opacity. Husserl’s thought moves
more and more in this second direction despite many echoes of the logicist period – it is seen
when he turns rationality into a problem, when he acknowledges that significations that are
ultimately ‘fluid’ (Erfahrung und Urteil 428), and when he grounds knowledge upon an originary
doxa” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 553 n. 14/423 n. 1).
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is not a transcendental idealist in Husserl’s sense. However, according to Merleau-Ponty,
any position that also takes into account the genesis of sense by accounting for the fact
that meaning is also and fundamentally centripetal (i.e. is taken up in the sense of a
tradition or meaning that comes from the world to me), then that position is not a
classical form of transcendental idealism and Merleau-Ponty would be closer to that
position.6 But since Merleau-Ponty relies on Husserl’s notion of Stiftung (or institution)
to account for the centripetality of meaning, it follows that Merleau-Ponty is very close to
Husserl’s position. But again, I will not go into such an issue. All I want to point out here
is that Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl—insofar as the Phenomenology of Perception
is concerned—is fundamentally ambiguous.
So what is Merleau-Ponty’s post-Kantian transcendental philosophy? It is a
philosophy that describes the phenomenon of the real, which is historical genesis in the
twofold sense that I have mentioned earlier. It is a philosophy where the body is a
structure that generates time and in this sense, the body is transcendental. It is a
philosophy in which the organism is a historical being. It is not a transcendental idealism
in the Kantian sense. In my opinion, Merleau-Ponty is closer to Hegel and Husserl than to
Kant (at least the Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason). But in one sense, Merleau-Ponty
is also very close to Kant as well, at least the Kant of the Critique of Judgment in general
and his notion of reflective judgment in particular.
Merleau-Ponty explicitly stated that the Phenomenology of Perception remains a
“preliminary study” in its attempt to define and apply the new method (Merleau-Ponty

6

Cf. “By defining ourselves as the universal power of Sinn-Gebung [giving sense], we
have returned to the method of the ‘that without-which” and to the classical style of reflective
analysis … we must again take up the analysis of the Sinngebung [sense-giving] and show how it
can be at once centrifugal and centripetal” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 463-4/502).
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2007a, 25). In view of that, it can be said that the Phenomenology of Perception is not
Merleau-Ponty’s final word on transcendental philosophy in general and the
transcendental method of radical reflection in particular. I would go so far as to say that
Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent works must be interpreted as further attempts of defining
and applying his transcendental method. This is substantiated by the fact that MerleauPonty says that this method “must then be applied to the relation of man to man in
language, in knowledge, in society and religion, as it was applied in this work
[Phenomenology of Perception] to man’s relation to perceptible reality and with respect
to man’s relation to others on the level of perceptual experience” (Merleau-Ponty 2007a,
25).
I end the dissertation with two questions as suggestions to further extend the
present project. Some scholars claim that the later Merleau-Ponty—the Merleau-Ponty of
The Visible and the Invisible—criticized transcendental philosophy via Heidegger’s
philosophy.7 In a letter that Hannah Arendt wrote to Heidegger on February 2nd, 1972,
she said: “During the last week I relaxed and for the first time I read Merleau-Ponty
whom you know well. Much better and much more interesting than Sartre, I believe,
what do you think?” (Taminiaux 2009, 21). Heidegger wrote back to Arendt, the letter is
dated February 15th, 1972, he said:

Merleau-Ponty was on the way from Husserl to Heidegger (Merleau-Ponty war
auf dem Weg von Husserl zu Heidegger). He died too early, eight days before the
trip he intended to take to Freiburg. But I do not know his works sufficiently well.
7

Matthews, like Barbaras, mentions that the later Merleau-Ponty via Heidegger criticizes
transcendental philosophy (Matthews 2002, 161; Cf. Barbaras 2004, 316). Barbaras and
Matthews differ on a singular point: Barbaras does not read this criticism of transcendental
philosophy as fundamentally a criticism of Husserl (although I suppose one can), but Matthews
does.
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A volume came out posthumously.8 It is difficult for French men to get rid of their
innate Cartesianism (Taminiaux 2009, 21).

Despite Merleau-Ponty’s alleged “innate Cartesianism,” two questions follow: was the
later Merleau-Ponty on the way from Husserl to Heidegger? Does the later MerleauPonty in contradistinction to the early Merleau-Ponty criticize transcendental philosophy
via Heidegger? It remains undecided here and now. But if it can be argued that the later
Merleau-Ponty was on the way from Husserl to Heidegger, then perhaps a case can be
made that the later Merleau-Ponty criticized transcendental philosophy via Heidegger,
assuming that Heidegger is not a transcendental philosopher or that Heidegger’s
philosophy excludes all transcendental philosophies.9

8

Perhaps the posthumously published volume that Heidegger has in mind is The Visible
and the Invisible.
9

There are some scholars that interpret Heidegger as a transcendental philosopher. See
Crowell and Malpas 2007.
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